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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the problem of generating executable code for distributed
embedded systems in which computing nodes communicate using the Controller
Area Network (CAN). CAN is the dominant network in automotive and factory
control systems and is becoming increasingly popular in robotic, medical and
avionics applications. The requirements for functional and temporal reliabil-
ity in these domains are often stringent, and testing alone may not offer the
required level of confidence that systems satisfy their specifications. Conse-
quently, there has been considerable research interest in additional techniques
for reasoning about the behaviour of CAN-based systems. This thesis proposes
a novel approach in which system behaviour is specified in a high-level language
that is syntactically similar to Esterel but which is given a formal semantics by
translation to bCANDLE, an asynchronous process calculus. The work devel-
oped here shows that bCANDLE systems can be translated automatically, via
a common intermediate net representation, not only into executable C code but
also into timed automaton models that can be used in the formal verification
of a wide range of functional and temporal properties. A rigorous argument is
presented that, for any system expressed in the high-level language, its timed
automaton model is a conservative approximation of the executable C code,
given certain well-defined assumptions about system components. It is shown
that an off-the-shelf model-checker (UPPAAL) can be used to verify system
properties with a high-level of confidence that those properties will be exhib-
ited by the executable code. The approach is evaluated by applying it to four
representative case studies. Our results show that, for small to medium-sized
systems, the generated code is sufficiently efficient for execution on typical hard-
ware and the generated timed automaton model is sufficiently small for analysis
within reasonable time and memory constraints.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 Embedded System
An embedded system is a computer system that is part of a larger system to
perform a dedicated function such as monitoring and controlling. We see such
computer systems everywhere around us, for example: cell phones, domestic
appliances, medical systems, traffic control systems, and automotive applica-
tions. Embedded computer systems are becoming more attached to our life,
therefore embedded development methods are very important in order to en-
sure reliability particularly where a failure may cause loss of life or financial
damage. On June 4, 1996 the Ariane 5 rocket launched by the European Space
Agency exploded just 40 seconds after initiation of the flight sequence (Dowson,
1997). A software failure was identified as a primary cause of the disaster. The
catastrophe was valued at approximately $370 million. More recently, Toyota,
the world’s largest automobile manufacturer, announced in 2010 the recall of
thousands of cars because of a problem in a braking system. A software glitch
also has been suspected in the braking system. Embedded system engineers
need to ensure that the systems which they deliver will behave correctly. Tools
and techniques that support that are highly demanded.
1.2 Real-time Embedded System
Mostly, embedded systems are real-time systems. In other words, they have
real-time constraints where the correctness of their behaviour depends not only
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on the logical results of the computation, but also on the time at which these
results are produced. In a vehicle air-bag example, once a crash is detected, the
air-bag has to inflate rapidly within a short time. In this example, the system
should respond to the event of the crash on the correct time in order to prevent
driver from striking the steering wheel or window. Real-time systems are clas-
sified into two types depending on how strict are the timing requirements: soft
real-time systems and hard real-time systems (Liu, 2000). A soft real-time sys-
tem has more relaxed timing constraints. The system can continue to operate
even if it fails to meet its deadline. Examples are multimedia applications, tele-
phone switches, and on-line reservation systems. In a hard real-time system,
if a timing constraint or deadline is not met, errors consequences may occur
threatening human lives or causing sever damage or financial loss. Examples
include safety-critical applications: medical machines, automotive and avionics.
Consider the simple example shown in Fig. 1.1 (Kopetz, 1997), where the com-
puter performs a single activity. The system controls the flow of a liquid through
a pipe. For a given set-point, the computer system must maintain the flow of
the liquid despite changing environmental conditions, such as varying level of
the liquid in the vessel or temperature sensitive viscosity of the liquid. The
computer system continuously observes the rate of flow, using the flow sensor,
and adjusts the control valve accordingly. The response to a change in the
flow must occur within a finite period of time in order to prevent an overload
situation. This however may require complex calculation in order to obtain the
new valve position. Checking that the system meets some functional properties
is necessary, for example: whenever an increase of the flow rate is detected,
the valve is eventually adjusted. However, verifying non-functional (or timing)
properties is very important, for example: whenever an increase of the flow
rate is detected, the valve is eventually adjusted before x time units. Tools and
techniques that provide a prior analysis about the worst-case behaviour of such
systems, are demanded.
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Computer Control System
Flow Setpoint
Control Valve Flow Sensor
Fig. 1.1: Flow Regulator System.
1.3 Distributed Embedded System
Embedded systems tend to be distributed because of the nature of the envi-
ronment in which they operate. In this case a system may have a number of
computing nodes that are interconnected by a communication network in order
to exchange information for the purpose of monitoring and control. Modern
vehicles may have over a hundred computing units to control, for example,
air-bag, driver’s doors, anti-lock brakes, engine functions and many other ac-
tivities in the car (Pop et al., 2004). Distribution is required for various reasons
such as performance increase, location of sensors and actuators, and fault toler-
ance (Caspi et al., 1999). For instance, consider the example shown in Fig 1.1.
For a geographical reason, the computing node that reads the flow rate, may be
placed close to the flow sensor and interconnected with a suitable communica-
tion bus with another computing node that controls the valve. Unfortunately,
it is a challenging task to design and implement real-time embedded systems
in such a way that guarantees that the functional and timing properties are
satisfied under all possible workloads. The problem becomes even harder when
the system is distributed.
A lot of distributed embedded systems are implemented using Controller Area
Network (CAN). The CAN is the dominant network in automotive and factory
control systems and is becoming increasingly popular in robotic, medical and
avionics applications. In the following, a brief introduction of the CAN is
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presented.
The Controller Area Network
Controller Area Network (CAN) (Bosch, 1991; ISO-CAN, 1993; Natale et al.,
2012) is a broadcast, message-oriented communication protocol developed origi-
nally for the automotive industry by Bosch GmbH in the mid-eighties. CAN was
devised to replace the complex wiring harness in automobiles with a two-wire
bus, and suited to operate in a harsh electromagnetic environment at trans-
mission speeds of up to 1 Mbit/s over short distances. CAN is a multi-master
protocol, any node on the network can send a broadcast message to other nodes.
The message does not contain the address of the destination node(s), but it has
a unique static number which defines the priority of the message in the net-
work. CAN implements the carrier-sense, multiple-access (CSMA/CA) proto-
col with a deterministic collision avoidance policy. This feature has made CAN
particularly suitable for hard real-time systems which require high reliability.
Currently its use has been expanded to include new application domains, for
example: manufacturing, construction, agriculture and healthcare (Ortiz et al.,
2011; Eugenio, 2008; Riti and Pozzi, 1999; Parent and Cassin, 1999).
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Fig. 1.2: CAN Frame - Standard Format.
Messages are transmitted over the CAN network as fixed format frames which
consist of a data field, a message identifier field and other trailing fields, see
Fig 1.2. The data field is between 0 and 8 bytes long. The identifier field is 11
(29) bits in the standard (extended) frame format. The other fields of the frame
are explained in Table 1.1. Additional bits are inserted when a frame is trans-
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Field name Purpose
SOF Denotes the start of frame transmission.
ID Represents message identifier.
RTR Remote transmission request.
IDE Identifier for the data which also represents the message
priority.
r0 Reserved bit.
DLC Data length code which represents the number of bytes
of data.
DATA Represents message data field which is between 0 and 8
bytes long.
CRC Cyclic redundancy check.
DEL CRC delimiter.
ACK0 ACK slot.
ACK1 ACK delimiter.
EOF End of frame.
Int Inter-frame space.
Tab. 1.1: CAN frame fields.
mitted over the network for synchronisation. This process is called bit stuffing
that means after five consecutive equal bits, a complementary bit is inserted
into the bit stream. Bit stuffing occurs from SOF up to, but not including,
the CRC delimiter. Stuff bits introduce uncertainty to the transmission time of
CAN messages. However, the maximum number of stuff bits can be calculated
in order to estimate the worst-case transmission time of a CAN message. This
is discussed in detail in section 2.3.4.
The identifier represents the priority of the message which is a non-negative
integer starting from 0; the smaller the number the higher the priority. When
two or more nodes try to transmit a message, the node with the higher priority
message gains access to the bus. First when the bus is free, a number of nodes
may start to transmit at the same time. Each node first transmits the message
identifier starting from the most significant bit, and then it monitors the bus. In
this mechanism, the bit is classified as either dominant or recessive. The node
can only read a recessive bit if all other nodes write recessive bits, otherwise
it reads a dominant bit. The behaviour of the bus in this case is similar to an
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AND-gate. When a node monitors a bit value that is not the one transmitted
it stops transmission, and behaves as a receiver to the highest priority message,
and then waits until the bus becomes idle again. Therefore, during arbitration,
the node with the highest priority message wins and continues to transmit the
rest of the message. Additionally, the message identifier expresses the type of
the message. Each node may be configured to accept a subset of messages.
A receiver node performs the acceptance test to the received message. If the
message is accepted it is stored in a receive buffer, otherwise it is rejected.
1.4 Formal Methods
Embedded systems may have high reliability requirements, e.g. a mean time to
failure of 109 hours is not unusual. Traditional approaches to testing embed-
ded systems may not alone provide the required confidence in their reliability.
In (Gluck and Holzmann, 2002) two problems are identified in conventional
testing in terms of concurrent systems: “limited controllability” and “limited
observability”. The first one means that it is not possible to control the specifics
of thread interleavings; the second one means that it is very hard to reproduce
the error scenario to identify the root cause. Therefore, finding errors such as
race conditions and deadlock in concurrent software is very challenging using
conventional testing.
However, these approaches can be supplemented by a variety of analytic tech-
niques. One such technique is model-checking (Baier and Katoen, 2008). Model-
checking has proved to be a very effective method to verify requirements and the
design of concurrent systems and communication protocols. Basically, a model-
checking tool accepts an abstract model of the system and a specification of
properties of the system. The tool then performs an exhaustive state-space
search to check if the model satisfies the given specification. A counterexample
(sequence of events or path) is generated if the specification is not satisfied
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by the model. Therefore, by studying the counterexample, the error may be
discovered and corrected. A major obstacle to the widespread deployment of
model-checking in practice is the state-space explosion problem: the number of
states to be checked in a realistic model of the system may exceed the avail-
able computing resources. Furthermore, model-checking verifies a system model
which is an abstraction of the actual system. Thus the model may exhibit a be-
haviour that can not be expressed by the actual implementation of the system.
Despite of these limitations, model-checking can increase the level of confidence
in a system design.
1.5 Related Work
The problem of real-time system has been subject to exhaustive research during
the last few decades. Many approaches have been proposed to ensure that
systems hold some useful properties. The synchronous approach is based on
very conservative assumptions on system computations and communications
which make the system difficult to implement particularly when the system
is distributed. Traditional scheduling analysis has been widely used by real-
time system engineers. It provides a simple mathematical analysis of system
behaviour. Based on the success of its application to single-processor systems,
the approach has been extended to the distributed applications. However, the
approach requires restrictive assumptions on the system implementation, and
does not allow system level properties to be checked. Other approaches based
on formal languages have been proposed, but they are mainly limited to uni-
processor applications.
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1.5.1 Synchronous Approach
The synchronous languages Esterel (Berry, 2000), Lustre (Halbwachs et al.,
1991) and Signal (LeGuernic et al., 1991) are designed around the synchrony
hypothesis which assumes a system responds to its environment’s events in zero
time (Benveniste et al., 2003). Moreover, all communications between the sys-
tem components are also performed instantaneously. The concept is similar to
the synchronous model of digital circuits. The circuits are described using gates
that must react during one clock cycle which means conceptually in zero time.
This approach allows one to reason formally about the operations of the sys-
tem (Benveniste and Berry, 1991). Synchronous languages and their compilers
are now widely used in industry for automotives, railways, and avionics.
The Esterel language is suited to the development of control-dominated embed-
ded reactive applications (Potop-Butucaru et al., 2007). An Esterel program
consists of a collection of concurrently running threads which are described in
a traditional imperative syntax. The concurrency however is compiled away in
order to generate a single-threaded source program that behaves like a state
machine at run-time. Many compilers have been developed for Esterel such as
Esterel Technologies Compiler v7 (Esterel-Tech, 2005), Saxo-RT Compiler (Weil
et al., 2000; Closse et al., 2002), and Columbia Esterel Compiler (Edwards and
Zeng, 2007).
In order to validate the synchronous assumption in realistic applications of a
synchronous language, the tool TAXYS (Bertin et al., 2000; Closse et al., 2001)
has been developed. The main goal of TAXYS is to generate a formal model
that captures the temporal behaviour of a real-time application and its external
environment. The formal model is produced in a timed automata form (Alur
and Dill, 1994). Esterel is used as a development language for the application.
The KRONOS model checker (Daws et al., 1996) is used to check whether the
program satisfies its timing constraints. Although the tool is applied success-
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fully for some applications, for example (Bertin et al., 2001) and (Tripakis and
Yovine, 2001), the approach is limited to a single-task implementation of a syn-
chronous real-time application running on a single-processor platform (Sifakis
et al., 2003).
Generating an executable code from a synchronous language for a distributed ar-
chitecture has been addressed in Next-TTA (Caspi et al., 2003) and COLA (Haberl
et al., 2008a,b). The approach of Next-TTA translates a high-level control de-
sign of Simulink (MathWorks, 2012) to a SCADE/Lustre program for valida-
tion purpose. Then the implementation is derived for TTA execution layer.
TTA (Time Triggered Architecture) (Kopetz, 1997) supports distributed im-
plementations based on a synchronous bus. The TTA conforms with a nota-
tion of global synchronisation and ideally matches the synchronous assumption.
Although the tool aims to benefit from the Lustre model-checker Lesar (Ra-
tel et al., 1991) to check whether the implementation satisfies its functional
and timing properties, the analysis is limited to uni-processor implementa-
tions (Caspi et al., 2003) because the tool Lesar assumes only this kind of
implementation when its input model is constructed. COLA (Kugele et al.,
2007) is a component language for design and development embedded systems.
The language has a formal semantics based upon synchronous dataflow. An ap-
proach is presented in (Haberl et al., 2008a) to translate models given in COLA
to C code. The approach employs a time division multiple access (TDMA) com-
munication schema (similar to TTA) to ensure the timely delivery of data in
order to retain the synchronous semantics of the COLA model (Haberl et al.,
2008a). Furthermore, although COLA is defined by a rigorous formal semantics
in which automated tools, such as model-checking, can be applied to check its
correctness, such a verification tool does not yet exist for the language, and it
remains for future work (Haberl et al., 2008a).
Although time-triggered systems obey well the synchronous approach, main-
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taining a global clock for both computation and communication is difficult to
implement, and the overhead of the implementation is often large when adopting
the fully synchronous approach (Potop-Butucaru and Caillaud, 2007). Asyn-
chronous communication schemes (e.g. CAN (Bosch, 1991)) which are now
widely used in industries, allow a number of computing nodes operating at dif-
ferent rates to be connected via a communication bus with no need to a global
clock for synchronisation. Globally Asynchronous Locally Synchronous (GALS)
is an architecture emerged to combine the two approaches. In this architecture,
synchronous components are connected via an asynchronous communication
media. The requirement for a global time is removed when a synchronous spec-
ification is implemented within the GALS model (Potop-Butucaru and Caillaud,
2007).
1.5.2 Scheduling Analysis Approach
This approach has been exhaustively studied in the real-time systems litera-
ture. A real-time application is considered to be composed of a set of tasks
that interact. A task is a piece of code which is executed in response to an
event from the environment. Tasks may share resources such as processor,
memory, and communication media. Timing requirements of a system design
are represented in a form of periods, deadlines and priorities to the tasks. The
main role of the scheduling approach is to provide an analysis used to confirm
that the timing constraints of the system are satisfied. There are two main
scheduling approaches: the cyclic executive approach and the priority-based
approach (Burns and Wellings, 2001). In the former approach, each task has
cyclic access to the processor in a predefined order. In the latter approach,
each task is assigned a unique priority according to some policy (e.g., RMA
or EDF (Burns and Wellings, 2001)). When a higher priority task is released
during the execution of a lower priority one, then the processor will imme-
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diately switch to execute the instructions of the higher priority task. This
is called a preemptive schema. However, in the non-preemptive schema, the
lower priority task is allowed to complete its execution before switching to the
higher priority task. A simple schedulability analysis is given by Liu and Lay-
land (Liu and Layland, 1973) in order to test if a set of fixed-priority periodic
tasks meet their deadlines. An enhanced analysis is proposed in (Joseph and
Pandya, 1986) which calculates the worst-case response time of each task, and
then compares it with the deadline of the task. Although the main focus of
traditional analysis is on the worst-case behaviour in order to ensure that tasks
meets their deadlines, the best-case response time analysis has been addressed
in (Redell and Sanfridson, 2002) and (Bril et al., 2004). One such application
of this analysis is to estimate the maximum variation in a task response time.
The scheduling analysis has been extended to allow distributed systems per-
formance evaluation where end-to-end response times are computed for tasks
running in a distributed environment and communicate via a real-time commu-
nication protocol. For example, the work of Tindell et al (Tindell and Hansson,
1995), Henderson et al (Henderson et al., 1998), and Redell et al (Redell et al.,
2004).
The scheduling approach in general assumes very restrictive assumptions on
the system implementation in order to analysis the behaviour of the system.
For example, all tasks are periodic, tasks have deadlines equal to their periods,
and tasks are independent. Additionally, special purpose resources such as
a real-time operating system (RTOS) (e.g., (WindRiver, 1999)) and protocols
(e.g., (Sha et al., 1990)), are often required to implement preemptive scheduling
policies and to avoid deadlocks. Moreover, the approach does not allow system
level properties (e.g. safety and functionality) to be verified, and only deals
with implementation level properties (tasks meet their deadlines).
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1.5.3 Other Approaches
Process algebra languages have been widely used in the specification and design
telecommunication protocols and distributed systems. A system is represented
as a process, or composed of other smaller processes. Their formal semantics
makes them amenable to formal verification (e.g. (Garavel and Sifakis, 1990))
as well as simulation. Their formalism has been extended to allow modelling
real-time aspects of a system, for instance: ET-LOTOS (Le´onard and Leduc,
1997), ATP (Nicollin and Sifakis, 1994). Despite their expressiveness and clean
formalism, and the availability of analysing tools: simulators, model-checkers,
and theorem provers, their applications have been limited to support only the
specification and verification (e.g. TRAIAN Compiler of LOTOS NT (Garavel
et al., 2002)) rather than implementation of a system (and distributed system
in particular). Moreover, they can not deal with a broadcast communication
mechanism such as CAN (Bosch, 1991; ISO-CAN, 1993) that is most frequently
employed in the implementation of distributed embedded systems. However,
generating an implementation code from a process algebra language for uni-
processor platform has been addressed in the work of Bradly et al (Bradley et al.,
1994c,b,a). A real-time system can be represented in the timed process algebra,
AORTA (Bradley, 1995). The language is designed to consider both verification
and implementation of a system. An implementation C code is generated for
each process of an AORTA design from the same graph that is used in the
generation of an analytical model (Bradley, 1995). The AORTA system can
be validated via simulation and formally verified by model-checking (Bradley
et al., 1996).
PTIDES is a programming model for distributed real-time systems (Zhao et al.,
2007; Lee et al., 2009). It is based on a discrete-event model which has been used
for simulations. In this model, a network of components reacts to input events
in time-stamp order and produces output events in time-stamp order. PTIDES
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leverages network time synchronisation with bounded error and bounded la-
tency in order to use the model to produce efficient distributed implementa-
tions. However, the approach, similarly to traditional scheduling analysis, is
limited to schedulability analysis which does not provide system level analysis,
and uses a special purpose architecture (PRET architecture (Liu et al., 2010))
to achieve timing predictability.
Additionally, other formalisms such as Time Petri Nets (Berthomieu and Diaz,
1991), Timed Automata (Alur and Dill, 1994), and State Machines have been
applied in the development of real-time embedded systems, and implemented in
the tools: Rome´o (Lime et al., 2009), Times (Amnell et al., 2003) and IAR visu-
alSTATE (IAR-Systems, 2012) respectively. However, in addition to their less
expressiveness (i.e. low-level representation format) compared to the process
algebra formalism, their usages has not yet considered distributed implemen-
tations. Rome´o facilitates automated verification via model-checking for the
time petri net model of real-time system. The tool does not support the im-
plementation of such systems. Other works however consider this problem,
i.e. producing an implementation program (e.g. RT Java) from a Petri net
model for a real-time system, see for example (Moreno et al., 2006). In Times,
an approach to modelling and implementing embedded systems that combines
both schedulability analysis and formal verification is presented in (Norstrom
et al., 1999). The idea is to extend the standard time automata (Alur and
Dill, 1994) with real-time tasks to allow a more relaxed task model (e.g. non-
periodic tasks) to be analysed using a formal verification tool such as UPPAAL
model checker (Behrmann et al., 2004). The approach is implemented in the
tool, Times (Amnell et al., 2003). Although an executable code can be gen-
erated from the extended timed automata model, the approach assumes that
the generated code is executed on a uni-processor platform that guarantees
the synchronous hypothesis (Amnell et al., 2003). A state machine-based ap-
proach (such as (Samek, 2008) and (IAR-Systems, 2012)) generates event-driven
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code for uni-processor embedded systems. The tool IAR visualSTATE (IAR-
Systems, 2012) can verify a fixed list of untimed properties such as the absence
of deadlocks and unreachable states. More complex properties can be verified
by constructing another state machine, that expresses the desired property,
parallel to the system design.
1.6 The Dissertation
1.6.1 Justification
The work presented in this thesis addresses the problem of generating executable
code for CAN-based distributed embedded systems in a way that guarantees
that both functional and timing properties expressed in a high-level formal
language are satisfied. The thesis proposes a novel approach in which system
behaviour is specified in CANDLE, a high-level language which is given a formal
semantics by translation to bCANDLE, an asynchronous process calculus. A
bCANDLE system is translated automatically, via a common intermediate net
representation, both into executable C code and into a timed automaton model
that can be used in the formal verification of a wide range of functional and
temporal properties.
1.6.2 Structure and Contributions
Chapter 2 introduces our code and model generation approach, and provides
all the essential details including models, languages, and formal notations. The
chapter presents no new results but provides the necessary information on which
the rest of the thesis is built.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the implementation of the formal language. The
executable code is derived from the language via an intermediate model. An
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efficient C representation of the intermediate model is presented. The chapter
presents our implementation model which defines certain assumptions about
system components. A single broadcast asynchronous communication mecha-
nism is adopted and implemented. The communication mechanism is an ab-
straction of the CAN. All communications occur through this mechanism and
never through the use of shared variables. This single notion, employed both
for external and local communication between system components, provides
flexibility to the system developer to freely distribute system components on a
number of nodes, and simplifies the process of generating a formal model of the
system. An AADL-like language is adopted to describe the system architecture.
The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) (Feiler et al., 2006)
is an industry standard language to specify a system architecture. The sys-
tem description provides details to the code generator about processes, nodes,
process-to-node allocation, scheduling algorithm, tick rate, and communication
details, including the IDs of messages and network transmission rate.
Chapter 4 presents a rigorous argument that, for any system expressed in the
high-level language, its formal model is a conservative approximation of the
executable C code. This allows the system developer to conclude that if a
model satisfies any universally quantified property, then it is guaranteed that
the implementation will also satisfy the same property.
Chapter 5 proposes a number of methods that ensure an atomic update of
data which is required to implement the semantics of the language correctly.
The methods are evaluated against some criteria we identify depending on the
worst-case behaviour analysis of the methods in order to select a suitable one
for our code generation approach.
Chapter 6 assesses the applicability and performance of the approach by imple-
menting four case studies. The performance is measured in terms of the com-
putational effort required to generate an executable code and a formal model
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for a given design, and the computational resources including memory (RAM
and ROM) and CPU load required to execute the examples on the target. Per-
formance results are compared with the results obtained from an alternative
method employing a widely-used real-time kernel that implements the same
case studies. The chapter also assesses the tractability of the formal models
which are generated from the case studies. A number of functional and tempo-
ral properties are verified using an off-the-shelf model checker.
Chapter 7 summarises the work, discusses the limitations of the work, and
suggests possible directions for future research.
2. METHODS, TECHNIQUES AND
TOOLS
This chapter introduces our code and model generation approach, and provides
all the essential details including models, languages, and formal notations, on
which the rest of the thesis is built.
2.1 Overview of the Approach
An overview of our code and model generation approach is depicted in Fig. 2.1.
The primary component in our approach is bCANDLE (Kendall, 2001b), a
timed process calculus intended for modelling CAN-based embedded systems.
The language features a value-passing, broadcast communication primitive,
message priorities and an explicit time construct. The motivation to use bCAN-
DLE is that it enables system developers to construct system models that are
amenable to formal analysis by model-checking. There is a well-defined trans-
lation from bCANDLE to timed automata (TA) models upon which standard
model checkers can be used. The existing translator is built upon a low-level
intermediate net representation (Kendall, 2001b). The idea of the thesis is to
make use of the net representation developed by the TA translator to gener-
ate executable code. The approach of generating executable code from a net
is discussed in Chapter 3. The main reason for employing the net is that it
will be easier to establish a connection between the behaviour of the model
and the executable code since they are both produced from the same source.
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This will be the subject of Chapter 4 of the thesis. The executable code is
generated in the C language. The model is generated in the form of a timed
automaton so an off-the-shelf model-checker (such as UPPAAL) can be used to
verify system properties. In order to be able to verify temporal properties of the
system, time bounds of the execution of system components can be predicted
using static analysis tools such as the Bound-T (Tidorum, 2012) and aiT (Ab-
sint, 2012). Although bCANDLE is a simple language, it is likely to be too
low level for routine use in system description. Therefore, CANDLE (Kendall,
2001b) was introduced for the purpose of a system design. The CANDLE is a
high-level programming language dedicated for CAN-based embedded systems.
The language has a formal semantics defined by translation into bCANDLE. In
summary, the system is expected to be designed in CANDLE. Then, a bCAN-
DLE model is produced from the CANDLE design of the system. Next, a net
representation is derived from the bCANDLE model. Finally, an executable C
code of the system is generated from the net.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the main
assumptions made and constraints on systems for which the code and model
generation approach is proposed. Section 2.3 introduces the bCANDLE mod-
elling language and its formal semantics. Section 2.4 introduces the intermedi-
ate representation of bCANDLE, the net and its formal semantics. Section 2.5
outlines the translation rules of bCANDLE into the net. Section 2.6 intro-
duces the high-level language of bCANDLE, CANDLE. Section 2.7 outlines the
translation rules of CANDLE into bCANDLE. Finally, section 2.8 concludes
the chapter.
2.2 System Characteristics
The proposed code and model generation approach targets a class of embedded
systems (Fig. 2.2) characterised by a number of properties:
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System Description
in CANDLE
Abstract Model
in bCANDLE
Net Intermediate
Model
Time Automata
Model
Execution Times
Executable Code
in C
Target Machine
Uppaal Model
Checker
Fig. 2.1: Overview of Code and Model Generation Approach.
Work done as part of this thesis is shown in bold.
1. A system comprises a number of software processes that are statically
distributed to computing nodes.
2. A computing node consists of a processor which has access to a local
memory, a programmable timer, zero or more communication controllers,
and zero or more sensors and actuators to interact with the physical world.
3. A restricted scheduling approach (e.g., cooperative or round-robin, dis-
cussed in section 3.2.3) is applied when two or more processes are allo-
cated to a single computing node in order to allow off-line calculation of
computation response times.
4. Processes communicate via asynchronous broadcast channels which im-
plement an abstraction of the CAN protocol in which the send operation
is non-blocking and the receive operation is blocking. The abstraction of
the CAN is formed by the following assumptions:
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Fig. 2.2: Distributed Embedded System (Kendall, 2001b).
• communication channels operate without errors,
• the details of bit-level data transmission are abstracted so that mes-
sages are assumed to be transmitted atomically,
• the CAN message ID field is 11 bits in length.
5. Processes that reside in the same computing node are not allowed to share
memory and typically use (local) broadcast channels to communicate.
6. Shared access to I/O is not allowed, i.e. in the case of multi-tasking,
access to a sensor or actuator is limited to a single software process.
2.3 The bCANDLE Modelling Language
bCANDLE (Kendall et al., 1997, 1998b; Kendall, 2001b) is a timed process cal-
culus dedicated for modelling distributed, real-time embedded systems based on
the CAN network. The language features a value-passing, broadcast communi-
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cation primitive, message priorities and an explicit time construct. A bCAN-
DLE system comprises three components: a data model, a network model, and
a process model. It is defined formally by a tuple (P,N,D). In the following,
the definition and notations are presented for each component of bCANDLE
system.
2.3.1 Data Model
Let Var be a finite set of data variables. Each variable x ∈ Var takes its value
from some non-empty, finite set of values, type(x) ⊂ V , where V is the set of
data values. We assume that V contains at least the distinguished value ⊥,
where ⊥ /∈ ⋃x∈Var type(x), which is taken to be the “undefined” data value,
then:
• V aluation =̂ Var → V
• Operation =̂ V aluation↔ V aluation
• Predicate =̂ 2V aluation
Let Ω be a finite set of operation names, Γ be a finite set of predicate names, then
a data environment D over Var ,Ω and Γ is a tupleD = (type, operation, predicate, val)
where
• type : Var → 2V is a total function, giving for each variable x ∈ Var , a
non-empty, finite set of data values, type(x), ranged over by x;
• operation : Ω → Operation is a total function, giving for each operation
name ω ∈ Ω, an operation, operation(ω), which interprets it;
• predicate : Γ → Predicate is a total function, giving for each predicate
name γ ∈ Γ, a predicate, predicate(γ), which interprets it;
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• val : Var → V is a total function which, for each variable x ∈ Var , gives
the current valuation of x, where val(x) ∈ type(x) or val(x) = ⊥.
Let D = (type, operation, predicate, val) be a data environment. Let x, y ∈ Var
be data variables, and v ∈ V a data value, then the following notational con-
ventions are employed:
• D. type, D. operation, D. predicate andD.val denote type, operation, predicate
and val, respectively.
• D.x denotes the value val(x).
• D[x := v] denotes the data environmentD′ = (type, operation, predicate, val′)
where val′(x) = v and val′(y) = val(y) for all y 6≡ x (≡ denotes syntactic
identity and 6≡ its negation).
• D ω−→dD′ abbreviates the condition (val, val′) ∈ operation(ω) ∧ D′ =
(type, operation, predicate, val′). The operation name ID is reserved for
the identity relation on valuations, i.e. it must be interpreted in any data
environment by the operation operation(ID) , {(val, val)|val ∈ Valuation}
• D |= γ abbreviates the condition val ∈ predicate(γ).
2.3.2 Network Model
The network model of bCANDLE is an abstraction of the CAN network which
consists of a number of broadcast channels. Each channel implements an ab-
straction of the CAN protocol. A message transmitted through a channel is
viewed as a pair consisting of a data value and an identifier. The data value
and the identifier corresponds to the data field and the arbitration field of the
CAN frame respectively. Transmission of a message is divided into three phases:
pre-acceptance, acceptance, and post-acceptance phase. The acceptance phase is
the interval during the transmission of a message when receiver nodes perform
2. Methods, Techniques and Tools 23
their acceptance test. The pre-acceptance phase extends from the beginning
of the transmission to the point of acceptance. The post-acceptance phase ex-
tends from the the point of acceptance to the point at which the channel next
becomes free. In practice, the location of the acceptance point may vary from
one type of CAN controller to another. For example, for some CAN controllers,
the acceptance point may occur on the leading edge of the ACK0 bit of the
CAN frame, see Fig 1.2. It is assumed that the time which passes during the
pre-acceptance and post-acceptance phases can be calculated for all messages.
This time is called transmission latency. The transmission latency of a mes-
sage gives the upper and lower bounds on the time which passes during the
pre-acceptance and post-acceptance phases of the message.
A channel is defined by the tuple (M,≺, δ, s, u) where:
• M ⊆ I × V is a set of messages. I is a set of message identifiers and V is
a set of data values.
• ≺: I ↔ I is a priority ordering of messages.
• δ : M → R∞ × R∞ × R∞ × R∞ is a transmission latency function. The
functions δlb, δub, δlB, δuB : M → R∞ give the lower and upper bounds on
the duration of the pre- and post-acceptance phases for the transmission
of a message. δlb (resp. δub, δlB, δuB) is abbreviated as lb (resp. ub, lB,
uB).
• s is a transmission status. The channel is either free or is transmitting
a message (pre-acceptance, acceptance or post-acceptance phase). The
notation shown in Table 2.1 denotes the transmission status.
• u is a message queue.
It is assumed that M , ≺ and δ are static components, they are defined at the
initialisation of a system and are unchanged after that. By contrast, s and u are
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Notation Transmission Status
↓ FREE, no message is in transmission.
t1,t2 m pre-acceptance phase of transmission of messagem with bounds
t1,t2 on time to completion, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ lb , 0 ≤ t2 ≤ ub.
↑ m acceptance point in transmission of m.
m
t1,t2 post-acceptance phase of transmission of message m with
bounds t1,t2 on time to completion, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ lB , 0 ≤ t2 ≤ uB.
Tab. 2.1: Transmission Status Notation.
dynamic components which are used to model the current transmission status
and message queue as a system evolves.
The message queue modelled here represents a single shared queue for a whole
network of nodes that are communicating using the same channel. It is assumed
that a transmitting node only attempts to transmit its highest priority message.
Additionally, a node that has a number of pending messages always attempts
to transmit the highest priority message as soon as the channel becomes free.
This implies that the channel can not become free between the transmission of
messages if there are pending messages. It means that the CAN controller will
arbitrate for the bus immediately after sending the previous message, and will
only release the bus in case of lost arbitration. This is important to ensure that
the transmission of a pending message is not deferred by beginning transmission
of a lower priority message. Each CAN controller must have a suitable buffer
management mechanism to respect these assumptions. This ideal behaviour of
CAN was identified by Tindell et al (Tindell and Burns, 1994; Tindell et al.,
1994) for scheduling analysis of CAN network. If all nodes follow the same
protocol to transmit messages, then the internal queue of all nodes can be
viewed as one large queue for a whole network in which messages are placed in
priority order, assuming that each message is assigned a unique priority number
in a network.
A bCANDLE network is a set of channels in which each channel is given a
unique identifier. Let K be a set of channel identifiers, then a network N over
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K is an indexed set of channels which is expressed as follows:
N = ((M,≺, δ, s, u)k | k ∈ K)
Let c be a channel, then the notation N [k := c] denotes the network N ′, where
N ′k = c and N
′
k′ = Nk′ for all k
′ ∈ K \ {k}.
A channel c can act independently, by performing a discrete change in its trans-
mission status or its message queue, to become c′ which gives a new network
N ′ = N [k := c′]. Alternatively, the state of of the whole network may be af-
fected as time progresses. The relation N
λnt→n N ′ represents a change of state
from N to N ′ annotated with the label λnt which ranges over An ∪ R. An is a
set of network action labels used to annotate discrete state changes. Elements
of R are used to annotate state changes due to the passage of time.
Fig. 2.3 gives the network transition rules. The rules are expressed using the
structural operational semantics (SOS) (Plotkin, 2004; Nielson and Nielson,
1991) style. SOS is the predominant approach for giving a meaning to pro-
gramming and specification languages. It generates a labelled transition sys-
tem, whose states are the terms of the language, and whose transitions between
states are obtained inductively from a collection of transition rules of the form
premises
conclusion
. The validity of the premises of a transition rule, under a certain
substitution, implies the validity of the conclusion of this rule under the same
substitution (Aceto et al., 2001). The rules N.1, N.2, N.3 and N.4 give the
transition rules due to discrete state changes of a network, whereas the rule
N.5 gives the transition rule due to a time progress of a network. The function
tcp(N) denotes the maximum time progress allowed for N .
2. Methods, Techniques and Tools 26
N.1
Nk = (↓,m : u)
N
k m−−−→n N [k := (lb,ub m,u)]
N.2
Nk = (
0, m,u)
N
k↑m−−→n N [k := (↑ m,u)]
N.3
Nk = (↑ m,u)
N
m k−−−→n N [k := (m lB,uB , u)]
N.4
Nk = (
0, , u)
N
k↓−→n N [k := (↓, u)]
N.5
0 ≤ t ≤ tcp(N)
N
t→n N + t
Fig. 2.3: Network Transition Rules.
Example of network behaviour
Assume a network that consists of a single channel which can transmit messages
of type flow. The transmitted values of the flow sensor reading are abstracted,
where 0 represents a reading at the low level, and 1 represents a reading at the
high level. The network then can be defined as follows:
N = {k 7→ (M,≺, δ, ↓, 〈flow.1〉)}
Where I = {flow}, V = {0, 1} and M = I × V . As there is a single channel,
then K = {k}. The function δ gives the transmission latencies in µs, as follows:
flow.
δlb 86
δub 106
δlB 24
δuB 24
In the table, flow. could be flow.0 or flow.1. It is assumed that the message
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flow.1 has been already placed in the message queue; a possible trace of the
network behaviour is shown in Fig. 2.4. The trace starts from the initial state
(↓, 〈flow.1〉) in which the channel is free and the message is queued. Then,
the time behaviour of the network progresses following the two-phase model.
The network performs a discrete action first using one of the rules (N.1, N.2,
N.3, and N.4) and then a time elapses using the rule (N.5) until the channel
becomes free and the message queue becomes empty. After that, the network
may progress using time transitions.
(↓, 〈flow.1〉) k flow.1−→n (N.1)
(
86,106 flow.1, 〈〉) 100−→n (N.5)
(
0,6 flow.1, 〈〉) k↑flow.1−→n (N.2)
(↑ flow.1, 〈〉) 0−→n (N.5)
(↑ flow.1, 〈〉) flow.1 k−→n (N.3)
(flow.1
24,24 , 〈〉) 24−→n (N.5)
(flow.1
0,0 , 〈〉) k↓−→n (N.4)
(↓, 〈〉) 5−→n (N.5)
(↓, 〈〉) 20−→n (N.5)
...
Fig. 2.4: Example of network behaviour.
2.3.3 Process Model
bCANDLE uses a simple process-algebraic language to describe the behaviour
of processes. A process is either a primitive process or a composition of other
processes. There are four kinds of primitive processes in bCANDLE:
1. k!i.x – non-blocking send : it causes the message i.v to be queued instan-
taneously for transmission on channel k, where i is the id of the message
and v is the current value of x. Then it terminates immediately.
2. k?i.x – blocking receive: it idles until an i-message reaches its acceptance
point during transmission on channel k. Then it immediately assigns the
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data value of the message to the variable x and terminates.
3. [ω : t1, t2] – time-bounded computation: it terminates not earlier than
t1 , and not later than t2 , time units after beginning execution, and
it atomically transforms the data state at the instant of termination as
specified by the operation ω.
4. γ → P – evaluate guard : it idles until the data environment satisfies the
guard γ (which is a predicate on the data state), then it performs P .
These basic processes can be compounded using a small set of operators: se-
quential composition, choice, interrupt, parallel composition, and process re-
cursion, in order to construct a larger process:
• P ;Q (sequential composition) is a process that behaves as Q when P
terminates.
• P + Q (choice) is a process that can behave either like P or like Q de-
pending on which process can first perform an action.
• P [> Q (interrupt) it behaves as P until either Q performs an action or P
terminates.
• P |Q is the parallel composition of P and Q.
• recX.P is a recursive process which has repetitive behaviour, where X is
a process variable and P is a process term.
For details on the formal semantics of these process terms, one can refer to (Kendall,
2001b, p. 82).
2.3.4 Example of bCANDLE
The bCANDLE model of the flow regulator example presented in Chapter 1 is
shown in Fig 2.5. It consists of two processes: Flow and Valve. Flow models
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a process which periodically reads a flow sensor and broadcasts its value in a
flow message. Valve models a process which repeatedly waits to receive a flow
message, executes a control algorithm to calculate a new value for the valve
position, and instructs an actuator to move the valve to its new position. The
time bounds given to each computation represent the lower and the upper bound
on the time taken to execute the computation. For example, the execution time
of the software to read the flow sensor may take between 85 to 100 time units.
Flow | Valve
where
Flow = [ReadSensor:85,100];k!flow.x;idle
[>
[timer:10000,10250];Flow
Valve = k?flow.y;[AdjustValve:200,300]; Valve
network
/* pri lb ub lB uB */
k = (flow : 1, 86, 106, 24, 24)
data x, y
Fig. 2.5: Flow regulator in bCANDLE.
Channel k models a CAN bus which transmits messages of type flow with a
priority equals 1 and transmission latency of between 86 and 106 time units
from start of a transmission to an acceptance point, and a latency of between
24 and 24 time units from the acceptance point to bus idle respectively. In the
following we demonstrate how transmission latency function is calculated.
The CAN protocol employs a special technique, called bit stuffing. After every
5 consecutive transmitted bits of the same value, a stuff bit is inserted of the
opposite value. This ensures that there are sufficient transitions in the bit
stream to ensure that the nodes can remain synchronised. The equation of
(Davis et al., 2007) gives the maximum transmission time of a message Cm
containing n data bytes and including stuff bits:
Cm =
(
g + 8.n+ 13 +
⌊
g + 8.n− 1
4
⌋)
tbit (2.1)
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where g is 34 for the standard format or 54 for the extended format. tbit is
the transmission time of a single bit. The term
⌊
g + 8.n− 1
4
⌋
of equation 2.1
calculates the maximum number of stuff bits. The denominator of the fraction
is 4 because bit stuffing includes also the stuffed bits in the frame. It is assumed
for this particular example that the message acceptance point coincides with
the leading edge of bit ACK0, see Fig. 1.2. In practice, the location of the
acceptance point may vary from one type of CAN controller to another. In
a CAN packet with n data bytes, there are g + 8.n + 1 bits from SOF up
to, but not including, ACK0. Bit stuffing occurs from SOF up to, but not
including, DEL. Therefore, the greatest number of bits is:
⌊
g + 8.n− 1
4
⌋
which
are transmitted before the acceptance point. Therefore, the lower and upper
bound of time taken during the pre-acceptance phase can be calculated by
equation 2.2 and 2.3.
lb = (g + 8.n+ 1) tbit (2.2)
ub =
(
g + 8.n+ 1 +
⌊
g + 8.n− 1
4
⌋)
tbit (2.3)
The remaining bits from ACK0 up to Int do not include stuff bits and so they
equal 12 bits. Therefore, the lower and upper bound of time time taken during
the post-acceptance phase can be calculated by:
lB = uB = 12.tbit (2.4)
Notice that ub + uB = Cm is always true.
For example, in a standard CAN packet, supposing a CAN bus operating at
5 × 105bit/s, the transmission latency function δ(m) for a message m with 1
byte size of data (i.e, n = 1) is:
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• lb = (34 + 8 + 1) tbit = (43)5× 105 = 86µs
• ub =
(
34 + 8 + 1 +
⌊
34 + 8− 1
4
⌋)
tbit = (53)5× 105 = 106µs
• lB = uB = (12)5× 105 = 24µs
Consequently, the transmission latency function δ(m) = (86, 106, 24, 24) for the
channel k.
2.4 The Net: The intermediate model of
bCANDLE
The first stage in construction of a TA model from a bCANDLE model was per-
formed (in (Kendall, 2001b)) by translating the bCANDLE model into an in-
termediate net representation which is similar to a Petri net (Murata, 1989). A
similar approach was applied by Garavel in the translation of LOTOS (Garavel
and Sifakis, 1990), and by Yovine in the translation of ATP (Yovine, 1993). The
nets which are used in bCANDLE are similar to the extended nets of (Yovine,
1993). The aim of this work is to make use of the net representation developed
by the TA translator to generate an executable code. This will be discussed
in details in Chapter 3. In this section, we introduce the net and present its
formal semantics.
The net, as usual, consists of a set of places and a set of transitions. The
net is extended in two ways. First, each transition has an associated attribute
which is used to determine whether the transition is fireable or not in a given
system context, where a context consists of a network and data environment.
Second, a transition is associated with a set of places vulnerable to the firing
of the transition. When a transition fires, control is removed not only from the
places in its source set but also from all those places which are vulnerable to
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it. This extension allows a compact representation of the interrupt operator in
particular.
Fig. 2.6 shows the net representing the flow regulator example. Places of the
net are shown as circles and transitions as boxes. The shaded circles represent a
distinguished place, tick, modelling termination. A label inside a transition box
refers to the transition attribute. The standard flow relation is shown using
solid lines. The vulnerability relation is shown using dashed lines. A small
black circle in a place shows that the place is marked. For example, transition
2 has associated attribute [ReadSensor : 85, 100]. The places: 2, 3 and 1 are
vulnerable to the firing of transition 4. The places 2, 4 and 5 are initially
marked in the net.
idlek!flow.x[ReadSensor:85,100]
[timer:10000,10250]
12 3
4
0
5 6 [AdjustValve:200,300]k?flow.y
Fig. 2.6: Net of the flow regulator example.
2.4.1 Definitions and Notation
A net is defined formally as a tuple R = (W,Θ,W I) where:
• W is the set of places.
• Θ is the set of transitions.
• W I is the set of initial marked places.
A transition θ = (w,W V , α,W T ) ∈ Θ where:
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• w ∈W is the trigger of θ, denoted •θ.
• W V ⊆W is the set of places vulnerable to θ, denoted ◦θ.
• α is the attribute of θ, denoted αθ.
• W T ⊆W is the target set of θ, denoted θ•
A place w is a trigger of exactly one transition. Transition attributes are just
basic processes. The set Attribute is defined by the grammar:
α ::= β̂|〈γ〉|X
where α ∈ Attribute is a transition attribute. X ∈ χ is a process variable. 〈γ〉
denotes a transition attribute which consists of the predicate γ ∈ Γ. β̂ is a
clocked basic process term (k!i.x, k?i.x, or [ω : t1, t2]
h). Timed automata use
clock variables to model passing the time. At the first step in the translation of
bCANDLE to timed automata, explicit clock variables are introduced into the
process terms and the network channels of the bCANDLE model. A computa-
tion, [ω : t1, t2], and its associated clock variable, h, are written as [ω : t1, t2]
h,
and a process term, P , and network channel, N , when decorated with clock
variables, are written as P̂ and N̂ respectively. The set of bCANDLE systems
following clock allocation is written as b̂CAN . The set of clock variables is
represented by H and h ranges over H.
The net of the flow regulator example shown in Fig. 2.6 is then defined formally
as follows:
R = ({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} , {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6} , {2, 4, 5})
where
θ1 = {1, {} , idle, {0}}
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θ2 = {2, {} , [ReadSensor : 85, 100], {3}}
θ3 = {3, {} , k!flow.x, {1}}
θ4 = {4, {2, 3, 1} , [timer : 10000, 10250], {2, 4}}
θ5 = {5, {} , k?flow.y, {6}}
θ6 = {6, {} , [AdjustV alve : 200, 300], {5}}
2.4.2 Behaviour
The behaviour semantics of a net is given as a transition system between states
consisting of a marking and a system context comprising a network and a data
environment. Given a net: R = (W,Θ,W I), a system can evolve from one
state (W1, N̂ ,D) to another state (W2, N̂
′, D′) as result of either a process
transition or a network transition where W1 ⊆ W is a marking of R, N̂ is
network context, and D is data context. In a process transition: for a trigger
w ∈W of a transition θ, if the context of N̂ and D satisfies conditions required
by the attribute α of θ, then new marking W2 is created from W1 by removing
w and vulnerable places to θ, and then including target places of θ. The new
context, N̂ ′, D′ is created according to the requirements of the attribute. In
the case of a network transition, the system can evolve to a new state if a
network component is modified, but marking and data environment remain
unchanged. The process transitions of (W1, N̂ ,D) are given by the rule R.1,
and the network transitions by the rule R.2.
R.1
w ∈W1 ∧ (w,W V , α,W T ) ∈ Θ ∧ fire(α, N̂ ,D, ψ, λ,H′, N̂ ′, D′)∧
W2 = W1 \ (w ∪W V ) ∪W T ∧ H = H′ ∪ clk(W T )
(W1, N̂ ,D)
ψ,λ,H−−−→R (W2, N̂ ′, D′)
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R.2
N̂
ψ,λn,H−−−−→n N̂ ′∧
∀k ∈ K, i ∈ I.(¬awaited(W,k, i) ∨ N̂k 6= (↑ i. , ) ∨ N̂k = N̂ ′k)
(W, N̂,D)
ψ,λn,H−−−−→R (W, N̂ ′, D)
The fire relation, as given in Fig. 2.7, simply determines the semantic rules for
the basic processes. λ is an action label, λn is a network action label, H is a set
of clocks, ψ is a clock constraint, K is a set of channel identifiers, and I is a set
of message identifiers. hu is a distinct clock variable used to model an urgent
transition (executed without delay). clk(W T ) denotes a set of clocks associated
with the set W T . awaited(W,k, i) holds iff, in the marking W , it is possible to
receive from channel k a message with identifier i. Formally,
awaited(W,k, i)=̂{w ∈W |αθw = k?i. } 6= ∅
F Snd
N̂k = (s, u) ∧ v = D.x
fire(k!i.x, N̂ ,D, tt, k!i.v, {hu}, N̂ [k := (s, u" i.v)], D)
F Rcv
N̂k = (↑ i.v, )
fire(k?i.x, N̂ ,D, tt, k?i.v, {hu}, N̂ ,D[x := v])
F Comp
D
ω−→d D′ ∧ t1 ∈ N
fire([ω : t1, t2]
h, N̂ ,D, h ≥ t1, ω, {hu}, N̂ ,D′)
F Gu
D |= γ
fire(〈γ〉, N̂ ,D, tt, γ, {hu}, N̂ ,D)
Fig. 2.7: Rules for fire.
We are interested only in the process transition when generating code because
both marking of the net and the data state can be changed. The network
transition can only modify the network state and we assume that the behaviour
defined by this rule is handled by the CAN controller. The following example
shows an example of a possible behaviour of a net.
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2.4.3 Example of Net Behaviour
In this example, we give a possible behaviour of the net of the flow regulator
example shown in Fig. 2.6. The following conventions are adopted:
• A system state is shown as a tuple (W, N̂,D).
• D is the initial data state where all variables are set to zero. D[var := val]
denotes a data state D′ which is the same as D except that the variable
var is associated with the value val in D′.
• The network component N̂ shows only the dynamic attributes of the single
channel k.
• Time delay is chosen arbitrarily from the allowable range of values.
• The transmitted values of the actual flow sensor reading are abstracted,
where 0 represents a reading in the low level, and 1 represents a reading
in the high level.
A possible behaviour of the net is illustrated in Fig. 2.8. The net trace starts
from the initial state ({2, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D) and evolves to a new state as result
of either the process transition rule R.1 or the network transition rule R.2.
2.5 The Translation of bCANDLE to Net
For a bCANDLE system (P̂ , N̂ ,D) ∈ b̂CAN , we briefly give in the following the
translation rules of constructing the net for P̂ , denoted N JP̂ K. We respectively
consider the basic terms, the guard γ → P̂ , the compound terms P̂1; P̂2, P̂1+P̂2,
P̂1[> P̂2, and P̂1|P̂2, the process variable, and the recursion operator. For more
details about the net construction from a bCANDLE system, one can refer
to (Kendall, 2001b, p. 112).
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({2, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D) 100−→ R.2
({2, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D) ReadSensor−→ R.1
({3, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1]) k!flow.1−→ R.1
({1, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈flow.1〉), D[x := 1]) k flow.1−→ R.2
({1, 4, 5} , (86,106 flow.1, 〈〉), D[x := 1]) 100−→ R.2
({1, 4, 5} , (0,6 flow.1, 〈〉), D[x := 1]) k↑flow.1−→ R.2
({1, 4, 5} , (↑ flow.1, 〈〉), D[x := 1]) k?flow.1−→ R.1
({1, 4, 6} , (↑ flow.1, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) flow.1 k−→ R.2
({1, 4, 6} , (flow.1 24,24 , 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) 24−→ R.2
({1, 4, 6} , (flow.1 0,0 , 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) k↓−→ R.2
({1, 4, 6} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) 200−→ R.2
({1, 4, 6} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) AdjustV alve−→ R.1
({1, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) 10000−→ R.2
({1, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) timer−→ R.1
({2, 4, 5} , (↓, 〈〉), D[x := 1, y := 1]) −→
...
Fig. 2.8: Example of net behaviour.
Basic terms: Let β̂ be one of the clocked basic terms k!i.x, k?i.x or [ω : t1, t2]
h,
then the net of β̂ is constructed as follows:
N Jβ̂K =̂ ({w}, {(w, {}, β̂, {tick})}, {w})
Guard: Let N JP̂ K = (W,Θ,W I), then the net of γ → P̂ is given by
N Jγ → P̂ K =̂ (W ∪ {w},Θ ∪ {(w, {}, 〈γ〉,W I)}, {w})
Sequential composition: Let (Wi,Θi,W
I
i ) = N JP̂iK, for i ∈ {1, 2}, be
disjoint nets. The net N JP̂1; P̂2K for the sequential composition P̂1; P̂2 is
given by
N JP̂1; P̂2K =̂ (W1 ∪W2,Θ′1 ∪Θ2,W I1 )
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where
Θ
′
1 =̂ {θ | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧ θ• 6= {tick}}
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ, αθ,W I2 ) | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧ θ• = {tick}}
Choice: Let (Wi,Θi,W
I
i ) = N JP̂iK, for i ∈ {1, 2}, be disjoint nets. Then
N JP̂1 + P̂2K =̂ (W1 ∪W2,Θ,W I1 ∪W I2 )
where
Θ =̂ {θ | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧• θ 6∈W I1 }
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ ∪W I2 , αθ, θ•) | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧• θ ∈W I1 }
∪ {θ | θ ∈ Θ2 ∧• θ 6∈W I2 }
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ ∪W I1 , αθ, θ•) | θ ∈ Θ2 ∧• θ ∈W I2 }
Interrupt: Let (Wi,Θi,W
I
i ) = N JP̂iK, for i ∈ {1, 2}, be disjoint nets. Then
N JP̂1[> P̂2K =̂ (W1 ∪W2,Θ,W I1 ∪W I2 )
where
Θ =̂ {θ | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧ θ• 6= {tick}}
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ ∪W I2 , αθ, θ•) | θ ∈ Θ1 ∧ θ• = {tick}}
∪ {θ | θ ∈ Θ2 ∧• θ 6∈W I2 }
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ ∪W1, αθ, θ•) | θ ∈ Θ2 ∧• θ ∈W I2 }
Parallel composition: Let (Wi,Θi,W
I
i ) = N JP̂iK, for i ∈ {1, 2}, be disjoint
nets. Then
N JP̂1|P̂2K =̂ (W1 ∪W2,Θ1 ∪Θ2,W I1 ∪W I2 )
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Process variable: Let X be a process variable, then the net of X is defined:
N JXK=̂({w}, {(w, {}, X, {})}), {w})
where w 6= tick is a place.
Recursion operator: Let N JP̂ K = (W,Θ,W I), then the net of rec X.P̂ is
given by
N Jrec X.P̂ K=̂(W,Θ′ ,W I)
where
Θ
′
=̂ {θ | θ ∈ Θ ∧ αθ 6= X}
∪ {(•θ,◦ θ, αθ,W I) | θ ∈ Θ ∧ αθ = X}
2.6 The CANDLE Programming Language
bCANDLE is very low-level for system developers to be used to write a system
description. Therefore, CANDLE (Kendall, 2001b) was introduced for the pur-
pose of a system design. CANDLE (Kendall et al., 1998a; Kendall, 2001a,b) is
a high-level programming language intended for distributed embedded systems
based on the CAN network. The formal semantics of the language is defined
by translation into bCANDLE. A CANDLE program consists of a number of
processes which implement a system behaviour.
Fig 2.9 shows two CANDLE processes representing the flow regulator example.
The CANDLE which is used in this work is a simplified version of the origi-
nal one. More elaborated language is available in (Kendall, 2001b). The first
process implements the behaviour of the flow task. The second process imple-
ments the behaviour of the valve task. The actual definition of the data vari-
ables (fFlow and vFlow) and the operations (readSensor and adjustValve)
are assumed to be provided from an external language (e.g., C). The two pro-
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Flow | Valve
where
Flow =
every 10000 do
readSensor();
snd(k, FLOW, fFlow)
end every
Valve =
loop do
rcv(k, FLOW, vFlow);
adjustValve()
end loop
Fig. 2.9: Flow regulator in CANDLE.
cesses are composed together using the parallel operator (|). In addition to
primitive statements (e.g., snd, rcv, and procedure calls), the language fea-
tures constructs to control flow of a program, like any traditional programming
language, such as branching, loops, and exceptions handling. In the following,
we informally introduce the compound statements of the language.
Compound Statements
Case Statement
In the case statement, one of several statements is executed depending on the
evaluated value of an expression. The statement has the following general form:
case e
when v0 => s0
when v1 => s1
...
when vn => sn
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otherwise => s
end case
When the value of the expression e is evaluated, one of the corresponding state-
ment si will be executed when vi matches the return value of the expression. If
none of them are matched, the statement s is executed.
Select statement
The statement allows a choice between a number of statements to be executed
depending on the reception of a message or the elapse of a time. The select
statement has the following form:
select
when rcv(k1, i1.x1) => s1
when rcv(k2, i2.x2) => s2
...
when rcv(kn, in.xn) => sn
when timeout elapse(t) => s
end select
If the message ij is successfully received, then the statement sj is executed. If
more than one message is received, then the choice between which statement is
executed, is made non-deterministically. If no message is received before t time
units, then the statement s is executed. Additionally, CANDLE provides an
extended form of the statement as follows:
select
when rcv(k1, i1.x1) => s1
when rcv(k2, i2.x2) => s2
...
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when rcv(kn, in.xn) => sn
when elapse(t) => s
in
body
end select
The statement behaves similarly to the original one except that the body state-
ment is executing while waiting the message reception and the time expiry.
When a message is received or a time delay is expired, then the execution of
body is interrupted, and the execution of the corresponding statement is started.
Loop statement
The loop statement allows an expression to be executed repeatedly forever.
The statement has the following form:
loop do
s
end loop
where s is a statement.
Every statement
The every statement allows an expression to be executed periodically. The
statement has the following form:
every T do
s
end every
where s is a statement that runs periodically every T time units. The body of
this statement is initiated immediately.
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Trap and Exit statements
The trap is used to handle exceptions produced in a program block. The
statement has the following general form:
trap
when x1 => s1
when x2 => s2
...
when xn => sn
in
body
end trap
where xi is an exception identifier and si is a statement that acts as a handler
for the exception. The body of the trap begins executing. An exception can
be raised inside body using the exit statement, e.g.
exit xi
If an exception is trapped, the execution of body is interrupted and the associate
exception handler begins executing.
2.7 The Translation of CANDLE to bCANDLE
In this section, we briefly give the rules of translating the CANDLE statements
into bCANDLE. We consider the primitive statements first and the compound
statements after that. For more details about the construction of a bCANDLE
model from a CANDLE program, one can refer to (Kendall, 2001b, p. 164).
Null and Idle statements
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JnullK =̂ null
JidleK =̂ idle
Send and Receive statements
Jsnd(k, i.e)K =̂ k!i.x
Jrcv(k, i.e)K =̂ k?i.x;
Elapse statement
Jelapse(T )K =̂ [timer : T ]
Procedure Call
JP (e1, ..., en)K =̂ [ω : tlb, tub]
where P is the name of the procedure, ei is an expression that expresses
a parameter of P , and tlb (resp. tub) is the lower bound (resp. upper
bound) on the time required to execute the procedure and to evaluate its
parameters.
Case statement
Jcase e when v0=>s0 when v1=>s1 . . . when vn=>sn otherwise=>s end caseK =̂
[tlb, tub]; (γ0 → Js0K + γ1 → Js1K + . . . + γn → JsnK + γ → JsK)
where tlb (resp. tub) denotes the lower bound (resp. upper bound) on the
time required to complete the evaluation of e, γi is true iff the expression
e equals vi, and the guard γ is true when iff ¬(γ0 ∨ γ1 . . . ∨ γn).
Select statement
Jselect when g0=>s1 when g1=>s1 . . . when gn=>sn end selectK =̂
(β0; s0 + β1; s1 + . . .+βn; sn)
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where JgK = β, and β is either k?i.x or [timer : t].
The extended select statement is translated into bCANDLE as follows:
Jselect when g0=>s0 when g1=>s1 . . . when gn=>sn in s end select K =̂
(JsK [> (β0; s0 + β1; s1 + . . .+ βn; sn))
Loop statement
Jloop do s end loopK =̂ rec LOOP.JsK;LOOP
where LOOP is a new process variable.
Every statement
Jevery T do s end everyK =̂
Jloop do select when elapse T in s;idle end select end loopK
Trap and Exit statements
Jtrap when x0=>s0 when x1=>s1 . . . when xn=>sn in s end trapK =̂
(JsK[>(γ0 → Js0K + γ1 → Js1K + . . .+ γn → JsnK))
where the guard γi is the true when the exception xi is raised.
Jexit xK =̂ [exit x : tlb, tub]; idle
where exit x is an operation required to raise the exception x.
Sequential and Parallel Composition
Js1 ; s2K =̂ Js1K ; Js2KJs1 | s2K =̂ Js1K | Js2K
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the code and model generation approach has been
provided. The main assumptions of the target distributed embedded systems
have been presented. The essential component of the approach which is the
bCANDLE modelling language has been introduced. The net, the intermediate
representation model at which our code and model generator are based, has
been defined. Because bCANDLE is very-low level for system developers, the
CANDLE high-level language is introduced. The translation rules of CANDLE
to bCANDLE and of bCANDLE to net have been outlined.
3. CANDLE CODE GENERATOR
3.1 Introduction
We aim in this chapter to demonstrate how an implementation is generated from
CANDLE. Our approach generates executable C code from the intermediate net
representation. The C language is chosen because is widely supported and has
available cross-compilers and static analysis tools. A program written in C is
not tied to a particular hardware platform and so it can be easily ported. There
are particular reasons for using the net to derive the implementation. First, the
net is a simple and compact representation which can yield a small size of
code suitable to a resource-constrained embedded system. Second, there are
some CANDLE constructs that lead to similar nets at translation. Therefore,
implementing the net can reduce the effort required to generate code for each
CANDLE statement. Third, the behaviour of the implementation should be
designed in a way that matches the semantics of CANDLE. This problem is
now scaled down to the problem of generating code which only needs to respect
the semantics of the net.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our implementation
model to execute the net. Section 3.3 presents the representation of the net
in the C language. The implementation of CANDLE channels is explained
in section 3.4. A simple architecture language is presented in section 3.5. The
language is adopted to describe the system architecture including hardware and
software components. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The Implementation Model
This section defines the implementation model to execute a net. This model
has been adopted in order to restrict the run-time behaviour of the system in
a way that allows off-line prediction for the execution time bounds of system
components. The system then can be analysed to verify that it conforms to a
specification and that sufficient run-time resources are available.
3.2.1 Features and Notation
Fig. 3.1 shows some features of the implementation model and introduces no-
tation used in its description. The implementation is clock-driven: a timer
provides a single interrupt source and a periodic interrupt to the implementa-
tion. The period of the interrupt is denoted by T . The interrupt is serviced by
an interrupt service routine (ISR) that takes Cs time units to execute on each
invocation. The time Cs comprises the maximum time to execute the ISR algo-
rithm, presented in section 3.3.2, and the maximum time to enter and leave the
ISR. If the actual execution time of the ISR is less than Cs for any invocation
then the completion of the ISR is deferred until Cs time units have elapsed.
This helps to reduce jitter in the system. The ISR is assumed to contain a
notional reaction instant, ρ, at which point all executable instantaneous actions
are deemed to be performed. It is not known when this instant will happen
exactly inside the ISR, but it could be at any time between the beginning and
the end of the ISR. This non-determinism in the model allows the omission of
many details in the model of the ISR, simplifying it and making model checking
more tractable.
A reaction may include the following ‘instantaneous’ actions:
• update active soft timers,
• transfer external CAN messages to intermediate ISR buffers,
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e
Fig. 3.1: Features and notation of the implementation model.
• identify the termination of computations and fire associated transitions,
• transfer data to transmit buffers for any active k!i.x transitions and fire
the transitions,
• transfer message data, if available, from intermediate ISR buffers to pro-
cess variables for active k?i.x transitions and fire the transitions,
• perform local communications, if available, and fire transitions,
• evaluate active guards and fire the transitions of those that are satisfied,
• release the next computation.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the release of a computation C1 in the reaction of the second
invocation of the ISR. Its actual execution time is denoted e. The time available
for process computation in any tick period is called a computation interval and
is denoted by χ. Notice that in any tick period, a node is executing the ISR,
executing some process computation or idling, i.e. T = Cs+ χ.
The period of the interrupt T and the ISR time Cs are not fixed; they may
vary from one computing node to another. The value of T is assumed to be
determined by the user at design time. Different values of T may have different
effects on the real system. For example, if T is selected to be short, then the
system becomes more responsive because events are noticed more quickly, but
more overhead occurs because the ISR is executed more often. On the other
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hand, when T is chosen to be long, the system will suffer less overhead, but it
becomes less responsive.
The proposed model has been influenced by other approaches, mainly the time-
triggered approach (Kopetz, 1997) and synchronous approach (Benveniste and
Berry, 1991). In the following, a comparison between our approach and other
approaches are discussed.
3.2.2 Comparison with Other Models
There are two distinctly different approaches to the design of real-time embed-
ded systems: event-triggered (ET) approach and time-triggered (TT) approach.
It is not the purpose of the thesis to compare the event-triggered and time-
triggered approaches. Many comparisons between the two approaches have
been published elsewhere, for example (Kopetz, 1991; Alber, 2004; Scarlett and
Brennan, 2006; Armengaud et al., 2009). The aim here is to justify the decision
behind adopting a time-triggered design to execute the net.
The majority of software architectures follow the ET paradigm. In the ET
approach, all system activities (computations and communications) are initi-
ated whenever a significant change in the environment (event) occurs, such as
a time tick, a button press, or arrival of a message. The ET approach is char-
acterised by flexibility and imposes fewer design constraints compared to the
TT approach. It requires fewer assumptions such as in constructing the system
architecture (Armengaud et al., 2009). Adding additional components to the
system does not require changes in the other system components. However, the
ET architecture uses the notation of an interrupt to observe the occurrence of
the environment events. Each event can be associated with an interrupt that
forces the system to react to the event by executing an appropriate compu-
tation (task). Because it is not known pre-runtime when the interrupts will
happen, it becomes difficult to calculate the worst-case execution times of the
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systems components off-line which are required to construct a model of the sys-
tem. Therefore, unless events are periodic or sporadic, the temporal behaviour
of the ET system becomes difficult to predict. Although there are some tech-
niques such as stopwatches (Cassez and Larsen, 2000) that does not require
pre-runtime calculation of worst-case execution times, using stopwatches may
make some verifications undecidable (Brihaye et al., 2006; Cassez and Larsen,
2000; Henzinger et al., 1995). Additionally, the architecture requires special
mechanisms (e.g., semaphore and mutex) to resolve data access sharing, and
inter-task communication and synchronisation. These mechanisms are resource
demanding and can make timing analysis of the system behaviour even more
complex.
In the TT approach, all system activities are initiated at pre-defined points in
time (Kopetz, 1997). The approach imposes a restriction on using interrupts in
order to preserve the predictability of the system behaviour. There is usually
one source of interrupt which is the tick timer (Kopetz, 1995). The system
periodically observes the state of the environment and triggers an appropriate
action according to a predefined plan. TT architecture employs a static or pre-
defined scheduler in which the schedule of all software components is computed
off-line (Xu and Parnas, 2000). Since the main characteristics of the components
(periods, worst-case computation times, and deadlines) are known in advance,
it is possible to verify that all timing constraints will be satisfied. Using such
a scheduler strongly facilitates timing analysis of the system (Ebner, 1998).
Moreover, the static scheduler provides pre-run time resolving of the timing
and data dependencies and so avoiding using resource demanding mechanisms
such as semaphores. However, building the TT schedule requires a number of
parameters of the system components to be determined during the design time,
such as the tick interval and the task order and offset. The problem is that de-
termining these parameters is not trivial and characterised as NP-hard (Gendy
and Pont, 2008). Moreover, slight changes to these parameters may lead to a
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significant change in the reconstruction of the schedule. This problem is called
the “fragility” of the TT design (Pont, 2008a). In contrast, our approach does
not impose restricted assumptions (e.g, periodicity) on the system components.
Once the bounds on the execution times are calculated, they are exported to the
model generator. An abstract model is produced from the system description.
Then the system behaviour can be analysed using a model-checking tool.
Additionally, the proposed approach has been influenced by the synchronous
approach (Benveniste and Berry, 1991). The synchronous approach adopts a
very conservative assumption called the synchrony hypothesis about the system
behaviour. It assumes that computations and communications of the system
components take zero time to execute. The system reacts to its environment
instantaneously. At each reaction, it reads its inputs, performs computation,
and then generates its outputs. The system components communicate through
broadcast channels. During one reaction the transmitted data becomes available
instantly to each receiver component. The broadcast communication mecha-
nism behaves similarly to wires in a synchronous digital circuit (Benveniste
et al., 2003). With the fully synchronous approach it is not always feasible to
build systems because it is often that systems are implemented on a distributed
architecture in which a set of computing nodes communicate by asynchronous
means of communication. For that reason, the globally asynchronous locally
synchronous (GALS) approach (Berry et al., 1993) has been proposed to unify
the capabilities of the synchronous and asynchronous approaches. The sys-
tem can be seen in this context as a set of synchronous components that are
connected by asynchronous communication channels. In contrast, our approach
adopts more flexible and realistic assumptions about the system behaviour than
the the synchronous approach. Computations take time to execute. The ex-
ecution times of the computations can be bounded by adopting a restrictive
software architecture similar to TT architecture. The system components com-
municate through broadcast channels which abstract the CAN protocol. If the
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components are allocated in the same computing node, they communicate via
local channels in which the transmission time is assumed to occur instantly. The
concept of local channels is discussed in section 3.4.2. When the components
are distributed, the transmission time is not instant. Moreover, the GALS ap-
proach employs two different semantics models to express the system behaviour,
which is locally synchronous and deterministic, and globally asynchronous and
non-deterministic. This however makes the task of checking whether the im-
plementation respects the semantics of its model so hard. In contrast, our
approach employs a single semantics model, which is fully asynchronous and
non-deterministic.
3.2.3 Scheduling
Many nodes in a CAN-based system may require only an elementary software
architecture in which a single process repeatedly performs a simple function,
e.g. a sensor node that samples its environment, normalises the reading given
by its ADC and broadcasts the result on the CAN bus. However, some nodes
may require a more complicated architecture in which the CPU is shared by
computations released by multiple processes. A key requirement for the appli-
cation of our method is the capability to perform oﬄine calculation of best-case
and worst-case bounds on the total time required to complete all computa-
tions, including time when a computation is ready to run but is not allocated
to the CPU. The flexibility of the computation model that we allow means
that, in general, it is not possible to adopt typical scheduling strategies such
as fixed-priority pre-emptive or earliest-deadline-first in our implementations,
since the periodicity requirements for the application of response-time anal-
ysis techniques applicable to these strategies may not be satisfied. Instead,
we consider other standard strategies including round-robin and cooperative
scheduling (Liu, 2000; Pont, 2008b) in which an oﬄine analysis is possible.
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These standard strategies are reviewed in the reminder of this section.
1. Pure round-robin scheduling is a simple scheduling approach in which
the processes are ordered and each process is allocated a single compu-
tation interval (‘slot’) in which to execute (part of) a computation. The
next slot is allocated to the next process in the ordering and so on, until
all processes have had a chance to use a slot. This completes a round of
the schedule. If there are n processes in the round-robin set, then every
round is of length n. The schedule is simply the repetition of rounds
executed in this fashion. This approach is reasonable for long running
computations (i.e. computations that needs more than one computation
interval to complete). However, if the set of processes allocated to the
same node contains short computations (i.e. computations that can com-
plete in a single computation interval), then the round-robin approach
could be inefficient. For example, Fig. 3.2 shows three short computa-
tions (C1, C2, and C3) scheduled using the simple round-robin approach.
The computations become ready to run in the first tick. Because they
are dispatched in order, C3 requires three ticks (one round) to complete,
even though it is a short computation.
C1 C2 C3
t
T
e3
Fig. 3.2: Simple round-robin scheduling of short computations.
2. Cooperative scheduling may be adopted when the set of processes
allocated to a node contains computations that are short enough to fit
together in a single computation interval. They can be scheduled co-
operatively, i.e. in any computation interval, each process with a ready
computation runs to completion and then relinquishes the CPU to allow
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execution of the next ready computation, if there is one (Pont, 2008b).
When all ready computations have been completed, the idle process runs
until the next timer interrupts. Fig 3.3 shows three short computations
scheduled cooperatively. Now, because C3 has a chance to run in the
same computation interval as C1 and C2, the computation will complete
in one tick time.
C1 C2 C3
t
T
e3
Fig. 3.3: Cooperative scheduling of short computations.
3. Weighted round-robin scheduling is a modification of the simple
round-robin approach in which each process is assigned a weight. The
weight of a process determines the number of consecutive slots that are
allocated to it in every round. If the round-robin set comprises processes
P1, . . . , Pn and each process Pi is assigned a weight si then the number
of slots in every round is
∑n
i=1 si. For example, Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5
show two computations C1 and C2 scheduled using the simple and the
weighted round-robin approach, respectively. By using the simple round-
robin method, although C1 completes within one tick time, C2 will require
4 ticks (two rounds) to complete, see Fig. 3.4. However, in the modified
round-robin method, we could assign C1 weight 1 and C2 weight 2, then
the computation C2 will complete within 3 ticks (one round), see Fig. 3.5.
C2
t
T
C1 C2
e2
Fig. 3.4: Pure round-robin scheduling.
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C2
t
C1
e2
Fig. 3.5: Weighted round-robin scheduling.
4. Hybrid scheduling A hybrid scheduling algorithm combines cooperative
scheduling and weighted round-robin scheduling. The set of processes,
P , is divided into two disjoint subsets, Pco and Prr, of cooperatively-
scheduled and round-robin processes, respectively. The available compu-
tation time χ in a tick period is divided into a time interval, χco, for
cooperatively-scheduled processes and a time interval, χrr, for round-
robin processes. The processes in Pco are scheduled using cooperative
scheduling during χco and the processes in Prr are scheduled using weighted
round-robin scheduling during χrr. The actual values for χco and χrr can
be chosen freely by the system developer, as long as χco + χrr = χ. Hy-
brid scheduling subsumes both cooperative and round-robin scheduling:
if Pco = P (and χco = χ) then we have pure cooperative scheduling;
and if Prr = P (and χrr = χ) then we have pure weighted round-robin
scheduling. Fig.3.6 shows an example of the hybrid scheduling of three
computations. The computation C1 and C2 are scheduled cooperatively,
whereas the computation C3 is scheduled using the weighted round robin.
t
C1C2 C3
T
χco χrr
Fig. 3.6: Example of hybrid scheduling.
Four static scheduling approaches have been proposed. For the purpose of this
study, we implemented only the pure round-robin and the cooperative sched-
uler. The choice between using one of them is performed oﬄine by the system
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developer. For example, if a process has a computation that updates a slow de-
vice, then it should not be scheduled cooperatively with other processes because
this kind of computation is considerably slower than that which illuminates a
LED for example. A general analysis of the response times of computations un-
der these scheduling policies is presented in section 4.2.4. The implementation
of the other methods will be considered in future work.
3.3 Representation of the Net
Embedded systems have constrained resources (CPU and memory) so an ef-
ficient executable code in terms of space and performance is a common re-
quirement. In this section, we demonstrate how a net is implemented in C.
Efficient data structures are proposed to store a net in memory. Attention has
been paid to splitting the code between read-only memory (ROM) and random-
access memory (RAM). Storing part of the code in ROM prevents unexpected
changes. For example, a stack may overwrite the program data as it shares
RAM area with the program. Moreover, minimising the required area of RAM
reduces the total cost of the embedded system because RAM is more expensive
than ROM storage chips. In the following, the data structures used to represent
the net are presented in section 3.3.1. The pseudo code the ISR that updates
the net state is presented in section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Data Representation
The main architecture of the net is described using a UML class diagram de-
picted in Fig. 3.7. In this figure, the class Net consists of places, marked places
and a number of transitions. A transition is represented by the class Transition
which consists of trigger, target places, vulnerable places and an attribute.
The attribute can be one of the simple primitives: computation, send, receive,
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or guard. Therefore, the attribute is defined as an abstract class represented
by Attribute and each primitive is defined as a sub-class, Computation, Send,
Receive, or Guard respectively. A computation can be a normal computation
(that is executed outside the ISR and updates the data state) represented by
the sub-class Compt, an idle computation represented by the sub-class Idle,
a delay (timer) represented by the sub-class Delay, or an exit computation
(that raises an exception) represented by the sub-class Exit. We differentiate
between these types of computation because each one has a different implemen-
tation. A guard can arise in three ways: as a result of a function call in the
case statement, a value of a variable in the case statement, or an exception
handled in the trap-exit statement. Each type of guard is defined by the sub-
classes GuardFun, GuardV ar, and GuardExp respectively because they are
implemented in different ways.
AttributeGuard
-guard
Receive
-channel
-message ID
-variable
Send
-channel
-message ID
-variable
Computation
-operation
Transition
-trigger
-target Places
-vulnerable Places
Net
-places
-marked Places
1
1
1 1..n
Delay
Exit
GuardVar
GuardFun
GuardExp Compt
Idle
Fig. 3.7: Net architecture in UML.
In the following, we demonstrate how each element of the net is implemented.
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First, we show the representation of the marked place, target places and vul-
nerable places. Next, the structure of the transition and the net is presented.
After that, we illustrate the representation of the attribute. Then, we show
how the data of the net is split between ROM and RAM. Finally, we give an
example.
Places of the Net
The marked places, the target places and the vulnerable places of a net are
represented by using bit-set data structures. A bit-set is defined as an array of
words. A word is a platform dependent and could equal 8, 16, or 32 bits. There
is a 1 or 0 corresponding to each element, specifying whether it is a member
of the set or not. Bit-sets provide a more space efficient solution than normal
arrays. Additionally, the C language features bit operations which can facilitate
straightforward implementation of the set operations such as intersection, union
and complement. These operations are needed to implement update marking
of the net. The number of words needed to specify the size of the bit-set is
expressed by N PLACE WORDS. The number of words of a 32-bit platform (for
example) can be obtained from the total number of the net places N PLACES
using Equation 3.1.
N PLACE WORDS =
⌈
N PLACES
32
⌉
(3.1)
Transition and Net Structure
A transition is represented as an ordinary C structure containing target places,
vulnerable places and an attribute. The net is defined as an array of this
structure. There is only one unique trigger (a number of a place) for every
transition, therefore an index of a particular transition in the array expresses
the trigger of the transition. Each transition must have a storage area for
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an attribute. The Attribute is represented using three fields in the transition
structure: type, index, and attribute. Fig. 3.8 shows the transition structure.
index
attribute
type
vulnerable
target
Fig. 3.8: Transition Structure.
Attribute Representation
The type ∈ AttributeType indicates the type of an attribute. The set of
attribute types is defined by:
AttributeType =̂ {IDLE, COMPT, DELAY, EXIT, GFUN, GVAR, GEXP, SEND, RECV},
where the elements of the set represent the sub-classes Idle, Compt, Delay,
Exit, GuardFun, GuardV ar, GuardExp, Send, and Receive, respectively.
The index and attribute field are defined as integers and used in a variety
of ways to store the details of different attributes. This is discussed in the
following.
Computation When the attribute type is computation, there are three ways
to deal with the attribute. First, if the computation is IDLE or COMPT, the
index field of the transition refers to a particular block in a net control
block (NCB) table. Each net has an NCB which represents the state of
the net during the execution of the system. Primarily, the NCB deals
with the case at which the net is currently executing a computation and
so it indicates the status of the computation:
1. it is currently executing but not completed,
2. it is completed,
3. it is not currently executing.
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The NCB also stores the result when the computation is a function. The
attribute field of the transition contains the memory address of the C
routine that implements the computation. Second, if the computation is
DELAY, then the index field refers to a particular timer in a timer table.
The timer table consists of a number of soft timers, and each timer is
allocated to a delay transition. These timers are updated by the ISR in
order to track the elapsed time for active (marked) delay transitions. The
attribute field is used to store the number of ticks to delay. Third, if
the computation is EXIT, then the index field refers to a particular block
in an exception control block (ECB) table. Each net has an ECB used
to indicate what exception is currently raised in the net. There is a flag
associated with each exception in the net. The attribute field contains
the exception mask which is used to access a particular flag in the ECB.
Guard When the attribute type is guard, there are three ways to deal with
the attribute. First, if the guard is GFUN, then the index field refers to the
NCB which stores the result of a function. The attribute field holds the
intended value of the guard. Second, if the guard is GVAR, then the index
field contains the memory address of the variable, and the attribute field
also holds the intended value of the guard. Third, if the guard is GEXP,
then the index field refers to an ECB in the ECB table. The attribute
field contains the exception mask which is used to access to a particular
flag in the ECB.
Send and Receive When the attribute type is SEND or RECV, the message
identifier, message length, and an index to a particular block in a port
control block (PCB) table, are packed in the index field. The PCB records
the state of a particular port connected to a channel during execution.
The PCB identifies whether the communication is local or external. It
indicates if there is a new received message and provides a place to store
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type field index field attribute field
IDLE Index to NCB table. Address of idle routine.
COMPT Index to NCB table. Address of computation routine.
DELAY Index to timer table. Number of ticks.
EXIT Index to ECB table. Exception mask.
GFUN Index to NCB table. Guard value.
GVAR Address of variable. Guard value.
GEXP Index to ECB table. Exception mask.
SEND Message ID, message length, Address of variable.
and index to PCB table.
RECV Message ID, message length, Address of variable.
and index to PCB table.
Tab. 3.1: Attribute representation summary.
the details of the received message including message identifier, message
length, and data. Local and external communication is discussed later
in section 3.4. The address of a variable that stores the message data, is
stored in the attribute field.
The different representations of the attribute types in the transition structure
are summarised in Table 3.1.
ROM or RAM
Constant data are not changed during run-time. This can be implemented
in C by using the const qualifier. The const attribute allows a C compiler
to place the constant data in ROM. The transitions (which is an array of
transitions representing the net) is not changed during run-time, therefore it is
more memory efficient to store it in ROM. Because transitions is constant
variable, it must be initialised pre-run-time. The marking (which is a bit-set
representing the current marking of the net) can be be changed during run-
time, so it must be stored in RAM. The marking is defined as a usual variable
in C.
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Example
We use a modified version of the flow regulator example introduced in Chapter 2.
We add a trap-exit and a case statement to the example in order to have all type
of guards in the net representation. Additionally, the code from this example is
generated for a single-node architecture, which means that both the Flow and
Valve process run on the same node and communicate via a local channel. The
aim of this example is not to describe a realistic system, but to generate a small-
sized transition table that demonstrates the data structures of a net. Fig 3.9
shows the CANDLE program of the example. The process Valve is modified
to raise the exception ALARM when the flow rate exceeds some range. Testing
the flow rate is modelled using the case testFlow() statement. The function
testFlow() can return three values: 0, 1, and 2 representing the state of the
flow rate, low, high, or out-of-range respectively. The exception is handled by
reporting a suitable warning and moving to an idle state thereafter.
Flow | Valve
where
Flow =
every 10000 do
readSensor();
snd(k, FLOW, fFlow)
end every
Valve =
trap
when ALARM => reportWarning(); idle
in
loop do
rcv(k, FLOW, vFlow);
case testFlow()
when 0 => increaseFlow()
when 1 => decreaseFlow()
when 2 => exit ALARM
end case
end loop
end trap
Fig. 3.9: Modified flow regulator in CANDLE.
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The net representation of the example is shown in Fig. 3.10. In the figure,
there are two nets, the top net represents the Flow process, and the bottom one
represents the Valve process. The total number of transitions is 14, there is
one trigger (place) for one transition. The idle transition is repeated to simplify
the diagram. The places of the net are numbered to match their ordering in
the generated transition table where transitions are sorted by their attribute
type (in ascending order of transition number) as follows: send, receive, com-
putation, guard, and delay. This order is adopted primarily for the correctness
of the implementation (which is discussed in Chapter 4), and to improve the
performance of operations (the ISR in particular) that work with the transition
table.
[readSensor] k!FLOW.fFLOW idle
13
[testFlow] 9
10
11
〈gf0〉
〈gf1〉
〈gf2〉
[increaseFlow]
[decreaseFlow]
12
[exit ALARM] idle
idle〈gfx〉 [reportWarning]
k?FLOW.vFLOW
[timer:10000]
3
4 5
6
7
8
0
0
0
1
2
Fig. 3.10: Nets of the modified flow regulator example.
Fig. 3.11 shows the generated data structures of the example nets and the initial
marking. There is a bit-set representing the current marking of the nets. The
transition table comprises 14 transition structures representing the transitions
of the nets. The NCB table comprises three blocks: one associated with each of
the processes, Flow and Valve, and one associated with the idle process, which
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executes when no other process has a computation ready to execute. The PCB
table has one block because there is one port connected to a single local channel.
The ECB table consists of three blocks similarly to the NCB table. There is
only one delay transition in the nets so the timer table has one soft timer.
3.3.2 Overview of ISR Implementation
The state of a net is evolved (changed) according to two rules, the process tran-
sition rule R.1 and the network transition rule R.2 introduced in section 2.4.2.
R.1 can modify both marking of the net and the data state, whereas R.2 can
only modify the network state. We assume that the behaviour defined by R.2
is handled by the CAN controller. Therefore, only operations required by R.1
are considered for implementation in the ISR.
The ISR is configured to run periodically. The ISR updates the marking of a
net according to the attribute type of a transition. The ISR implements the
behaviour of the net as it is defined in the rule R.1. Algorithm 1 shows the
pseudo code of the ISR. First, all active soft timers are updated in order to
track the elapsed time. Next, the ISR polls all external receive buffers to record
new arrived messages. If a message arrives after this step is completed, then it
will only be considered in the next invocation of the ISR. After that, all local
communication buffers are marked as stale (or reset). This ensures that any
local message transmitted in the previous invocation of ISR will not be available
again for reception in the current ISR. Then, the ISR reacts to all marked places
in the net. In this step, a new marking of the net is obtained by firing all ready
transitions. This step is repeated until the marking of the net becomes stable.
This means that all ready instantaneous primitives (actions) are executed in
the current ISR. However, in the first iteration of this loop, all external receive
buffers are marked as stale. It means that any external message received at
the beginning of the current ISR, will not be available again for reception in
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Fig. 3.11: Example of transition table.
3. CANDLE Code Generator 67
next iteration, otherwise the ISR could enter an infinite loop. After that, one
or more ready computations are scheduled to run during the next tick interval.
Finally, the ISR makes all external messages ready for transmission just before
it returns. In this step, the messages in the external transmit buffers become
ready for transmission.
Update soft timers;
Update external port control blocks;
Mark all local port control blocks as stale;
repeat
savedMarking ← marking;
foreach marked place i do
marking ← React(i);
end
if First iteration then
Mark all external port control blocks as stale;
end
until savedMarking = marking ;
Schedule next computation(s);
Flag external transmit buffers;
return
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code of the ISR.
The ISR reacts to a marked place according to the attribute type of the tran-
sition of which the place is the trigger. When the operation is completed, the
current marking of the net is updated, and the system state (represented by
the current values of NCBs, PCBs, ECBs) is modified. The pseudo code of
the React operation is presented in Algorithm 2. When the condition of a par-
ticular attribute is satisfied, the transition is fired by executing the operation
Fire and so the current marking of the net is updated. The pseudo code of
Fire is shown in Algorithm 3. The operation consists of three steps: remove
the source place p from the current marking, remove the vulnerable places
transitions[p].vulnerable from the current marking, and add the target places
transitions[p].target to the current marking.
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Input: A transition trigger, p.
Output: Updated marking and system state.
switch transitions[p].type do
case IDLE
Skip;
end
case COMPT
if computation is ready and not completed then Skip;
else if computation is completed then Fire(p);
else if computation is not ready then Mark as ready;
end
case DELAY
if timer is active then
if timer is expired then
Fire(p);
Make timer inactive;
end
end
else if timer is inactive then
Load a delay value to timer;
Make timer active;
end
end
case EXIT
Raise the corresponding exception in ECB;
Fire(p);
end
case GFUN
if Function result in corresponding NCB = guard value then
Fire(p);
end
end
case GVAR
if The variable value = guard value then
Fire(p);
end
end
case GEXP
if The exception is raised in corresponding ECB then
Clear the exception flag in corresponding ECB;
Fire(p);
end
end
case SEND
if External channel then
Write message details to an external transmit buffer;
Fire(p);
end
else if Local channel then
Write message details to corresponding PCB;
Fire(p);
end
end
case RECV
if Fresh message available in corresponding PCB then
if message id is matched then
copy the message content to a user data variable;
Fire(p);
end
end
end
end
return
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code of React.
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Input: A transition trigger, p and the current marking, marking of the net.
Output: New marking, marking′ of the net.
marking′ = marking \ ({p} ∪ transitions[p].vulnerable) ∪ transitions[p].target
return
Algorithm 3: Pseudo code of Fire.
3.4 Implementation of Channel
A channel is an abstraction of the CAN protocol through which processes com-
municate via asynchronously broadcast messages. All communications between
system components occur through this mechanism and never through the use
of shared variables. A message is identified with the pair (id, val). The id is the
message identifier which corresponds to the message priority in CAN. The val
is the value of the message which represents the data field of the CAN frame.
bCANDLE processes can be allocated to a number of nodes which are connected
by one or more CAN buses. The allocation of processes determines the imple-
mentation of channels. When the process A communicates with the process B
by the channel k and both A and B are allocated to the same node, then k is
usually mapped to a local channel. In contrast, when A and B are allocated to
two separate nodes, then k is mapped to an external channel. Fig. 3.12 shows
four examples of the possible process-to-node mapping. In the case a, the pro-
cesses P1, P2 and P3 are completely distributed, so they must communicate
using an external channel. In the case b, all processes share the same node,
therefore a local channel must be used for communication. In the case c, the
process P1 and P2 are allocated to the same node, whereas the process P3 is
allocated to another node. The processes, in this scenario, must communicate
by using an external channel since there is at least one process that is allocated
to a separate node. In this particular case, although P1 and P2 are allocated to
the same node, the communication between the two processes occurs through
an external channel. This requires that the communication controller has the
ability to be configured for a self-reception in which a transmitted message can
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be received by the same node. For example, the CAN controller of Philips
LPC2294 supports this feature. Finally, the case d shows that the processes
P1, P2, P3, and P4 are allocated to the same node, then they must use a local
channel for communication. However, the process P5 is allocated to a separate
node, then P5 and P4 must communicate using an external channel.
P1 P2 P3
External Channel
P1 P2 P3
External Channel
P1 P2 P3
Local Channel
(a)
(b)
(c)
P1 P2
External Channel
(d)
P3
P5
P4
Local Channel
Fig. 3.12: Processes-to-nodes mapping.
Two ways of implementing a channel are introduced: external channel and local
channel. We use a simple send/receive example to demonstrate the two different
3. CANDLE Code Generator 71
implementations of channels. In the example, process P1 broadcasts a message
(i, var1) through the channel k and idles thereafter. The process P2 is pending
on channel k until it receives a message with the identifier i. The content of
the message is held in the variable var2. Fig. 3.13 shows bCANDLE model of
the example, and Fig. 3.14 shows the net representation of the model.
P1 | P2
where
P1 = k!i.var1 ; idle
P2 = k?i.var2 ; idle
network
k = (i: pri, lb, ub, lB, uB)
data var1, var2
Fig. 3.13: The bCANDLE model of simple send/receive example.
k!i.var1 idle
k?i.var2 idle
Fig. 3.14: The Net of simple send/receive example.
3.4.1 External Channel
When the communicating process P1 and P2 are allocated to two separate
nodes, then the channel k must be mapped onto a physical communication
link. The processor delegates responsibility for the communication to an ex-
ternal CAN controller. Fig. 3.15 illustrates the structure of a communication
between processes P1 and P2. When k!i.var1 of the process P1 is marked and
ready to run, the ISR writes the message content held in the variable var1 to
a CAN transmit buffer. The ISR then sets a flag transmit flag to indicate
that the message is available for transmission. On the receiving node, When
k?i.var2 of P2 is marked and ready to run, the ISR polls a flag receive flag
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to check the arrival of the message. This occurs periodically until the intended
message arrives. When a message is received with the identifier i, then the ISR
reads a CAN receive buffer and assigns the message content to the variable var2
of the process P2.
var1
CAN transmit
buffer
transmit flag
var2
CAN receive
buffer
receive flag
CAN buscanWrite(var1) canRead(var2)
ISR ISR
P1 P2
Fig. 3.15: P1 communicates with P2 by external channel.
3.4.2 Local Channel
If the process P1 and P2 are allocated to the same computing node, then the
channel k is mapped onto a local channel. When k!i.var1 of the process P1 and
k?i.var2 of P2 are both marked and ready to run, the memory address of var1
and var2 are passed to the ISR. The ISR then copies the value of var1 to var2
provided both the source and destination message identifiers are matched, see
Fig. 3.16. The current example has only one receiver process. However, when
there are a number of receiver processes, the ISR will provide each receiver a
copy of the value of the sent message at the same time.
3.5 Representation of the Architecture
The code generator requires information about the architecture of the execution
platform in order to produce the code correctly. This includes information
about processes, nodes, process-to-node allocation, scheduling algorithm, tick
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var1 var2
var2← var1
P1 P2
ISR
Fig. 3.16: P1 communicates with P2 by local channel.
rate, and communication details (e.g, network transmission rate and message
identifiers). In the current work, a special-adopted file format is used to describe
the architecture of a system. The adopted language has a simple textual syntax
but allows to specify all details which are necessary for the code generation.
Fig.3.17 shows an example of a configuration file created for the flow regulator
example. The system consists of two computing nodes: flow and valve. The
process Flow is allocated to the node flow and Valve is allocated to the node
valve. The first node uses 32 bits word size, has 1000µsec tick rate, employs
a simple round-robin scheduling algorithm, and defines a single external com-
munication port. There is a separate section to define processes. For instance,
the process Flow allows 20 words at maximum for the stack size and defines
one channel k mapped to the communication port CAN 0. Additionally, there
is a section to describe the communication channels. The section defines the
transmission rate and messages exchanged between the system components.
For instance, in the example shown in Fig 3.17, the transmission rate is set at
100 kbit/s. Messages with the identifier FLOW are used for communications, and
the size of the data field of a message is only 1 byte.
There is however an industry standard language to specify a system architec-
ture. The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) (Feiler et al.,
2006) can be used to describe the execution platform of the generated code.
The language has both a textual and a graphical representation. The AADL
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node flow
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Flow
scheduler : ROUND_ROBIN
ports : CAN_0
process Flow
stacksize : 20
channels : k -> CAN_0
node valve
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Valve
scheduler : ROUND_ROBIN
ports : CAN_0
process Valve
stacksize : 20
channels : k -> CAN_0
channel k
bps : 100000
messages : <FLOW:1>
Fig. 3.17: The architecture description of the flow regulator example.
comprises elements to specify software components (data, thread, process and
subprogram), hardware components (device, memory, bus and processor) and
composition (system).
Fig. 3.18 shows the AADL representation of the flow regulator example. The
processes Flow and Valve are bound to the nodes flow and valve respectively.
The channel k is an external channel and therefore it is bound to the physical
CAN bus CAN 0. We use the system element to represent a channel. This ele-
ment is abstract and can be mapped to a software or to a hardware component.
Therefore, it is suitable for specifying both external and local channels.
The second example shown in Fig 3.19 presents another configuration for the
flow regulator example. The processes Flow and Valve are bound to the same
node flow−valve. The channel k is local channel and so it is bound to a
memory element which represents the local communication.
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flow
valve
Flow
Valve
kCAN 0
Actual Processor Binding
Actual Processor Binding
Channel Binding
Fig. 3.18: The AADL of the flow regulator example (distributed architecture).
Flow
Valve
k
Actual Processor Binding
Actual Processor Binding
Channel Binding
flow-valve
LOCAL DATA
Fig. 3.19: The AADL of the flow regulator example (single-node architecture).
AADL has built-in properties to provide information about system components.
A property has a name, type, and an associated value. For instance, the prop-
erty Actual Processor Binding allows to bind a process to a processor compo-
nent. Interestingly, the language permits defining new properties. This feature
is very useful in specifying other system information of node components (e.g,
word size, scheduling algorithm, tick rate), process components (stack size and
channel binding), and channel components (e.g, transmission rate and message
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identifiers). This can be a subject of future work.
3.6 Summary
The CANDLE code generator has been introduced in this chapter. Executable
code is derived from a net which is the intermediate model of a CANDLE sys-
tem. Our implementation model to execute the net has been presented. An
efficient C representation of the net has been designed. The implementation
of broadcast channels has been described. Finally, an AADL-like language has
been adopted to describe the system architecture including nodes, processes
and channels. The approach taken simplifies the process of reasoning about the
relationship between generated formal model and its implementation, because
both the model and code are derived from the same net. The main point of this
chapter is to generate executable code for CAN-based distributed embedded
systems in a way that guarantees that both functional and timing properties
expressed in a high-level formal language are satisfied. Chapter 4 presents a
rigorous argument demonstrating that a generated formal model is a conser-
vative approximation of its implementation. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the
approach adopted provides an efficient implementation. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to apply such a method to the implementation
of distributed embedded systems.
4. CORRECTNESS OF SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Introduction
The main goal of this work is to produce a method for the development of CAN-
based embedded systems that provides both for the generation of reasonably
efficient system implementations and also formal models that conservatively
approximate their implementations; both components are to be generated auto-
matically from the same system description. This chapter addresses the imple-
mentation and modelling decisions that have been made to ensure that models
conservatively approximate their implementations.
We have adopted the time-triggered implementation model which has been
described in Chapter 3. According to the implementation model, all instanta-
neous primitives are assumed to run inside the ISR. Computation primitives
however are assumed to run outside the ISR. In this chapter, we discuss the
correctness of the implementation of each primitive. An informal argument has
been used to demonstrate that the implementation satisfies the semantics of its
model. The reason for this approach is that the target implementation language
(which is C) lacks a formal semantics. Although there have been many attempts
to provide a formal semantics to C, for example recently in (Ellison and Rosu,
2012), the validation of the translation from C to a low-level machine language
is very important to ensure that the C compiler generates an executable code
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that behaves exactly as specified by the semantics of the source program. A
rigorous solution to this problem is not trivial. The problem has been addressed
in the CompCert project (CompCert, 2012) and the results have been exten-
sively published, for instance (Blazy, 2008; Dargaye, 2009; Leroy, 2009; Blazy
and Leroy, 2009; Bedin et al., 2012).
The chapter is organised as follows. Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the
modelling and implementation decisions made to ensure the correctness of the
formal language primitives, including computation, guard evaluation, message
reception, and message transmission respectively. Section 4.6 discusses the cor-
rectness of the process combinators (sequential composition, choice, interrupt,
and parallel composition). Finally, section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Computation Release and Termination
In this section we consider how to calculate lower and upper execution time
bounds for the models of computations released by a process P that is assumed
to be the only user process allocated to its node. The bounds are calculated to
ensure that the model is a conservative approximation of the implementation.
We begin by distinguishing between the sets of observable computations, O,
e.g. computations that interact with the environment, perhaps by reading from
a sensor or writing to an actuator, and internal (unobservable) computations,
I, that merely update the local data state without interacting with the envi-
ronment. We assume the set of all computations, C = O ∪ I and O ∩ I = ∅.
The construction of models for internal computations is considered first.
4.2.1 Internal Computations
Fig. 4.1 shows the implementation structure and its related model for a process
fragment given by P = . . . C1();C2(); . . ., where C1, C2 ∈ I.
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ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
C1 C2
T − Cs
T + Cs
Fig. 4.1: Internal computation bounds (we(C1) <= χ)
[C1 : T − Cs, T + Cs]; [C2 : T − Cs, T + Cs].
The worst-case (resp. best-case) execution time of a computation C is denoted
we(C) (resp. be(C)). We assume in the case of both computations C1 and
C2 that their worst-case execution times are no greater than the length of a
computation interval. Hence we can be sure that their actual execution times,
e1 and e2 respectively, are within the computation time available in one tick, i.e.
e1 <= χ and e2 <= χ. Notice that the model [C1 : T − Cs, T + Cs]; [C2 : T −
Cs, T +Cs] allocates bounds enclosing a full tick interval to each computation
in order to account both for any idle time until the next tick and also the time
taken for execution of the ISR. This is similar to the standard approach taken
to account for the time used by a tick scheduler in the response time analysis
of fixed priority systems, e.g. as described by Liu (Liu, 2000). Fig. 4.1 shows
the actual execution time as a shaded grey box and the upper bound on the
extended time as a dashed box. The lower and upper bounds are chosen so
that the model contains behaviours that include successive reaction instants
ρ1 and ρ2 in which ρ1 occurs at the end of the first ISR and ρ2 occurs at the
beginning of the second ISR (lower bound: T −Cs), and, conversely, ρ1 occurs
at the beginning of the first ISR and ρ2 occurs at the end of the second ISR
(upper bound: T + Cs). Therefore, we can be sure that the model contains
all possible behaviours of the implementation. In the case that a computation
requires more than one tick to complete, the bounds on its completion time are
calculated accordingly. Fig. 4.2 illustrates a computation requiring more than
one tick to complete and shows its associated model. Once again, the bounds
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calculated give rise to a non-deterministic model that allows the notional time
of a reaction instant to occur at any point within an ISR.
1 2 n
C1 C1 C1 C1 C2
Fig. 4.2: Internal computation bounds (we(C1) > χ)
[C1 : n.T − Cs, n.T + Cs]; [C2 : T − Cs, T + Cs].
4.2.2 Observable Computations
We assume that all observable computations complete their execution within a
single computation interval. Even so, the model of an observable computation is
a little trickier to construct than that of an internal computation, since we need
to consider its termination not only with regard to the time of the next reaction
instant but also with regard to the time of its interaction with the environment.
Fig. 4.3 shows the implementation structure and its related model for a process
fragment given by P = . . . C1();C2(); . . ., where C1 ∈ O and C2 ∈ I.
C1
be(C1) we(C1)
C2
T − Cs
T + Cs
Fig. 4.3: Observable computation bounds (C1 ∈ O, C2 ∈ I)
([C1 : be(C1), we(C1)]; idle [> [T −Cs, T +Cs]); [C2 : T −Cs, T +Cs].
The associated model is constructed to capture both the actual termination
time of C1, since it may be observed by the environment, and also the effective
termination time of C1 in so far as it causes the release of C2 at the next
reaction instant. The first part is modelled by [C1 : be(C1), we(C1)]; idle, i.e.
C1 actually terminates, and may be observed, at some time between its best-
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case and worst-case execution times; then the idle computation executes until
the next reaction instant. The timing of the next reaction instant is within
the usual bounds for a computation executed within one tick period and is
modelled by the interruption of the idle computation by a non-deterministic
timeout, [T − Cs, T + Cs], whose termination allows the release of C2. So the
complete model in this case is
([C1 : be(C1), we(C1)]; idle [> [T − Cs, T + Cs]); [C2 : T − Cs, T + Cs]
and, in general, the model of any observable computation C is just
([C : be(C), we(C)]; idle [> [T − Cs, T + Cs])
4.2.3 Delay
Explicit delays are introduced into system descriptions using the elapse(<timeSpec>)
statement, where timeSpec is a time specification, e.g. seconds(5), millisec-
onds(10) etc. The code-generator converts timeSpec into a number of ticks and
the model-generator generates a model in which the elapse statement is repre-
sented as an internal computation that implements the identity operation in a
time whose bounds are calculated as in section 4.2.1.
For example, consider the implementation of the statement elapse(microseconds(5500))
on a node with a tick period T = 2 ms. The time specification is converted
into a number of ticks as follows:
microseconds(5500) =
⌈
5500 · 10−6
2 · 10−3
⌉
= 3
and the delay is modelled as [3T − Cs, 3T + Cs], as shown in Fig. 4.4.
Notice that if the requested delay is not a multiple of the tick period, the
implementation provides a delay that is close to the least multiple of the tick
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T
Fig. 4.4: Delay bounds (elapse(microseconds(5500)), T = 2 ms
, [3T − Cs, 3T + Cs].
period greater than the requested delay. The generated model represents this.
4.2.4 Response-Time Analysis
We must be able to perform an oﬄine calculation of the bounds on the response
time of all computations for any chosen scheduling algorithm in order to gen-
erate a model. In the case of a computation, C, released by a cooperatively
scheduled process, we know that it will complete within one tick and so its model
is given simply as [C : T −Cs, T +Cs], as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Computations
that cannot be scheduled in a single tick are called long-running computations
and are scheduled using a weighted round-robin algorithm. The remainder of
this section considers how to calculate the bounds on such computations.
The number of ticks required to provide e time units of execution for a long-
running computation is given by
nt(e) =
⌈
e
χrr
⌉
(4.1)
where χrr is the length of time allocated for the execution of round-robin pro-
cesses in each tick period, i.e. in the hybrid scheduling algorithm the length of
a round-robin slot is given by χrr
If a set of processes {P1, . . . , Pn} is sharing the CPU using a weighted round-
robin scheduler, a computation of length ei released by process Pi will require a
number of rounds given by dnt(ei)si e, where si gives the weight of Pi equal to the
number of round-robin slots allocated to it in a complete round of the schedule.
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For example, let the set of processes and their weights be as follows:
{(P1, 1), (P2, 2), (P3, 3), (P4, 4)}
Then every round is of length 10 and in each round a process is allocated a
number of slots according to its weight. A round in this case would be
P1, P2, P2, P3, P3, P3, P4, P4, P4, P4,
and process P3, for example, would have 3χrr time units allocated to it in every
round for the execution of its long-running computations. 
Worst-case response time
The worst case response time for a long-running computation Ci, released by
process Pi, occurs when Ci is released just as the scheduler is about to schedule
Pi+1 for the first time in this round, i.e. when Pi must wait for all other
processes to use their full allocation and for its slot in the next round to arrive
before it can begin execution.
From this we conclude that the number of ticks required in the worst case to
complete a long-running computation of length ei, released by Pi, in a round
of length R is given by
wt(ei) =
(
R ·
⌈
nt(ei)
si
⌉)
−
(⌈
nt(ei)
si
⌉
· si − nt(ei)
)
(4.2)
The term on the left of the minus sign gives the number of rounds required for
the computation multiplied by the length of a round. The term on the right
compensates for any over-allocation of slots computed by the first term.
For example, assume the same set of processes and weights as in the example
above and a round-robin allocation χrr = 500 time units. Now, assume that
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process P3 releases a computation with a worst-case execution time of 1800 time
units. This will require d1800500 e = 4 ticks which it will receive in d43e = 2 rounds.
Each round is of length 10, so we can say that the computation will complete
in no more than 20 ticks. Actually, in 2 rounds P3 will receive 6 ticks, i.e. 2
ticks more than needed for this computation. So, in fact, the computation will
complete in 18 ticks, as given by equation 4.2. 
Having calculated the number of ticks required in the worst case for the com-
pletion of a computation, Ci, the worst-case response time of Ci is given simply
by the product of this value and the length of the tick period.
W (Ci) = T · wt(we(Ci)) (4.3)
Best-case response time
In the best case the scheduler will be just about to schedule Pi for the first time
in this round, so it will not be necessary for Pi to wait for the rest of the round
to begin its slot. This gives us a formula for the number of ticks required in the
best case to complete a long-running computation of length ei, released by Pi,
in a round of length R:
bt(ei) = wt(ei)−
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\{i}
sj (4.4)
So the number of ticks required in the best case is the just the number of ticks
required in the worst case minus the number of ticks required for the rest of
the round, i.e. the number of ticks allocated to all processes except Pi. The
best-case response time of a computation Ci is then given by
B(Ci) = T · bt(be(Ci)) (4.5)
4. Correctness of System Implementation 85
4.3 Guard Evaluation
A guard is the name of a predicate evaluated in the current data environment
which gives a value either true or false. There are two ways in which a guard can
arise. First, in the CANDLE statement case, the result of a function call (or
the value of a variable) is compared with a number of constant values. Second,
an exception is raised when the exit statement is executed in the trap− exit
statement. In each case the guard is handled (evaluated) inside the ISR which
is performed as a simple test of one value (the result of the evaluation) with
another (e.g, a particular case expression value). The evaluation of a predicate
for a function call occurs as a computation executed outside the ISR. Then the
ISR compares the result of the computation with a simple value. In the case
of exception, a flag is set inside the ISR to raise an exception. Then the ISR
performs a simple test to see whether an exception flag is set or not.
4.4 Message Reception
Particular care needs to be taken to ensure that the generated model is a con-
servative approximation of its implementation in the case of message reception.
There are three main requirements:
1. to ensure that there is an adequate number of receive buffers to store
messages transmitted between polling operations so that messages are
not lost;
2. to identify precisely when a node is marked as ready for message reception
and to account for the time between polling operations; and finally
3. to identify the order of message receptions at different CAN controllers
in gateway nodes.
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4.4.1 Receive Buffers
If there are n receive buffers in a CAN transceiver then
1. there should be no more than n possible acceptances in any interval that
is no longer than T + Cs, and
2. the receive buffers should be flushed at each reaction in the ISR.
These requirements ensure that
1. messages are not lost, and
2. the time to react to a message is properly accounted for.
4.4.2 Reception Readiness
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the difficulty in ensuring that messages are received only
when a node is clearly ready for their reception, according to the semantics
of the model. The figure shows the behaviour of a node with a single process
executing the process fragment . . . C1(); rcv(k, i, x);C2() . . ., in three different
scenarios for the transmission of a message i.v on the CAN bus. The questions
are in which of the scenarios should the message be received and how is the
timing of the reception modelled.
First, remember in our time-triggered implementation model, CAN messages
are polled in each ISR. This is the only opportunity for message reception in an
implementation. At ISR 2 in Fig. 4.5, a message will be available for reception in
scenarios Bus (1) and Bus (2). However, in the former case, the actual execution
of computation C1 will not have completed before the message acceptance point
occurs, and so clearly message reception k?i.x cannot be enabled in time; and
in the latter case, although the actual execution of C1 will have completed
before the message acceptance point, its model represents its termination as
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Node
1 2 3 4C1
k?i.x
T + Cs
C2
Bus (1) (rejected)
Bus (2) (rejected)
Bus (3) (accepted)
Fig. 4.5: Message reception (↑ denotes the message acceptance point)
[C1 : T − Cs, T + Cs]; k?i.x; [0, T + Cs]; [C2 : T − Cs, T + Cs].
occurring at the reaction instant in ISR 2, and again k?i.x is enabled after the
message acceptance point. So, in both of these scenarios, the semantics of the
model requires that the message should not be received. In scenario Bus (3),
the reaction instant at ISR 2, when k?i.x is enabled, is clearly not later than
the message acceptance point. In this case, the message should be received at
ISR 3 and computation C2 will be released in the next computation interval.
It is clear that, at ISR 3, the model needs to allow for the message acceptance
to have occurred at any time between the reaction instants at ISR 2 and ISR 3.
It is not possible to tell, a priori, precisely when the message acceptance point
will occur. Hence, the inclusion in the model of the non-deterministic delay
[0, T + Cs].
The approach taken to ensure that the implementation corresponds with the
semantics of the model is to order the transition table so that receive transitions
are considered first (before computation terminations) and, after the first pass
through the reaction loop, external messages are marked as ‘stale’, i.e. no longer
available for reception in the current reaction. Following this procedure, it can
be seen that a message will not be received in scenarios Bus (1) and Bus (2)
but that a message will be received in scenario Bus (3).
4. Correctness of System Implementation 88
4.4.3 Reception Order
A node may be configured with a number of different CAN controllers. This
could happen in gateway nodes. Fig. 4.6 shows the behaviour of a gateway
node with a single process executing the process fragment
k1?i1.x; [0, T + Cs]; [C1 : T − Cs, T + Cs]
+
k2?i2.y; [0, T + Cs]; [C2 : T − Cs, T + Cs]
and two messages from two different CAN buses arrive in the same interval.
According to the model both k1?i1.x and k2?i2.y are enabled. So if the message
i1 is received first then the computation C1 is released and k2?i2.y is disabled.
However, if the message i2 is received first then the computation C2 is released
and k1?i1.x is disabled. When the acceptance point of the messages occurs in
the same interval, then both message i1 and i2 become available for reception.
The difficulty in the implementation is to determine which message should be
polled first inside the ISR. There are three possible cases to consider:
1. both channels are external,
2. one channel is external and one is local,
3. and, both channels are local.
A possible solution to the first case can be achieved by using CAN controllers
that provide a time stamp on received and transmitted messages (e.g, (Texas-
Instruments, 2005)). When the received messages are time stamped, then the
ISR can identify the order of message receptions and update the transitions
table accordingly.
For the second case, the order of message receptions is ensured by the ISR
implementation. The ISR polls the external receive buffer(s) and updates any
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ready receive transition before checking the local communications. Therefore,
if a message acceptance occurs during the previous interval, the ISR considers
that the external message arrives first. However, if the message acceptance
occurs after the beginning of the ISR, then the local message will be considered
first and the external message will not be processed until the next ISR runs.
In the third case, the order of message receptions is resolved non-deterministically.
Local communication occurs inside the ISR where the transmission and recep-
tion of a message are assumed to happen instantaneously. Therefore, any order
is chosen in the implementation would be acceptable since the model can express
both behaviours.
Node 1 2 3 4C1
k1?i1.x
T + Cs
Bus (1)
Bus (2)
Fig. 4.6: Example of message reception in a gateway node.
Receive with Interrupt Operator
Consider the following process fragment:
k?i.x; [0, T + Cs]; [C1 : t] [> [Timer : t]; [C2 : t]
The new data value of the variable x only becomes available after [0, T + Cs]
is completed. According to the semantics of the interrupt operator, the first
argument may be interrupted at any instant once it is enabled. If it is inter-
rupted just before [0, T + Cs] begins, then the new state of x must be visible
based on the semantics of k?i.x. However, the [Timer : t] is a time delay and
is only evaluated inside the ISR. The message is received and the variable is
updated inside the ISR as well. If we ensure this happen before evaluating the
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timer, then any other primitive will see the new state of the variable after it
is updated. So the term k?i.x; [0, T + Cs] behaves atomically to the second
argument of the interrupt operator.
Similarly if a guard < γ > appears in the second argument. In this case,
we have to ensure also the guard evaluation is performed after the message is
completely received inside the ISR.
Moreover, a message reception may appear in the second argument. There are
two possibilities: the two receive statements read from the same channel, or the
two receive statements read from two different channels.
For the first case, one can consider the following example:
k?i1.x; [0, T + Cs]; [C1 : t] [> k?i2.y; [0, T + Cs]; [C2 : t]
Now, if the channel k is local, then the evaluation of the two ready receive state-
ments can be performed non-deterministically because the local communication
occurs instantaneously inside the ISR.
When the channel k is external, the evaluation is performed as follows. If i1-
message is received before i2-message, then the ISR polls i1 and updates x
before processing i2. This can be guaranteed by the employed CAN controller.
For example, Motorola msCAN08 utilises a double receive buffers. The incom-
ing messages are stored in a two stage input FIFO (MC68HC08, 2012). The first
received message is stored in a foreground buffer and so it becomes available for
a polling software component. The second received message is stored in a back-
ground buffer and it only becomes available once the foreground buffer is read.
Therefore, once k?i1.x is started, it can only be interrupted after [0, T + Cs]
is completed. On the other hand, when i2-message is received first, then the
ISR polls i2 and updates y before processing i1. So k?i1.x is interrupted be-
fore it begins. Consequently k?i1.x; [0, T + Cs] is either executed at once or
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interrupted before it is started, i.e. the term behaves atomically to the second
argument of the interrupt operator.
In the second case, one can consider the following example:
k1?i1.x; [0, T + Cs]; [C1 : t] [> k2?i2.y; [0, T + Cs]; [C2 : t]
The evaluation of the message reception is resolved in a way that is similar to
the order of message reception discussed in section 4.4.3.
4.5 Message Transmission
According to our implementation model, transmission of a message is initiated
inside the ISR which is assumed to happen instantaneously. In this section
we discuss two issues that could affect the implementation correctness of the
message transmission.
4.5.1 Transmission Readiness
The implementation requires a non-zero time before a message becomes ready
for transmission. If the channel is external, the ISR accommodates the message
contents for any active k!i.x transition in an available transmitter buffer. Then
it clears a transmitter flag to indicate that the message is ready for transmission
and fires the transitions. When the channel is local, the ISR transfers the mes-
sage contents of any active k!i.x transition into an intermediate buffer and then
fires the transitions. The operation of message transmission may be completed
at any instant in between the beginning and the end of the ISR.
If we assume that the message is enqueued for external transmission at the
beginning of the ISR, then the model may exhibit a behaviour where a message
is enqueued and the bus is free. In this case the message can be transmitted
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without contention for the bus. In practice, the message may be enqueued
at any instant up to the end of the ISR. The problem is that the bus could
be occupied by another message and so the message has to wait until the bus
becomes free again. Therefore, this possible behaviour of the implementation is
not expressed in the model. Similarly if we assume that the message is enqueued
at the end the ISR, then it is possible to find a case where the implementation
exhibits a behaviour that is not expressed in the model.
The problem is that the message is allowed to be enqueued at any moment
during the ISR time. If this is prevented, then the implementation would only
have the same behaviour. To resolve this problem, the ISR should accommodate
the message contents in the transmitter buffer and clear the transmitter flag
just before the ISR terminates. Then the message can only contend for the bus
at the end the ISR.
When the message is enqueued for local transmission, the two assumptions
of the ISR can be considered. Communications using the local channels are
instantaneous, i.e. the message is enqueued, transmitted and received in the
same instant. In practice, the local communications happen inside the ISR.
The effect of executing the send statement is not visible outside the ISR except
transmitting to an external channel and a computation release. In other words,
the only visible actions that result from executing the ISR are sending a message
to an external channel and releasing a computation. Based on that, the local
communication can be safely assumed to happen either at the beginning of the
ISR or at the end of the ISR.
In the following we discuss a problem that may arise when multiple send state-
ments become ready for execution at the same instant.
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4.5.2 Multiple Ready Transmissions
Consider the following process fragment:
(k!i.x; idle) | (k!j.y; idle) | (k?i.z; [C1 : t] + k?j.w; [C2 : t])
Three processes are composed using the parallel operator. The first and the
second process send messages with particular identifiers on the channel k. The
third process waits to receive a message and execute a particular computation.
At some point, the first and the second process may become ready for execution
simultaneously. According to the semantics of the send, the message i and j
are enqueued at the same instant for transmission. When the processes are
allocated into the same node and the channel k is local, the two messages
should be sent and received at the same instant because the communication on
the local channel is assumed to happen instantaneously. The problem is that if
the message i is received first, then the message j can not be received and vice
versa because of the choice operator in the third process. In other words, the
given model exhibits two possible behaviours at the same time and the choice
between them can be made non-deterministically. However the implementation
has now a freedom to implement either one of the possible behaviour.
This problem does not arise when the processes are fully distributed on separate
nodes and communicate by an external channel. This is because transmission
on the external bus consumes a time and the highest priority message will be
selected for transmission once the arbitration on the bus begins between the
nodes. For instance, if the message i is higher priority than j, then the message
i is transmitted first. When the message is successfully received, i.e. k?i.z is
executed, the computation [C1 : t] will then be ready to run and the second
term (k?j.w; [C2 : t]) of the third process will be disabled.
Another issue may arise if the first and the second process are allocated to
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the same node, then it must be ensured that there are an adequate number of
transmit buffers to accommodate all the ready-to-transmit messages. The num-
ber of the transmit buffers is a feature of the adopted platform. For example,
the Motorola msCAN controller has only three transmit buffers (MC68HC08,
2012). However, it is possible to benefit from the model that is generated from
the system description and use the model checking tool to ensure that the im-
plementation never requires more than the available buffers. Therefore, for a
particular platform, a design is either accepted or rejected. If the design is
rejected, the user can modify the design or use a different platform.
4.6 Process Combinators
The bCANDLE modelling language has a set of control flow operators which
are sequential composition, choice, interrupt, and parallel composition. These
operators are used to combine the language primitives in order to construct a
system model. The code generator derives the system implementation from the
net that is generated from the system model. So the implementation implements
directly the flow control of the net. This means that the algorithm used to
control flow of the execution of the code is exactly the same algorithm that
controls the flow of the model. This algorithm is defined by the net rules R.1 and
R.2 discussed in Chapter 2. The rules are used to determine the next marking
of the net. Because the code generator is based on the net implementation,
the control flow constructs are automatically correct i.e. they behave similarly
both in the model and in the generated code. As long as the primitives are
implemented correctly and the control flows are implemented correctly, then
the implementation behaviour should comply with the model behaviour.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed the modelling and the implementation deci-
sions that we have made to ensure that the system model conservatively ap-
proximates its implementation. The discussion has been presented for each
primitive of the formal language, including the computation, guard evaluation,
message reception, and message transmission. Having correctly implemented
the primitives and the the control flow of the system model, we conclude that
the behaviour of the system implementation complies with the behaviour of the
system model.
5. ATOMIC UPDATE OF DATA
As introduced in Chapter 2, a bCANDLE model of a system consists of basic
process terms such as: send a message k!i.x, receive a message k?i.x, perform
a computation within a bounded period of time [ω : t1, t2], and evaluate a
guard on the data environment γ. These terms may be compounded by a small
set of operators: sequential composition ;, choice +, interrupt [>, and parallel
composition |. The bCANDLE semantics assumes that computations complete
and update their data instantaneously and atomically on completion. In this
chapter, we discuss the problem concerning the implementation of computations
in which computations are vulnerable to interruption. First, the importance of
the interrupt operator in the bCANDLE is outlined in section 5.1. Then, a
problem that may arise when implementing a computation with the interrupt
operator is discussed in section 5.2. Next, other approaches that resolve the
problem are reviewed in section 5.3. After that, a number of methods are
proposed to work out the problem in section 5.4. The proposed methods are
evaluated in order to select those suitable for the implementation of the code
generator in section 5.5. Finally, section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.1 The Interrupt Operator
The bCANDLE statement P [> Q behaves as P until either Q performs an
action or P terminates. The bCANDLE interrupt operator allows time to pass
and network activity to occur in both arguments. It has the same semantics as
the interrupt operator of ET-LOTOS (Le´onard and Leduc, 1997). The operator
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can be used to construct a model where the execution of a process can be
disabled when an event occurs (Nicollin and Sifakis, 1994). This allows one
to state the responsiveness property of the system when it reacts or responds
to environment events (Kesten and Pnueli, 1991). For example, P [> β;Q is a
process that is allowed to behave as P as long as the termination action of β does
not occur. β can be a message reception k?i.x, a time delay [timer : t], or guard
evaluation γ. If β terminates (e.g: a message is received), then P is aborted
and Q begins its execution. The interrupt operator allows a very compact
representation of a system behaviour. To illustrate the process expression:
(a1; a2; a3)[> (b1; b2) may be recast without the interrupt operator. a3 is the
termination action of the first argument, and b1 is the initial action of the second
argument. This can be accomplished using the choice operator as follows:
(b1; b2) + (a1; b1; b2) + (a1; a2; b1; b2) + (a1; a2; a3)
Fig 5.1 and 5.2 show two nets that are generated from the interrupt expression
and the choice expression respectively. It is clearly seen that using the interrupt
operator provides a more compact representation than the choice operator in
realising the same behaviour.
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2
Fig. 5.1: Net of the interrupt expression.
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b1 b2
b1 b2
b1 b2
a1
a1 a2
a1 a2 a3
Fig. 5.2: Net of the choice expression.
5.2 The problem of the Interrupt Operator
The bCANDLE semantics assumes that computations complete and update
their data instantaneously and atomically on completion. The bounded com-
putation [ω : t1, t2] transforms the data state according to the specification
of the operation ω. The change to the data state must occur in a single in-
stantaneous action at the moment of termination. The computation may be
compounded with other primitives using the interrupt operator in one of the
following three forms:
• [ω : t1, t2] [> [timer : t];S – timeout.
• [ω : t1, t2] [> k?i.x;S – message reception.
• [ω : t1, t2] [> γ → S – guard evaluation.
Computations are not allowed to be used as the second argument of the inter-
rupt operator since they can change the data state. In other words, there is no
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possibility of interference in the interrupt operator such as in the parallel oper-
ator. The computation [timer : t] only consumes time and it does not change
the data state, therefore it can be used as second argument for the interrupt
operator. For example, assume the following bCANDLE expression:
[Comput1 : t1]; idle[> [timer : t]; [Comput2 : t2]
t
ISR
Comput1
Comput2
Incomplete
data update
Interrupt
point
t
t
Data update
Fig. 5.3: Interrupt problem.
In this expression the computation [Comput1 : t1] is executed first and time is
allowed to progress in the second argument. If the time expires in the time-
consuming computation [timer : t], the computation [Comput2 : t2] starts
executing. If the timer expires in [timer : t] and the first argument is in the idle
state, then [Comput2 : t2] can begin executing using the previous data state
which will have been updated in [Comput1 : t1]. However, the timer may expire
at a point where [Comput1 : t1] is updating some data state. This could happen
when t1 > t. Then [Comput1 : t1] will be interrupted and the control will be
given to [Comput2 : t2]. The data state may be left partially modified because
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of the interruption, see Fig. 5.3. Therefore, special attention must be taken to
implement the interrupt operator. All partial changes that may have happened
to the data state must be aborted at the point of interruption. Consequently, a
particular mechanism should be provided during the implementation to ensure
that incomplete computation leaves the data identical to the state before start
of the computation. This is a well-known problem in pre-emptive multi-tasking
systems where a number of tasks may have access to a ‘critical section’ such
as a shared area of memory (read/write global variables) or an input/output
ports. In the next section, we review a number of methods and techniques to
resolve this problem.
5.3 Related Work
The problem discussed above is a known problem in the area of concurrent
systems, and a number of solutions have been proposed. The most common ap-
proach is to use a kind of lock, known as a semaphore, when accessing a shared
resource. A process locks a semaphore and then accesses the resource. When it
finishes with the resource, it unlocks the semaphore. Any other process needing
access to the shared resource is forced to wait until it can acquire the lock. Us-
ing a semaphore requires careful programming practice otherwise it may raise a
number of problems. For instance, if one occurrence of a semaphore is omitted
or misplaced in a program, the entire program may collapse at run-time (Burns
and Wellings, 2001, p. 244). Furthermore, as the semaphore blocks a calling
process, a deadlock could occur, if semaphores access is not nested correctly,
which in turn may lead to a software failure. Moreover, priority inversion (Mall,
2009) is another problem could happen because of using semaphores. In this
case, a high priority process may be blocked for an unbounded time in ac-
cessing a shared resource that is locked by a low priority process. In order
to avoid the priority inversion problem, priority inheritance protocols were de-
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veloped (Goodenough and Sha, 1988; Sha et al., 1990). Many real-time op-
erating system (RTOS) support this, such as VxWorks (WindRiver, 1999),
MicroC/OS-II (Labrosse, 2002), and FreeRTOS (Barry, 2009). Additionally,
using semaphores is characterised by high memory requirements because the
state (context) of each blocked process should be saved in memory. Thus a
large number of processes (perhaps more than 100) would lead to unacceptable
memory usage (Poledna et al., 1996).
Alternatively, a lock-free approach was proposed by Herlihy and Moss in (Her-
lihy and Moss, 1993) by using ‘transactional memory’ (TM). The concept of the
transaction first emerged in the area of database management systems. The TM
approach is implemented in two ways: hardware TM (HTM) and software TM
(STM) approach. The HTM approach relies on hardware support to execute a
transaction may be used. The transaction is defined as a set of operations that
are executed by a process satisfying ‘serializability’ and ‘atomicity’ (Herlihy and
Moss, 1993). The first term means that the steps of a transaction do not appear
to be interleaved with the steps of another transaction, so the transaction seems
to execute serially. The second term means that when a transaction completes
a sequence of changes to shared places, it commits and then the changes become
visible, or aborts and all changes are then discarded. The STM approach was
introduced in (Shavit and Touitou, 1997). It provides a software-based imple-
mentation of memory transactions exploiting the increase in processors speed.
The HTM approach provides better performance but it has architecture limi-
tations in addition to the cost of special purpose hardware for implementation.
The STM approach allows larger size of transactions but the implementations
suffer from the overhead required to manage transactions (Mankin et al., 2009;
Cascaval et al., 2008).
Another approach however deals with the source of the problem rather than
providing a solution. In the co-operative scheduling approach of (Pont, 2008b),
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the problem does not arise because only one task is active at any time. A task
runs to completion and can not be pre-empted by other tasks. As pre-emption
is eliminated, the need for a mechanism to protect shared resources does not
appear. Considering this approach requires re-design of the system in order to
satisfy the assumptions made by the approach such as the duration of tasks
must be less than the schedule tick interval (Pont, 2008b).
Additionally, some computer architectures provide some instructions that can
read and write memory locations atomically (can not be interrupted by inter-
rupts). For example, in the Motorola HC08, the LDHX instruction can load
a 16-bit memory location to the index register (MC68HC08, 2012). Similarly
STHX instruction can store the 16-bit index register in a memory location. Fur-
thermore, ARM processors have the Load/Store Multiple (LDM/STM) instruc-
tion which can transfer multiple registers of 32-bit size between memory and
the processor in a single instruction (Sloss et al., 2004). The main drawback
of using these instructions to update data is that they may increase the inter-
rupt latency since they are not interrupted while executing. For example, LDM
requires (2 +Nt) cycles to complete execution, where N is the number of reg-
isters to load and t is the number of cycles required for each sequential access
to memory (Sloss et al., 2004). Although a solution is proposed in (Maaita
and Pont, 2005) to reduce the impact of such instructions on the interrupt, this
method is a hardware specific and is not appropriate if the data update size is
large.
5.4 The Proposed Solution Ensuring Atomic
Update
In this section, we discuss a number of methods that ensure the atomicity of
data update. For each method, the worst-case response time of a computa-
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tion is calculated as the means of comparison. We adopt a traditional analysis
approach to calculate the response times. We identify the following three char-
acteristics to compare between the proposed methods:
1. ISR release jitter,
2. worst-case computation completion time,
3. ease of implementation.
Some of the methods could cause a delay to the next invocation of the ISR
because of the way they implement the atomic update. This delay is called ISR
release jitter. The problem with this delay is that it increases the worst-case
execution time of the ISR. The ISR execution time has been included explicitly
in our analysis when we produce the lower/upper bound of computations as
discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, the method that minimises the ISR release
jitter would yield better analysis (less pessimistic result). The completion time
of a computation expresses the time needed to execute the computation and to
update its data. Then, the method that yields a shorter worst-case completion
time will be considered. The third criterion considers the method that is easier
to implement, i.e. the method that does not require more resources to be
implemented such as CPU time, memory, or hardware timers.
Additionally, the analysis provided in this work considers only a single process
running on a single node, so all computations come from the same net. When
a number of processes are allocated to the same node, some computations may
have to run at the same time. We have discussed a number of scheduling
approaches in Chapter 3. Each proposed method implements different approach
to ensure the data update atomicity, so their efficiencies are different in each
case. However, when we add the consideration of multi-process to the methods,
the additional process affects all methods in the same way and the only changes
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occur to the computation times in a consistent way for all methods. These
changes do not assist to decide between the methods.
In the following, section 5.4.1 introduces the traditional analysis, and sec-
tion 5.4.2 proposes the atomic update methods.
5.4.1 Worst-Case Response Analysis
The exact analysis of Joseph and Pandya (Joseph and Pandya, 1986) calcu-
lated the worst-case execution time (response time) of a task in a system with
pre-emptive task scheduler. The system behaviour is limited to the following
computation model in order to do this kind of analysis. All tasks have peri-
ods. All deadlines are equal to these periods. All tasks are independent and do
not communicate with each other. Finally, a task has a unique priority level
according to the rate monotonic policy in which the shorter the period, the
higher the priority. The equation (Joseph and Pandya, 1986) below shows how
the worst-case response time can be computed iteratively:
Rn+1i = Ci +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
Rni
Tj
⌉
Cj (5.1)
Here are the definition of the parameters in Equation (5.1):
• Ci: worst-case computation time of task i.
• Ti: period of task i.
• Ri: worst-case response time of task i.
• n: the current iteration number.
• hp(i): a set of tasks of higher priority than task i. The
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Response Time Analysis with Release Jitter
Equation (5.1) assumes that there is no delay between the invocation time -
arrival time - of a task and release time - actual running time - of the task. The
strict periodicity assumption now is relaxed. The following equation takes into
account the variable delay between the invocation and release time of a task:
wn+1i = Ci +
∑
∀j∈hp(i)
⌈
wni + Jj
Tj
⌉
Cj
Ri = wi + Ji
(5.2)
Here are the definition of the parameters in the equation:
• wi: worst-case response time of task i once it has been released.
• Ri: worst-case response time of task i including the delay between invo-
cation and release.
• n: the current iteration number.
• Jj : is release jitter of a higher priority task j, the difference between the
longest and shortest delay from invocation to release of the task.
5.4.2 Atomic Update Methods
In order to apply the traditional response time analysis on the atomic update
methods, we employ the following assumptions. First, the ISR is treated as a
periodic task that runs with the highest priority level. The period of the ISR
is denoted by T , and the worst case computation time of the ISR is expressed
by Cs. Second, computations are considered to execute in the lower priority
level. A computation has a worst-case computation time expressed by Ci, and
the worst-case response time is denoted by Ri. The worst-case time required by
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a computation i to update its data state is represented by Ai. The completion
time of the computation is expressed by ri. Third, all ready computations are
assumed to be released at the beginning of the ISR. This assumption complies
with the critical point assumption of the traditional analysis at which all sys-
tem components (tasks) are assumed to be released at the same time. Forth,
the duration of the atomic update of a computation must be accommodated
within one tick interval: Ai < (T − Cs). This is because a longer update op-
eration would lead to missing one tick and the track of the elapsed time as a
consequence. However, a long atomic update of data could be split into a num-
ber of short operations by the programmer in a way that satisfies the previous
constraint.
Then, for each method, we calculate the worst-case response time of a com-
putation in the basic case that does not take into account the effect that a
method has on the ISR release jitter or the time of the atomic update of data.
Next, we calculate the computation response time by taking into account only
the ISR release jitter when presented. After that, we calculate the worst-case
completion time of the computation which includes the basic response time and
the atomic update time.
Method(1): One-tick duration computation
Similarly to the TT approach (Pont, 2008b), when a computation completes in
one-tick time, then the data is guaranteed to be modified without interference
of other computations. Fig. 5.4 shows two short sequential computations. The
computation 1 and 2 are completed within one tick interval. When the first
computation updates data before completion, then the update operation per-
formed by the computation 1 is ensured to be completed before running the
computation 2. Consequently, the main assumption in this approach is that
the worst-case response time of a computation plus the data update time must
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be less than the tick interval time: Ri +Ai < T .
t
T
ISR
Computation1
Computation2
R1 R2
Cs
t
Atomic Update
A1
Fig. 5.4: Method(1): One-tick duration computation.
The worst-case response time of the computation is simply calculated by Equa-
tion 5.3:
Ri = Ci + Cs (5.3)
This method has no impact on the ISR release time because a computation
completes within one tick time.
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by Equation 5.4:
ri = Ri +Ai (5.4)
Method(2): Atomic Update with Enable/Disable Interrupts
A computation may disable the timer interrupt before updating the data state.
Once the computation completes, the data is modified and the timer interrupt
is enabled thereafter. The advantage of this solution is that it introduces no
delay between the computation and the data update. However, the update
operation may exceed the time available in the current time slot because of a
large size of data that needs to be changed. This will cause a release jitter to
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the next invocation of the ISR (represented by Js) before it is actually started,
see Fig. 5.5 for example. In the worst-case, the ISR release jitter could equal
Ai. This may happen when the computation starts data update operation just
before the beginning of the next invocation of the ISR. Additionally, the method
provides no opportunity to interrupt the current-running computation once it
starts an update operation.
t
t
T
ISR
Cs
Computation2
Atomic Update
Computation1
R1 A1 R2
Js
Fig. 5.5: Method(2): Computation disables interrupts.
The worst-case response time of a computation is calculated by the equation 5.5.
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
(5.5)
The worst-case response time of a computation that suffers from an ISR release
jitter is calculated by the equation 5.6:
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
0 ≤ Js ≤ Ai−1
(5.6)
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where Ai−1 is the atomic update time needed by a preceding running compu-
tation.
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.7:
ri = Ri +Ai (5.7)
Method(3): Atomic Update Inside the Interrupt Handler
In this method, a computation does not update the data state. The computa-
tion completes and then idles. The data is updated within the next execution of
the ISR. Although this method ensures the strict periodicity of the tick timer, it
introduces a delay to the execution of a succeeding ready-to-run computation.
For example, in Fig. 5.6, computation 1 idles for d1 time unit before the data
is updated in the next invocation of the ISR. Furthermore, a large size of data
may cause a large overhead to the ISR execution time, leaving no time to pro-
cess a new ready computation in the next time slot. Similarly to the previous
method, this method introduces an ISR release jitter which equals the time of
the atomic update.
t
T
ISR
Cs
Computation2
Atomic Update
Computation1
R1 R2
t
d1
A1
Fig. 5.6: Method(3): Update data inside the interrupt handler.
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The worst-case response time of a computation is calculated by the equation 5.8.
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
(5.8)
The worst-case response time of a computation that suffers from an ISR release
jitter is calculated by the equation 5.9:
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
Js = Ai−1
(5.9)
where Ai−1 is the atomic update time needed by a preceding running compu-
tation.
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.10:
ri = Ri + di +Ai
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T −Ri
(5.10)
Method(4): Atomic Update with Rollback
In this method, a computation is allowed to modify its data state immediately
after it has completed. A roll-back mechanism is provided to guarantee that the
interrupted update operation leaves the data identical to the state before the
execution of the operation. The proposed roll-back mechanism is illustrated in
Fig. 5.7. A computation first obtains a local copy of the data state. When the
computation is completed, it saves a copy of the original data sate in a log and
then updates the global data state. The roll-back mechanism is important to
protect the data from partial changes because of the interrupted (or incomplete)
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update operation, and to restore the data to the previous consistent state.
However, a considerable interrupt overhead may occur if the update operation
is interrupted at the point just before it terminates. In this case, a full recovery
procedure must be performed to all changed data, which would introduce a
delay to a succeeding ready-to-run computation. For example, in Fig. 5.8, the
update operation of computation 1 is aborted in the next invocation of the ISR
before it terminates. In this case, a roll-back recovery operation is undertaken
to restore the original state of the data. It consumes B1 time units before the
new ready computation 2 is dispatched. Similarly to the previous method, a
computation may suffer from the ISR release jitter.
Local data state
computation
Atomic update
Local data state
computation
Atomic update
Local data state
computation
Atomic update
Computation 2Computation 1 Computation n
Log
Empty-flag
Global data state
(1) read
(2) write-backup
(3) write
Fig. 5.7: Roll-back mechanism.
The worst-case response time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.11.
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
(5.11)
The worst-case response time of a computation that suffers from an ISR release
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Roll-back
Fig. 5.8: Method(4): Update data with roll-back.
jitter is calculated by the equation 5.12:
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
Js = Bi−1
(5.12)
where Bi−1 is the time needed to do a roll-back recovery of data of a preceding
running computation. Similarly to the constraint we adopt for the time of the
atomic update, it must be ensured that the recovery time completes in the
worst-case within one tick interval (i.e, Bi−1 < T − Cs).
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.13:
ri = Ri +Ai (5.13)
Method(5): Delayed Atomic Update
This method always assumes that there is insufficient time to update the data
state of a computation in the current time slot, see Fig. 5.9. When the computa-
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tion is completed, it postpones the data update operation to the next available
time slot. The main advantage of this method is that the ISR has the opportu-
nity to abort the current running computation before any changes may occur
to the data state, and run a new computation after that.
t
T
ISR
Cs
Computation2
Atomic Update
Computation1
R1 R2
t
d1 A1
Fig. 5.9: Method(5): Delayed atomic update.
The worst-case response time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.14.
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
(5.14)
This method has no impact on the ISR release time.
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.15:
ri = Ri + di + Cs+Ai
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T −Ri
(5.15)
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Method(6): Update Data Now or Delay
A computation checks the remaining time in the current time slot to see if there
is a sufficient time to update the data state before the next invocation of the
ISR. If this is the case, the computation immediately changes the data in the
current slot, otherwise the update operation is delayed to the next available
time slot and the computation idles. Fig. 5.10 illustrates the two cases. In the
figure, computation 1 modifies the date immediately when it is completed since
the remaining time d1 is longer than the time needed to update the data A1.
Computation 2, however, delays the update operation because the remaining
time d2 in the current slot is shorter than the time needed to complete the
update operation A2. The advantage of this method is that the ISR has always
the opportunity to cancel the current running computation before any changes
may occur to the data state, and to run a new computation after that.
t
T
ISR
Cs
Computation2
Atomic Update
Computation1
R1 R2
t
d1
A1 d2 A2
Immediate
atomic update
Delayed
atomic update
Fig. 5.10: Method(6): Update now or delay update.
The worst-case response time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
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tion 5.16.
Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs
R0i = Ci
(5.16)
This method has no impact on the ISR release time.
The worst-case completion time of a computation is calculated by the equa-
tion 5.17:
ri =
 Ri +Ai if Ai ≤ diRi + di + Cs+Ai if Ai > di
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T −Ri
(5.17)
Method Worst-case response
time
Worst-case response time
with ISR release jitter
Worst-case completion
time
1 Rn+1i = Ci + Cs none Ri +Ai
2 Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs Ri +Ai
3 Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs
Js = Ai−1
Ri + di +Ai
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T − Ri
4 Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni + Js
T
⌉
Cs
Js = Bi−1
Ri +Ai
5 Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs none Ri + di + Cs+Ai
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T − Ri
6 Rn+1i = Ci +
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
Cs none Ri +Ai, if Ai ≤ di . Or
Ri + di +Cs+Ai, if Ai > di
di =
⌈
Ri
T
⌉
T − Ri
Tab. 5.1: Response times and completion times of atomic update methods.
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5.5 Evaluation and Discussion
Six methods have been proposed to resolve the problem of atomic update. We
calculate, in each method, the worst-case response time of a computation in the
basic case, the worst-case response time of a computation that suffers from the
ISR release jitter (when presented), and the worst-case completion time of a
computation. The results are summarised in Table 5.1. The response times of a
computation are computed similarly in all methods, see the first column of the
table. The response time of the method 1 can be considered a special case of
the response time of the remaining methods because computations, according
to this method, complete within one tick interval and so the term
⌈
Rni
T
⌉
equals
1. In the second column, the response time of a computation is calculated
when the computation experiences ISR release jitter. The ISR release jitter is
caused by the overrun of a preceding computation and it is related to the data
update method. The methods 2, 3, and 4 introduce ISR release jitter and so
they have impact on a succeeding running computation. The methods 1, 5,
and 6, however, do not introduce ISR release jitter. The third column shows
the calculation of the completion time of a computation which includes the
response time of the computation and the data update time. The completion
time varies according to the methods used to update data. The methods 1,
2, and 4 have similar way of calculation of the completion time which is the
summation of the response time and data update time only. The methods 3
and 5 require calculating di, the idle (waiting) time that the computation has
to wait until the update operation is started, in addition to the response time
and data update time.
Based on the first criterion introduced in section 5.4, the methods 2, 3, and 4
are discarded because they introduce ISR release jitter and so may lead to a
pessimistic analysis. The methods 1, 5, and 6 pass this criterion because they
have no impact on the ISR release jitter.
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When the system computations are short and can complete within one tick time,
then method 1 would be suitable for implementation of our code generation
approach. Method 1 has very restrictive assumption on the duration of the
computations which would be difficult to satisfy if we require long computations
since this would require increasing the tick interval and reducing responsiveness
of the system. However, this method does not require a special mechanism to
ensure the atomicity of the data update. Moreover, a long computation can be
split by the programmer into a number of short computations in a way that
ensure all computations and their atomic updates complete within one tick
interval.
The methods 5 and 6 can be considered when the system computations (or
at least one computation) require more than one tick interval to complete.
Although, method 6 would give better performance than method 5 during run-
time because the data is updated soon after the computation completes, both
of them have the same worst-case completion time. Now, according to the third
criterion, method 5 is easier to implement than method 6 because method 6
requires access to a hardware timer during run-time in order to evaluate the
remaining time before the next invocation of the ISR. Therefore, method 5
would be more suitable for our code generation approach.
A particular mechanism to ensure the atomicity of the data update is not re-
quired in the following two cases. First, a computation takes more than one
tick interval to complete but it is not affected by the interrupt operator (i.e.
not interrupted at all). Second, a computation could take more than one tick
interval and the data update is interrupted but the computation does not use
the data again before they are reinitialised. These cases can be checked using
model-checking. It would require constructing a suitable property to verify that
the computation never be affected by the interrupt or makes use of data before
reinitialisation. When there is a computation that runs for a number of ticks
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and can be affected with the interrupt, then one of the recommended mecha-
nism must be implemented and applied in order to ensure the atomicity of the
data update. This however is outside the scope of this thesis. Future work on
the atomic update work would require implementing a chosen solution for the
code generation, and testing it in a case study.
5.6 Summary
The bCANDLE semantics requires that computations complete and update
their data atomically. The syntactic restrictions imposed by CANDLE ensure
that the interrupt operator is the only source of potential failure of this re-
quirement. This chapter has examined the problem of the interrupt operator.
Several methods have been proposed to resolve the problem, namely one-tick
duration computation, atomic update with enable/disable interrupts, atomic
update inside the interrupt, atomic update with rollback, delayed atomic up-
date, and update data now or delay. Many of these methods are well-known
in the in the context of database transactions (Haerder and Reuter, 1983). We
have presented a new analysis in the context of embedded systems by applying
response time analysis to calculate the worst-case response time of each method
and use this as our basis for comparison.
6. EVALUATION AND EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the feasibility of our code gener-
ation approach on a number of case studies. Additionally, we are attempting to
highlight the limitations of the approach and assess the complexity of systems
that may be analysed with available computing resource. The measures used to
demonstrate the practical applicability are the performance and the formal ver-
ification capability of the proposed approach. The performance is measured in
terms of the computational effort required to generate an executable code and
a formal model for a given design, and the computational resources including
memory (RAM and ROM) and CPU load required to execute the examples on
the target. The experimental results are compared with results taking an alter-
native approach employing a real-time operating system (e.g, MicroC OS-II) to
implement the same examples. To evaluate the formal verification capability of
our approach, we generate a formal model (Timed Automata model) for each
case study and use a model checking tool (e.g, UPPAAL Model Checker) to
check if the system satisfies a number of useful properties including functional
and timing properties. The main point of this is to discover to what extend
the models which are generated are tractable. Moreover, the computation re-
sources (CPU time and memory) used by the model checker are measured for
the properties. This illustrates the cost of the computation resources required
to verify a number of different case studies.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 briefly presents the main char-
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acteristics of the four examples we choose as case studies, namely a flow regu-
lator system, steam boiler control system, security alarm system, and anti-lock
braking and anti-slip regulation system (ABS/ASR). Section 6.3 presents our
results from the performance evaluation of the code generated for the selected
case studies. Section 6.4 provides experimental results that demonstrate the
formal verification capability of our approach. Finally, we conclude our results
in section 6.5.
6.2 Case Studies
For our practical evaluation, we use four case studies: a flow regulator system,
steam boiler control system, security alarm system, and an ABS/ASR system.
The flow regulator system is a well-known example in the literature (Kopetz,
1997). Additionally, it is especially well-suited to assess the scalability of our
approach because we readily can vary the complexity of the designs. The steam
boiler control example has multiple operational modes meaning that the sys-
tem behaves in different phases during running. This kind of system is very
difficult to analyse by traditional methods applicable only to periodic systems.
The security alarm example illustrates the usefulness of the local communica-
tion mechanism adopted by our approach because all system components are
executed on a single-processor platform and communicate only by locally pass-
ing messages. The ABS/ASR system was motivated by the fact that it is an
industry-related example, and it is recently used in the literature, for exam-
ple (Enoiu et al., 2012; Herber, 2010).
6.2.1 Flow Regulator System
The purpose of the system is to control the flow rate of a liquid through a pipe
according to a set value. The physical view of the system is depicted in Fig. 6.1.
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The system consists of two processes that run on separate nodes communicating
via a CAN bus. The first process is Flow which periodically reads the rate of
the flow using a flow sensor and then broadcasts the flow value through the
CAN bus. The second one is Valve which controls the position of a valve based
on the received flow value so that the flow rate remains within a small range
around a pre-determined flow value. The system architecture is illustrated in
Fig. 6.2. The CANDLE program of the system is shown in Appendix A.
Flow Regulator System
Flow Setpoint
Tank
Control Valve Flow Sensor
Fig. 6.1: Flow Regulator System.
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CAN
Transceiver
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System Environment
Flow
process
Valve
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Fig. 6.2: Architecture of the flow regulator system.
In order to evaluate the scalability of our approach, the size of the system design
is varied by adding more processes of Flow and Valve, and then the performance
of the generated code for the new designs is evaluated as provided later in
section 6.3. The system design is varied according to the following scenarios. We
preserve the number of nodes and duplicate the number of processes executing
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on each node of the original design. The processes that are allocated to one
node communicate with the corresponding processes of the other node using one
CAN bus, see Fig 6.3. For the purpose of performance evaluation, the process
of each node is duplicated up to three times. So we obtain another two versions
of the example called Flow2 and Flow3. Now, Flow2 consists of 2 processes of
Flow and 2 processes of Valve, and Flow3 consists of 3 processes of Flow and
3 processes of Valve. In the rest of this chapter, we use Flow1 to refer to the
original flow example which consists of 1 Flow process and 1 Valve process.
CAN
Transceiver
CAN
Transceiver
CAN Bus
System Environment
Flow
process
Flow
process
Valve
process
Valve
process
Fig. 6.3: Architecture of the modified flow regulator system.
6.2.2 Steam Boiler Control System
This example is a modified version of the steam boiler control problem described
in (Abrial et al., 1996). The system consists of a steam boiler, a pump, and
water-level sensor. The pump controls the flow of water into the boiler, which
is then heated and evaporated to produce steam. The steam flows out from
the top of the boiler and is used to power a generator. The water-level sensor
provides the control system with the level of water in the boiler. Fig 6.4 shows a
physical view of the system. The objective of the system is to maintain the level
of water (w) in the boiler within minimum (W1) and maximum (W2) bounds.
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This can be performed by turning the pump on or off, so it is ensured that
W1 ≤ w ≤ W2 is satisfied. It is considered unsafe to operate the system if
the sensor process fails. The system detects a sensor process failure when the
interval between sensor messages exceeds some threshold.
Steam output
W1
W2
Boiler
Pump
Level Sensor
Steam Boiler Control
System
Water
Fig. 6.4: Steam Boiler Control System.
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Fig. 6.5: Architecture of the steam boiler control system.
The control system consists of three processes: Controller, WaterLevel, and
Pump. Each process runs on a separate node and communicates with other
processes via a CAN bus. Fig. 6.5 shows the architecture of the system. The
CANDLE program of the system is shown in Appendix A. The system operates
in three different modes: initialisation, ready, and normal.
6. Evaluation and Experiments 124
• In the initialisation mode, the system resets its devices and initialises its
local data. It is assumed that the system starts with the water level in
the boiler between W1 and W2 and the pump is off. The system moves
to the ready mode after successful initialisation.
• In the ready mode, the processes WaterLevel and Pump repeatedly re-
port a ready message to the Controller process until they receive a start
message. After that, the system moves to the normal mode.
• In the normal operation mode, the WaterLevel process periodically reads
the water-level sensor and broadcasts the current sensor value. The
Controller process receives the sensor value and then evaluates the value
of the water level. If the level is too high, a message is sent to turn off the
pump. If the level is too low, a message is sent to turn on the pump. The
pump is kept in the current state if water is within the acceptable level.
However, the Controller process sends a shutdown message to other pro-
cesses if it does not receive a sensor level value before timing out and then
the system idles. In this case, it is assumed that the water-level sensor is
faulty.
6.2.3 Security Alarm System
The security alarm system is a simple theft-detection device (e.g, a briefcase).
The system functions as follows. A user presses a button to enable the security
mechanism. When the system detects any motion, it requires the user to enter
a security code within a pre-defined time interval. The alarm timer starts
when the motion is first detected. If the correct code is entered in time, the
security mechanism is disabled and the device can be opened by pressing a
button. When the correct code is not entered on time, the alarm sounds.
However, the alarm can be turned off only by entering the correct security
code, after that the security mechanism is disabled. The device can be locked
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and unlocked freely if the security mechanism is not enabled. The physical view
of the system is depicted in Fig 6.6. In this figure, the button E of the keypad
is used to enable/disable the security alarm system, and the button L is used
to lock/unlock the device. The LCD is used to display the status of the system.
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Fig. 6.6: Security Alarm System.
The system comprises four processes that run on the same node and communi-
cate via a local broadcast channel. Fig.6.7 illustrates the system architecture.
The main process is Control which continuously monitors and reports the sta-
tus of the device. The PendingTimer process represents the alarm timer which
keeps track of the current time elapse. The Flasher process enables a suitable
alert device (e.g, sounder). The Display process outputs the current system sta-
tus to a suitable display device (e.g, LCD). The system processes communicate
by exchanging messages using a single local broadcast channel. The CANDLE
program of the system is shown in Appendix A.
6.2.4 ABS/ASR System
In a vehicle with a conventional braking system, when the driver depresses the
brake pedal in the case of emergency situation, the vehicle wheels may get
locked. The locked wheels prevent the driver from steering the vehicle while
stopping. This could threaten the driver’s life or cause severe damage. To avoid
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Fig. 6.7: Architecture of the security alarm system.
wheel lockup or loss of traction, the ABS/ASR system (Day and Roberts, 2002;
Bosch GmbH, 2011) has been developed . The ABS/ASR system monitors the
speed of each wheel and regulates the brake pressure in order to avoid locking
a wheel. This improves the driver’s control over the vehicle while the brakes
are applied.
The system consists of three process types: a Sensor process that reports a
wheel speed, a Brake process that regulates the brake pressure of a wheel, and
a Control process that executes the ABS/ASR control algorithm. There are
four sensor processes and four brake processes in the system. The sensor and
brake process are allocated to the same node, whereas the control process is
executed on a single node. All processes communicate using a CAN bus. The
control process periodically sends a speed request to the sensor processes. The
sensor processes send the speed of the wheel to the control process. The control
process executes the ABS/ASR control algorithm, and then broadcasts the
new pressure values. The brake process of each wheel reads its corresponding
pressure value and adjusts the brake pressure accordingly. The physical view
of the system and the architecture of the design are shown in Figure 6.8. The
CANDLE program of the ABS is shown in Appendix A.
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Fig. 6.8: ABS/ASR Control System.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
For the evaluation of the performance of our approach, we measured the com-
putational effort of
• the generation of executable C code for the CANDLE program,
• the transformation of a given CANDLE program into an UPPAAL model.
The code generator program and the model generator program were run on a
PC with an AMD Athlon(tm) 3GHz Dual Core Processor 5200B and 2 GB of
main memory running a Linux operating system. Table 6.1 shows the main
features of the system design for each case study. In this table, Process is the
number of processes in the CANDLE design of the example, LOC is the number
of lines of CANDLE code, and Transition is the number of transitions of the
net generated from the example design. The results show that the examples
have small nets (expressed by the number of transitions), e.g the Alarm and
ABS example have only a few tens of transitions.
The results of the code and model transformation times are presented in Ta-
ble 6.2. In this table, Code-time represents the time required to generate an
executable C code for the example, and Model-time expresses the time required
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Case-study Processes LOC Transitions
Flow1 2 15 7
Flow2 4 27 12
Flow3 6 39 17
Boiler 3 60 39
Alarm 4 61 32
ABS 9 75 38
Tab. 6.1: Features of the case studies.
to generate an UPPAAL model for the example. The transformation times are
given in seconds. The code and model generator program has been written
in the Ocaml and Python programming languages using the StringTemplate
library (Parr, 2013). The experiment shows that the measured times are ac-
ceptable (i.e. performed within a few seconds), and vary a little as a function
of the size of the example (number of processes, LOC, and transitions).
Case-study Code-time (s) Model-time (s)
Flow1 2.00 3.81
Flow2 2.02 3.83
Flow3 2.06 3.97
Boiler 2.34 4.65
Alarm 2.29 4.77
ABS 2.26 5.18
Tab. 6.2: Transformation times from CANDLE into C and UPPAAL.
For the evaluation of the computational resource of the approach, the memory
usage of the executable C code has been measured for each case study. The
case studies were implemented using an Olimex LPC-2378STK development
prototype board with MCU LPC2378 16/32 bit ARM7TDMI-STMt processor,
512K Bytes of Program Flash, and 16K Bytes of RAM. The source codes of the
examples were compiled using the IAR Embedded Workbench IDE version 6.21
with the compiler setting shown in Table 6.3. The results of the experiments
are shown in Table 6.4. When the example is implemented using more than one
node, the memory usage is presented separately for each computing node. For
instance, the Flow1 case study consists of two computing nodes: node flow and
node valve. The scheduling algorithm employed in each node of the case study is
6. Evaluation and Experiments 129
shown. Currently, we use two scheduling methods: cooperative (co) and round-
robin (rr) scheduling method. The memory usage of the application code (which
is generated code by our framework) and the device-driver code (which is used
to access the IO, e.g. CAN, LCD, LEDs, and ADC) were shown separately,
see Table 6.4. For the application code, the RAM and ROM requirements
were measured to assess the efficiency of the generated code. The experimental
results of the memory usage were encouraging because the examples consumed
relatively little RAM. The RAM area is approximately 20% of the ROM area,
see Fig.6.9. The memory usage of the device-driver code was presented in total
(RAM and ROM), see the column IO code of the table. The experimental
results showed that the alarm example requires the greatest IO code compared
to the others (approx. 11.5 KB). This is because the example makes use of the
LCD that requires much more code than other devices such as turning on/off
an LED.
General Options
Target device NXP LPC2378
Endian mode little
Output file executable
C/C++ Compiler Options
Language C
C dialect C99
Language conformance standard with IAR extensions
Generate interwork code true
Processor mode ARM
Optimisation level high, balanced
Tab. 6.3: IAR C compiler options.
Additionally, the ISR time has been estimated empirically for each case study
with expected uncertainty of about ±5µsec. Although, an analytical study
using some static analysis tools (e.g. (Absint, 2012; Tidorum, 2012)) would be
interesting to obtain the worst-case execution time of the ISR, such tools are not
supported by the current IDE. The ISR times are presented in the last column of
Table 6.4. We can notice that the ISR time increases in according to the size of
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Case-study App. Code (Byte) IO Code (Byte) ISR
RAM ROM Total RAM+ROM time (µs)
Flow1 node flow (co) 381 2677 3058 2472 25
node valve (co) 373 2561 2934 2004 20
Boiler node controller (co) 396 2600 2996 1992 40
node pump (co) 396 2596 2992 1992 40
node waterlevel (co) 408 2836 3244 2472 20
Alarm node alarm (rr) 1324 5332 6656 11557 150
ABS node control (co) 832 3776 4608 2008 40
node wheel0 (co) 506 2729 3235 2480 30
node wheel1 (co) 506 2729 3235 2480 30
node wheel2 (co) 506 2729 3235 2480 30
node wheel3 (co) 506 2729 3235 2480 30
Tab. 6.4: Memory usage of the case studies.
Fig. 6.9: RAM vs. ROM memory usage of the case studies.
the example. The ISR time of the alarm example required considerably longer
execution time compared to the other examples because all system components
are allocated on the same computing node.
Furthermore, the memory requirement of the generated code for some examples
have been compared with alternative method that employs the MicroC/OS-II
real-time kernel to implement the same examples. The examples that we use
are the original flow regulator system (Flow1) and its varied versions (Flow2
and Flow3) that already discussed in section 6.2.1. The examples implemented
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in MicroC/OS-II have been obtained from undergraduate student assignments
performed in Northumbria University. Table 6.5 shows the measurements of the
memory usage for the two implementation methods. The device driver code was
omitted in this experiment since it is fixed in both methods. The results show
that our approach can generate C code in which the required memory size is
competitive to the traditional method that employs a widely used real-time
kernel. Fig. 6.5 presents the results of the comparison. It is apparent that the
required RAM of our approach is at least 50% smaller than the required RAM
of the MicroC/OS-II implementation.
Generated App. Code (Byte) RTOS App. Code (Byte)
Case-study RAM ROM Total RAM ROM Total
Flow 1 node flow 381 2677 3058 1000 2402 3402
node valve 373 2561 2934 1340 2906 4246
Flow 2 node flow 485 2821 3306 1164 2472 3636
node valve 461 2673 3134 1488 2994 4482
Flow 3 node flow 589 2953 3542 1368 2538 3906
node valve 565 2725 3290 1680 3078 4758
Alarm node alarm 1324 5332 6656 2914 5614 8528
Tab. 6.5: Comparison with RTOS code.
6.4 Formal Verification
For the evaluation of the formal verification capability of our approach, we gen-
erated TA models from the CANDLE designs of the provided case studies using
an existing framework. The main point of this is to discover to what extend the
models which are generated are tractable. We verified safety (something wrong
never happens) and bounded-response time properties (something useful will
happen before some time), see section 6.4.1. Additionally, the model checking
tool is used to assess the capability of the available hardware resources. An ex-
ample of that is a number of transmit/receive buffers required of an employed
CAN controller. This demonstrates the usefulness of the generated model dur-
ing the design phase, see section 6.4.2.
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Fig. 6.10: Memory usage comparison.
We used the UPPAAL model checker version 4.0.11 with the verification setting
shown in Table 6.6. The model checker program was run on a PC with an AMD
Athlon(tm) 3GHz Dual Core Processor 5200B and 2 GB main memory running
a Linux operating system.
Option Value
Search Order Breadth First
State Space Reduction Conservative
State Space Representation DBM
Diagnostic Trace None
Extrapolation Automatics
Hash table size 16MB
Tab. 6.6: UPPAAL verification options.
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6.4.1 Model Checking Properties
Flow Regulator System
For the flow regulator example, we verified the following properties:
P1.1 deadlock freedom,
P1.2 whenever the flow sensor is read, the valve is adjusted within t time units,
P1.3 whenever the flow sensor is read, it is read again within t time units,
P1.4 whenever the valve is adjusted, it is adjusted again within t time units,
P1.5 whenever the flow message is enabled, then it will be received within t
time units.
The property P1.1 is a safety property. The property P1.2, P1.3, and P1.4 are
bounded-response time properties. They required a separate test automaton
to be expressed in the UPPAAL language. The property P1.5 represents the
worst-case transmission time of the message. It is also a bounded-response time
property. The specification and the verification of the properties are illustrated
in the following.
The property P1.1 can be expressed easily in the UPPAAL query language
as follows:
A[] not deadlock (P1.1)
The property P1.2 is an example of bounded-response time property. The
property has the following general form:
∀(P → ∀♦Q ∧ g ≤ T )
which means that whenever P (request) is satisfied at a certain time, then Q
(response) will eventually be satisfied within T time units, where g is a global
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clock which is reset once P has occurred. To express the property we, following
the approach of (Jensen et al., 1996; Aceto et al., 1998), introduce a separate test
automaton that probes the system processes. In the system model, the edges
that have observable computations are provided with probe actions. The test
automaton is designed to enter a new location when an observable computation
is fired. Then a simple form of liveness property (something useful will happen)
in UPPAAL is used to construct the property.
The test automaton of the property P1.2 is depicted in Fig 6.11. The test au-
tomaton interacts with the system model by using two synchronisation actions:
ReadSensor? and AdjustV alve?. The corresponding actions ReadSensor! and
AdjustV alve! are added into the edges that contain the computationReadSensor
and AdjustV alve respectively. The TA model of the Flow and Valve process
are presented in Appendix B. For example, when the system fires the observable
computation ReadSensor, the test automaton is forced to enter the location
L1.
Fig. 6.11: Test automaton of the property P1.2 of the flow regulator example.
The properties are translated into a liveness property in UPPAAL, written
ϕ  ψ, which is read as whenever ϕ is satisfied, then eventually ψ will be
satisfied. ϕ event means that the test automaton reaches the state L1 and ψ
event means that the automaton reaches the state L2. In order to measure the
time required between the two events, we use a clock variable tt. The clock
variable is reset whenever the system enters L1 state. Moreover, the location
L2 is chosen to be committed which means that time is a not allowed to progress
in this location, and the outgoing edge of the location must be involved in the
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next state transition. This is very useful when construct the property in order
to capture the moment at when the test automaton first enters this location.
Then we can write property P1.2 in UPPAAL as follows:
(Test1.L1 and Test1.tt == 0) -->
(Test1.L2 and Test1.tt <= C1) (P1.2)
where C1 is the upper bound time of the property and it is obtained by trial
and error. We have exploited the UPPAAL simulator to obtain the value of C1.
First, we run the verifier on a property that simply demonstrates the location
L2 is reachable in order to get the initial value of C1:
E<>(Test1.L2)
When the verifier returns, we read the maximum value of the clock variable
Test1.tt from its range in the simulator window. We then assign this value
to C1 and run the property P1.2. If the property is satisfied, we can conclude
the final value of C1. If the property is not satisfied, we enable the diagnostic
trace in the simulator window and read the maximum value of Test1.tt from
its range that violates the property. We use the new value to run the property
P1.2 again. We repeat this process until the property P1.2 becomes satisfied
for a particular value of C1.
The properties P1.3 and P1.4 represent the periodicity of executing the op-
eration ReadSensor and AdjustV alve respectively. It is useful to predict the
worst case time between two consecutive activations of an operation in the sys-
tem. For example, the operation ReadSensor can sense a change in the value of
the flow rate only at regular intervals (i.e. the flow rate is sampled). The change
in the value may happen just after the completion of the operation. Therefore,
to calculate the maximum time to adjust the valve for a new value of the flow
rate, we have compute the maximum interval time of the operation ReadSensor
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and the maximum time between the ReadSensor and AdjustV alve operation.
This requirement can be expressed simply by combining the property P1.3 and
P1.2.
We use the same approach above to construct properties P1.3 and P1.4. How-
ever, the second observable action in the test automaton is replaced with the
action that is enabled when the operation is executed again. For example, the
test automaton in Fig. 6.12 observes the two consecutive occurrences of the
operation AdjustV alve, so the probe action AdjustV alve? is used in the first
two edges of the automaton. The property is written in UPPAAL as follows:
(Test2.L1 and Test2.tt == 0) -->
(Test2.L2 and Test2.tt <= C2) (P1.3)
where C2 is the upper bound time of the property and it is obtained by trial
and error as well.
Fig. 6.12: Test automaton of the property P1.3 of the flow regulator example.
The test automaton of the property P1.4 is shown in Fig 6.13 and similarly we
can write the property as follows:
(Test3.L1 and Test3.tt == 0) -->
(Test3.L2 and Test3.tt <= C3) (P1.4)
where C3 is the upper bound time of the property obtained also by trial and
error.
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Fig. 6.13: Test automaton of the property P1.4 of the flow regulator example.
The property P1.5 represents the worst-case response time (WCRT) of a mes-
sage delivered by the CAN. This time includes the queueing time in a transmit
buffer and the transmission time of the message. Comparing to traditional
methods (e.g, (Davis et al., 2007)), our approach does not require a complex
analysis and restricted assumptions (e.g, periodic messages) in order to calcu-
late the WCRT of a message. The approach benefits of the model-checking tool
to predict the WCRT of (periodic or aperiodic) messages as long as a TA model
of the system is available.
We use the same approach to construct the property. The test automaton
observes the communication model of the system. The provided framework
generates this model in parallel with the model of the system processes from
the design. Appendix B shows the TA model of the communication. The test
automaton of the property is depicted in Fig. 6.14. In this figure, the action
k e? is enabled whenever a message is queued for transmission. The action k a?
is enabled when the message is accepted. The variable k v denotes the message
identifier (e.g, FLOW ). A guard (e.g, k v == FLOW ) is added into the first
two edges of the automaton to ensure that the transition is enabled only for a
particular message id. The property can be written:
(Test4.L1 and Test4.tt == 0) -->
(Test4.L2 and Test4.tt <= C4) (P1.5)
where C4 is the upper bound time of the property obtained by trial and error.
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Fig. 6.14: Test automaton of the property P1.5 of the flow regulator example.
The UPPAAL model checker was run in command-line mode because the GUI
version does not provide the verification time and memory usage needed to
obtain the verification results. If flow model.xml contains the TA model gener-
ated for the flow example, and flow model.q is a file containing a statement of
a property, the property can be checked in UPPAAL using the command:
verifyta -u flow_model.xml flow_model.q
The verification time and the memory usage needed to check the property are
computed using the Memtime tool (Bengtsson, 2012) with version 1.3 which
is the default performance measuring tool used by the UPPAAL development
team:
memtime verifyta flow_model.xml flow_model.q
The result when model checking the properties are presented in Table. 6.7. In
this table, the second column shows the time needed to check the property
in seconds. The third column shows the number of states generated to verify
the property. The fourth column shows the size of memory used to verify the
property. The result of the verification is shown in the fifth column. The
symbol
√
is used to represent that the property is satisfied, the symbol × is
used when the property is unsatisfied, and the symbol ? is used for unknown
result. The last column shows the upper bound of the time Ci required for a
property. The values of Ci have been obtained for the ISR period T = 1000µs
and the ISR time Cs = 250µs with CAN bus equals 100 kbit/s. These value
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are also assumed for the remaining case studies. Notice that the first property
(deadlock freedom) has no time bound, so we show the symbol − instead.
The measurements show that the properties required less than 2MB of memory
to be verified within a fraction of second. However, notice that the values of
the CPU time (0.10secs) and memory usage (1988KB) shown in the table are
minimum values that are generated by the Memtime tool.
Property Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied Ci (µs)
P1.1 0.10 28 1988
√ −
P1.2 0.10 28 1988
√
C1 = 1870
P1.3 0.10 33 1988
√
C2 = 11600
P1.4 0.10 28 1988
√
C3 = 11250
P1.5 0.10 28 1988
√
C4 = 620
Tab. 6.7: Model-checking results of the flow regulator example.
Steam Boiler Control System
For the steam boiler example, we verified the following properties:
P2.1 deadlock freedom,
P2.2 whenever the sensor reads a low level of water, the pump is turned on
within t time units,
P2.3 whenever the sensor reads a high level of water, the pump is turned off
within t time units.
The property P2.1 is a safety property, whereas P2.2 and P2.3 are bounded-
response time properties. The properties are specified and verified similarly to
the properties of the flow example. The result of model checking of the prop-
erties are presented in Table. 6.8. The measurements show that the properties
required less than 2.MB of memory to be verified within a fraction of second.
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Property Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied Ci (µs)
P2.1 0.10 233 1988
√ −
P2.2 0.10 233 1988
√
C1 = 2320
P2.3 0.10 233 1988
√
C2 = 2320
Tab. 6.8: Model-checking results of the steam boiler example.
Security Alarm System
For the alarm example, we verified the following properties:
P3.1 deadlock freedom,
P3.2 whenever a motion is detected, the alarm timer is enabled within t time
units,
P3.3 whenever the alarm timer is expired and the correct code is entered, the
sounder (LED) alerts (toggle) within t time units,
P3.4 if the sounder (LED) is in alert (toggle) state and the correct code is
entered, the sounder (LED) is turned off within t time units.
The property P3.1 is a safety property, whereas P3.2, P3.3, and P3.4 are
bounded-response time properties. The properties are specified and verified
similarly to the properties of the flow example. The result of model checking
of the properties are presented in Table. 6.9. The measurements show that the
properties require less than 70.MB of memory to be verified in less than 15sec.
Property Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied Ci (µs)
P3.1 13.42 183942 47160
√ −
P3.2 12.62 188328 64632
√
C1 = 1350
P3.3 11.42 184056 64240
√
C2 = 2920
P3.4 12.21 183944 64372
√
C3 = 2920
Tab. 6.9: Model-checking results of the security alarm example.
Anti-lock Braking System
For the ABS example, we verified the following properties:
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P4.1 deadlock freedom,
P4.2 if the acceleration is changed, the brake pressure of the wheels are regu-
lated within t time units,
P4.3 whenever the first request of speed is sent to a wheel, the brake pressure
of the wheels are regulated within t time units.
The property P4.1 is a safety property, whereas P4.2 and P4.3 are bounded-
response time properties. The properties are specified and verified similarly to
the properties of the flow example. The result of model checking of the proper-
ties are presented in Table. 6.10. The measurements show that the properties
required less than 60.MB of memory to be verified within a few seconds. This
demonstrates a potential advantage of our approach since complex systems can
be expressed by quite small models. By contrast, in the approach of (Herber,
2010), the UPPAAL model of the ABS system generated from SystemC code
has approximately 10 times more processes than the UPPAAL model generated
by our approach from the CANDLE program which implements the same func-
tionality. Table 6.11 summarises the main characteristics of the two TA models
of the ABS example. This has a considerable impact on the tractability of the
generated model. For instance, the UPPAAL model checker has been used to
check a basic property (deadlock freedom) on the TA model generated from the
SystemC code for the ABS example. The verification ended after more than
5 hours with an out-of-memory error and 16777216 states stored during the
verification. The same experiment, undertaken on our TA model of the same
case study, terminated positively within 0.60 second, having stored 11469 (see
Table 6.10).
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Property Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied Ci (µs)
P4.1 0.60 11469 38492
√ −
P4.2 0.60 11469 55408
√
C1 = 3320
P4.3 1.20 11469 56192
√
C2 = 14220
Tab. 6.10: Model-checking results of the ABS example.
ABS TA Model (CANDLE) ABS TA Model (SystemC)
Process 12 121
Channel 8 168
Clock 0 global and 12 local 1 global and 1 local
Variable 8 283
Tab. 6.11: TA model comparison of the ABS system.
6.4.2 Verifying Transmit/Receive Buffer Resources
It is very useful for system developers to be able to assess the capability of
the available hardware that will be used to run the system. An example is the
number of transmit/receive buffers of the CAN controller required by the system
implementation. For that reason, TA models have been generated for varied
versions of the flow example because it was simple to change the complexity of
the example. The example was varied by adding new processes of Flow and
Valve to the original design in according to the second scenario discussed in
section 6.2.1. In this scenario the system architecture consists of two computing
nodes sharing a single CAN bus. The Flow processes are allocated to the first
node, and the Valve processes are allocated to the second one. The employed
CAN controller (NXP, 2009) features triple transmit buffers and double receive
buffers. The UPPAAL model checker was used to determine the number of
transmit/receive buffers required by the examples in the worst-case.
Firstly, to determine the maximal number of the transmit buffers, the TA model
of the CAN shown in Appendix B is amended as follows. Whenever a new mes-
sage is enqueued, a counter is incremented. Each node transmits a particular
set of messages which can be known at design time. Therefore, if we wish to
calculate the number of the transmit buffers for a particular node, we have to
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constrain the operation of the counter increment. For example:
if((k_v==id1)||(k_v==id2)||(k_v==id3)){
tCounter++;
}
where k v holds the current message ID (id1, id2, or id3) that can be sent
by the node. tCounter is a variable that holds the number of the transmit
buffers. When the message is successfully transmitted, the counter is decre-
mented. This happens when the model fires the post-acceptance transition.
Then the property is expressed in UPPAAL as:
A[] (k.tCounter <= C1)
The property will be satisfied if the number of buffers never exceeds the value
C1 which denotes the number of the available transmit buffers.
Secondly, to determine the number of the receive buffers, we introduced a sep-
arate TA model, see Fig.6.15. The model consists of three locations, L0, L1
and L2. It is possible to move from location L0 to L1 at any time. Once the
automaton enters L1, it can stays in this location up to (T + Cs) time units.
This time expresses the maximum interval time that a message may wait in the
buffer until it is polled by the ISR. This time equals the ISR period (T) plus the
ISR execution time (Cs). A counter is incremented whenever a new message
from a predefined set is accepted. A particular node can receive a predefined set
of messages. The counter is used to hold the number of buffers. The UPPAAL
property:
A[] (rBuff.rCounter <= C2)
is true if the number of buffers never exceeds the value C2, where C2 expresses
the number of the available receive buffers.
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Fig. 6.15: Test automaton of receive buffer verification.
The results of the transmit/receive buffer verification are presented in Table 6.12
and Table 6.13 respectively. The verification was run for the following setting:
T = 1000µs, Cs = 250µs, the transmission rate of 200kbit/s, and a message
payload of 1byte. In these tables, the first column shows the number of Flow
and Valve processes used in the example, the second column shows the available
number of buffers. The computation resources (CPU time, state-space size,
and memory usage) to run the verification are shown in the next three columns
respectively. Finally, the result of the verification is shown in the last column.
The experiments showed that it is possible to verify the transmit buffer number
of 15 processes of Flow and Valve in the current computing resources. It took
less than 4 minutes of CPU time, and approximately 110MB of memory us-
age, see Table 6.12. However, the number of receive buffer was verified for the
examples with only up to 12 processes. The example with 12 processes took
about 75 minutes of CPU time, and 800MB of memory usage, see Table 6.13.
The verification of 13 processes was terminated after 16 hours of running the
experiment with reported memory usage exceeds 2GB. The experiment took
an unexpectedly long time because the model checker program made use of the
swap memory. When a state-space size becomes larger than an available mem-
ory, a part of the state space is usually stored in a swap area. It is well known
that reading/writing operations from/to the swap memory are slower than that
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performed in the main memory. The observed time and space complexity of
the verification of receive buffer is shown in Fig. 6.16 and Fig. 6.17 respectively.
The figures show that the CPU time and memory usage are increased rapidly
as the number of processes is increased.
Process C1 Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied
1 3 0.10 43 2008
√
2 3 0.10 284 2008
√
3 3 0.10 1030 2008
√
4 3 0.10 457 2008 ×
5 3 0.20 1266 37840 ×
6 3 0.30 2999 37984 ×
7 3 0.70 6367 38108 ×
8 3 1.60 12444 38508 ×
9 3 3.90 22786 39296 ×
10 3 8.41 39573 40376 ×
11 3 18.02 65776 41988 ×
12 3 36.13 105351 44952 ×
13 3 69.46 163462 65812 ×
14 3 128.82 246735 87364 ×
15 3 236.16 363545 112708 ×
Tab. 6.12: Transmit buffer verification of the flow regulator examples.
Process C2 Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied
1 2 0.10 43 2008
√
2 2 0.10 284 2008
√
3 2 0.10 315 2008 ×
4 2 0.20 883 37840 ×
5 2 0.30 2599 37844 ×
6 2 0.80 7887 38112 ×
7 2 3.10 24383 39076 ×
8 2 13.62 76283 41816 ×
9 2 58.76 240519 50632 ×
10 2 252.15 762055 112500 ×
11 2 1073.58 2420911 289392 ×
12 2 4423.76 7698483 814088 ×
13 2 ≥57615.16 ? 2220692 ?
Tab. 6.13: Receive buffer verification of flow regulator examples.
The results show that only the examples that have up to three Flow and Valve
processes satisfy the available transmit buffer of the employed CAN controller,
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Fig. 6.16: Time complexity of receive buffer verification.
Fig. 6.17: Space complexity of receive buffer verification.
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see Table 6.12, whereas the examples with up to two Flow and Valve processes
satisfy the available receive buffer, see Table 6.13. This is because the Flow
processes have similar behaviour, i.e. they run periodically at the same rate, so
they all come to the same instant when they enqueue their messages into the
transmit buffer. A way of investigating this further was considered by adding
an offset to each Flow process, so they run at different rates. The offsets were
assigned as follows. If there are N Flow processes in the example, the first
Flow process will have 1 tick offset, the second will have 2 ticks offset, ... and
so on. Interestingly, this modification enables the examples to satisfy both
the available transmit and receive buffer for some examples, see Table 6.14
and Table 6.15 respectively. In the first experiment, we verified the number
of transmit buffers for 11 processes of Flow and Valve and the verification
returns positive results for this examples. The 12 processes example however
was not determined. The verification for this example was terminated after
approximately 65 hours, see Table 6.14. In the second experiments, we were able
to verify the number of receive buffers for 14 processes in the current computing
resources. For instance, the verification of 14 process took less than 6 hours to
return the result, see Table 6.15. However, the verification of 15 processes was
terminated after about 16 hours and so the result was not determined.
Process C1 Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied
1 3 0.10 48 2008
√
2 3 0.10 278 2008
√
3 3 0.20 906 37832
√
4 3 0.20 2669 37844
√
5 3 0.60 6765 38112
√
6 3 1.70 16041 38644
√
7 3 5.01 37662 39692
√
8 3 15.12 87949 42232
√
9 3 45.34 203551 47924
√
10 3 148.86 502548 62684
√
11 3 1680.50 3316922 220852
√
12 3 ≥235006.00 − − ?
Tab. 6.14: Transmit buffer verification of flow regulator examples with offset.
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Process C2 Time (s) State Memory (KB) Satisfied
1 2 0.10 48 2008
√
2 2 0.10 278 2008
√
3 2 0.10 906 2008
√
4 2 0.20 2669 37848
√
5 2 0.60 6765 38116
√
6 2 1.60 16041 38508
√
7 2 5.01 37662 39692
√
8 2 15.13 87949 42232
√
9 2 45.35 203551 47932
√
10 2 148.79 502548 62680
√
11 2 560.68 1137807 97684 ×
12 2 4247.32 4844946 309928 ×
13 2 8213.91 10231159 623748 ×
14 2 19925.65 21003639 1233312 ×
15 2 ≥57996.51 − 2081260 ?
Tab. 6.15: Receive buffer verification of flow regulator examples with offset.
Surprisingly, only the verification of the examples with up to 10 processes re-
turns positive results. The examples with more than 10 processes do not satisfy
the number of the available receive buffer. The counter-example generated by
the model checker program was analysed to figure out the source of the problem.
The investigation leads to a problem in our policy of assigning offsets. Although
each Flow process runs periodically with different offset, the offset value should
not exceed the period of the process. The current period of Flow processes is
10 ticks. So the process 11 will coincide with the process 1, the process 12 will
coincide with the process 2, ... and so on. This explains the unsatisfied result
of the verification for the examples with more than 10 processes.
Alternatively, we could modify the system architecture by employing more com-
puting nodes. Then we can allocate a fewer number of Flow and Valve processes
in each node. This will decrease the number of transmit/receive buffer required
by each node. Although this solution has an impact on the cost of the sys-
tem implementation, it could be more feasible in the cost than using higher
performance hardware to comply with the provided design. Consequently, the
experiments demonstrate the usefulness of having a model of the system early
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during the design phase, because the user can then verify the applicability of
the available resources before running the system implementation.
6.5 Summary
The experiments have successfully demonstrated the feasibility, the performance
and the formal verification capability, of our code generation approach. The
computational time of the transformation from CANDLE to executable C code
and UPPAAL model is modest and varies only a little as a function of the num-
ber of processes, the code size, and the net size. It requires only a few seconds
even for large examples. The efficiency of the generated code has been com-
pared with other code that employs a real-time kernel. The measurements have
shown that our generated code is competitive in size to the version implemented
by a widely-used RTOS, and the required RAM is at least 50% smaller in size
than that is required by the RTOS. This demonstrates that our approach can
generate an efficient code suitable for limited resource embedded systems. Addi-
tionally, the generated code is guaranteed to realise the behaviour of CANDLE
model which can be formally verified against key properties. The experimental
results of the formal verification capability are promising. A number of useful
properties of a broad class of interesting examples have been successfully verified
within acceptable computation resources. The results have shown that using
a model-checking tool is very useful during the design time to assess run-time
resources requirements.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we present a summary of the contributions of the thesis, discuss
the limitations of the work, and present possible directions for future research.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
The work presented in this thesis addressed the problem of generating exe-
cutable code for CAN-based distributed embedded systems in a way that guar-
antees that both functional and timing properties expressed in a high level
formal language are satisfied. The thesis proposed a novel approach in which
system behaviour is specified in CANDLE, a high-level language which is given
a formal semantics by translation to bCANDLE, an asynchronous process cal-
culus. A bCANDLE system is translated automatically, via a common interme-
diate net representation, both into executable C code and into timed automaton
model that can be used in the formal verification of a wide range of functional
and temporal properties.
A code generator was developed that can automatically produce executable C
code from a CANDLE specification. The code is generated from CANDLE
via an intermediate net representation. An efficient C representation of the
net was presented. We introduced a time-triggered execution (implementation)
model to execute the net in which, at each tick, a scheduler determines which
computation should run next. The schedulers that we have considered include
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simple round-robin, weighted round-robin, cooperative, and hybrid methods.
The hybrid scheduler combines cooperative and round-robin scheduling tech-
niques. These scheduling strategies facilitate off-line prediction of the worst-
case response time of system computations. A single broadcast asynchronous
communication mechanism was adopted and implemented. The communication
mechanism is an abstraction of the CAN. All communications occur through
this mechanism and never through the use of shared variables. This single
notion, employed both for external and local communication between system
components, provides flexibility to the system developer to freely distribute
system components on a number of nodes, and simplifies the process of gener-
ating a formal model of the system. An AADL-like language was introduced
to describe the system architecture. The description file provides details to the
code generator about processes, nodes, process-to-node allocation, scheduling
algorithm, tick rate, and communication details, including the IDs of messages
and network transmission rate.
The bCANDLE semantics assumes that computations complete and update
their data instantaneously and atomically on completion. Therefore, a num-
ber of methods were proposed that ensure the atomicity of data update. The
methods were evaluated based on three criteria we identified. It was concluded
that for short computations that complete within one tick, the method on-tick
duration computation would be suitable, and for long running computations,
the delayed atomic update method would be considered for our code generator.
A rigorous argument was presented that, for any system expressed in the high-
level language, its formal model is a conservative approximation of the exe-
cutable C code. This allows the system developer to conclude that if a model
satisfies any universally quantified property, then it is guaranteed that the im-
plementation will also satisfy the same property.
A variety of experiments were conducted to assess the applicability and per-
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formance of our approach. We used four representative case studies: a flow
regulator control system, a boiler control system, a security alarm system, and
an anti-lock braking system. Executable C code and formal models were suc-
cessfully generated for the case-studies in a reasonable time. The memory
consumption of the generated code was assessed and compared with an alter-
native method employing a widely-used real-time kernel. The experimental
results showed that overall memory consumption of generated code is compet-
itive with that used by the real-time kernel. Additionally, the results showed
that RAM usage is at least 50% less than that required by the real-time kernel.
These results give us confidence in the viability of implementing a code genera-
tor based on the net representation of the CANDLE system under development.
The tractability of the model checking problem for the generated formal mod-
els was assessed by using an off-the-shelf model checker. A number of useful
properties were successfully verified within acceptable computation resources.
The experimental results showed that the generated models are comparatively
small. We believe this demonstrates the power of the abstractions adopted by
our approach. The results showed also that using a model-checking tool is very
useful during system design phase to assess run-time resource requirements in
addition to typical functional and temporal properties.
This is the first time that a code generator for CAN-based systems has been
developed that allows model checking of specifications that can be guaranteed
to retain the behaviour of implementations.
7.2 Limitations
The main motivation behind our approach is the capability of generating a
model amenable to model checking and executable C code suitable for imple-
mentation. An informal argument was proposed to confirm that the formal
model conservatively approximates its implementation. This work did not for-
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mally verify the relationship between the model and the code. The reason for
that is that the target implementation language (which is C) lacks a formal
semantics. Moreover, further validation would be required also for the trans-
lation from C to a low-level machine language. This is important to ensure
that the behaviour described in C is preserved during the compilation to the
target machine code. A rigorous solution to this problem is not trivial. The
problem has been addressed in the CompCert project (CompCert, 2012) and
the results have been extensively published, for instance (Blazy, 2008; Dargaye,
2009; Leroy, 2009; Blazy and Leroy, 2009; Bedin et al., 2012).
Additionally, a model checking technique was used to verify that the model ex-
hibits some useful properties. The main drawback with such a technique is the
state-space explosion. This work did not investigate methods and techniques
to tackle this problem. However, computer capacity has been significantly im-
proved in terms of processing speeds and main memory sizes. This allows user
to tackle larger problem sizes that were previously impossible to verify. Fur-
thermore, model checking algorithms and tools are also exploiting the trend
in increasing hardware performance. An example of this is the capability of
executing a model checker on multi-core machines or a network of computers.
For instance, the Spin model checker has been recently enhanced to support
such features, see (Holzmann et al., 2011; Holzmann, 2012).
7.3 Future Work
Preliminary work has been conducted. The experimental results demonstrate
the viability of the proposed approach. Its performance is adequate and promis-
ing. In the following, a number of avenues of future investigation are suggested.
A number of different case studies were successfully applied in this work to
demonstrate the practical applicability of our approach. An interesting avenue
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of further investigation is to push our approach to the limit by applying larger
case studies. This would be very useful to explore the industrial strength of
the approach when it is applied to industrial examples. Then we could gain
a better idea about the capability of the approach, including code and model
generation.
A time-triggered software architecture was employed to execute the net in which
a single periodic interrupt is allowed in the system implementation. Currently
the interrupt service routine (ISR) is modelled implicitly avoiding a detailed
modelling of the ISR. This simplifies our models and makes model checking
more tractable. This however introduces pessimism into the models by intro-
ducing wider time bounds on system computations. One direction for future
work would be investigating the impact of including the ISR details explicitly
in the models. This can yield narrower bounds but the verification can be-
come more expensive since the size of the state space is expected to increase.
Modelling the ISR explicitly can also provide more flexibility in the selection of
scheduling algorithms because this allows modelling the scheduler in more detail
and thereby makes a wider range of schedulers available to the code generator.
Another avenue of investigation involves the application of software model
checking directly on the generated code. This would require applying abstrac-
tion methods on the code such as counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
(CEGAR) (Clarke et al., 2000). Then it would be interesting to compare the
tractability of our generated code to an existing software model checking tool
with that of code that is hand-crafted and implements the same functionality.
This would evaluate the generated code amenability for software model checking
technique.
A number of methods were proposed that ensure the atomicity of the data
update. The current case studies applied in the experimental chapter are not
affected by the problem of data interruption because computations are either
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short that complete within one tick, or long running that are not interrupted
by other computations. Future work on this work would require implementing
a chosen solution for the code generation, and testing it in different case studies
that could encounter this problem.
The intermediate net representation of CANDLE is the base of the model gen-
erator and the code generator. One possible direction of further research is
to investigate optimisation techniques that can be applied to reduce the size
of the net. For example, in the translation of LOTOS to C programs, a col-
lection of optimisations have been applied on the control and data flow of an
intermediate Petri net stage (Garavel et al., 2011). It is interesting to inves-
tigate the applicability of such techniques (e.g, (Garavel and Serwe, 2006)) to
our net that is generated from bCANDLE. This would contribute both during
model-checking and code generation stage. In other words, the optimised net
could yield a smaller executable code, and a possible reduction in the size of
the formal model. Although some techniques in (Kendall, 2001b) were applied
to tackle the problem of the state-space size, this approach could consider the
state-space explosion problem early before the model is generated. Addition-
ally, a finite state-machine (FSM) representation can be generated from the net
representation in order to generate the executable code. Although we think this
would have a considerable impact on the size of the generated code since FSM
has a higher representation cost compared to the Petri net, such code would
be faster to execute. An example of comparison between FSM and Petri net
representation can be found in (Zhu and Brooks, 2009). The system developer
may then have an option to select between two alternative methods to generate
the code.
For some scenarios, verifying the model of the whole system can be not possible
because of the state-space explosion problem. An interesting avenue of future
work would be incorporating compositional techniques to handle this problem.
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In this approach of analysis, several components of the system can be modelled
in more abstract way, and only one component is modelled in detail. After
that, we move to the next component and we do the same. If each of these
components considered in the abstract environment satisfies some properties,
then we can claim that the composition of these components satisfies also the
same properties. Some compositional methods have been already applied to
bCANDLE in the work of (Brockway, 2010). Therefore, extending the current
work to consider such techniques can be straightforward.
We proposed an approach that can automatically generate executable C from
specification of CAN-based system. In some industries such as automotive,
aerospace, medical devices, and others, a particular software development stan-
dard is followed, specifically for those systems that are programmed in C. One
such example is the MISRA C standard (MISRA, 2004) which is mainly de-
veloped to ensure the products are suitable for application in the automotive
industry. The MISRA C standard defines a number of rules (constraints) in
using the C language on safety-related systems. We think that it is interesting
for the industry that the code generator are able to produce a C code that con-
forms to such standard. This feature would improve the code quality and could
make the code generator more accepted by the previously mentioned industries.
Multi-core platforms provide high performance computing capability compared
to traditional single-core platforms. They integrate many processors on a sin-
gle chip which are connected through a Network on Chip (NoC). For instance,
the Intel Single-Chip Cloud Computer (SCC) comprises of 48 cores on a single
chip (Petrovic´ et al., 2012). Our approach facilitates executing a number of
processes in a single-processor platform via using the concept of local channel
introduced in Chapter 3. The local channel has been already implemented us-
ing shared memory where the processes communicate by message passing. We
think it would be straightforward to extend this concept to leverage the power
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of multi-core platforms. Then each process could be executed on a separate
processor (core) and communicate via local channels. This can offer an alter-
native implementation option to the system developer to improve the overall
performance of the system implementation.
The CAN is the dominant network in automotive and factory control systems
and is becoming increasingly popular in robotic, medical and avionics appli-
cations. There are a wide variety of other broadcast protocols available in
practice, each is dedicated for a particular application area. For example,
Profibus (Tovar and Vasques, 1999) for process control, LON (Rabbie, 2005)
for building automation, and ZigBee (Baronti et al., 2007) for wireless sensor
network. It would be interesting to extend the current work to consider more
communication protocols than the CAN. The formal language bCANDLE has
been constructed with the CAN protocol in mind. The network model of the
language defines a number of semantics rules to describe the network behaviour.
We think that these semantics rules should be revisited in order to adopt the
behaviour of other network protocols.
APPENDIX
A. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we show the CANDLE program, the architecture description,
the computations bounds, the bCANDLE model, and the net representation
respectively of the examples introduced in Chapter 6.
A.1 Flow Regulator System
CANDLE Program
Flow | Valve
where
Flow =
every 10000 do
readSensor();
snd(k, FLOW, fFlow)
end every
Valve =
loop do
rcv(k, FLOW, vFlow);
adjustValve()
end loop
Architecture Description
node flow
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Flow
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
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process Flow
stacksize : 20
channels : k -> CAN_0
node valve
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Valve
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Valve
stacksize : 20
channels : k -> CAN_0
channel k
bps : 100000
messages : <FLOW:1>
Computations Bounds
readSensor 1000 1250
adjustValve 1000 1250
bCANDLE Model
(Flow | Valve)
where
Flow = __LOOP__0
Valve = __LOOP__1
__LOOP__0 = (((([readSensor:1000,1250] ; k!FLOW.fFlow) ; idle)
[> [__timer__:10000,10000]) ; __LOOP__0)
__LOOP__1 = ((k?FLOW.vFlow ; [adjustValve:1000,1250]) ; __LOOP__1)
A. Case Studies 161
Net Representation
1
[readSensor:1000,1250]^H2
[__timer__:10000,10000]^H4
4
5
k?FLOW.vFlow
2
k!FLOW.fFlow^H1
3
idle
6
[adjustValve:1000,1250]^H3
A.2 Steam Boiler Control System
CANDLE Program
WaterLevel | Pump | Controller
where
WaterLevel =
initSensor();
select
when rcv(k, START) => null
in
every 5000 do
snd(k, SENSOR_READY)
end every
end select;
select
when rcv(k, SHUTDOWN) => idle
in
every 10000 do
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case readSensor()
when 0 => snd(k, LEVEL_OK)
when 1 => snd(k, LEVEL_LOW)
when 2 => snd(k, LEVEL_HIGH)
end case
end every
end select
Pump =
initPump();
select
when rcv(k, START) => null
in
every 5000 do
snd(k, PUMP_READY)
end every
end select;
select
when rcv(k, SHUTDOWN) => pumpOff(); idle
in
loop do
select
when rcv(k, PUMP_ON) => pumpOn()
when rcv(k, PUMP_OFF) => pumpOff()
end select
end loop
end select
Controller =
initController();
select
when rcv(k, SENSOR_READY) => rcv(k, PUMP_READY)
when rcv(k, PUMP_READY) => rcv(k, SENSOR_READY)
end select;
snd(k, START);
loop do
select
when rcv(k, LEVEL_OK) => null
when rcv(k, LEVEL_LOW) => snd(k, PUMP_ON)
when rcv(k, LEVEL_HIGH) => snd(k, PUMP_OFF)
timeout elapse(15000) => snd(k, SHUTDOWN); idle
end select
end loop
Architecture Description
node waterlevel
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wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : WaterLevel
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process WaterLevel
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
node pump
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Pump
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Pump
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
node controller
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Controller
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Controller
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
channel k
bps : 100000
messages : <START:0, SENSOR_READY:0, SHUTDOWN:0, LEVEL_HIGH:0, LEVEL_LOW:0,
LEVEL_OK:0, PUMP_READY:0, PUMP_ON:0, PUMP_OFF:0>
Computations Bounds
initSensor 1000 1250
readSensor 1000 1250
initPump 1000 1250
pumpOn 1000 1250
pumpOff 1000 1250
initController 1000 1250
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testLevel 1000 1250
bCANDLE Model
(WaterLevel | (Pump | Controller))
where
WaterLevel =
([initSensor:1000,1250] ;
((__LOOP__0 [> (k?START._ ; [__null__:0,0])) ;
(__LOOP__1 [> (k?SHUTDOWN._ ; idle))))
Pump =
([initPump:1000,1250] ;
((__LOOP__2 [> (k?START._ ; [__null__:0,0])) ;
(__LOOP__3 [> (k?SHUTDOWN._ ; ([pumpOff:1000,1250] ; idle)))))
Controller =
([initController:1000,1250] ;
(((k?SENSOR_READY._ ; k?PUMP_READY._) + (k?PUMP_READY._ ; k?SENSOR_READY._)) ;
(k!START._ ; __LOOP__4)))
__LOOP__0 =
(((k!SENSOR_READY._ ; idle) [> [__timer__:5000,5000]) ; __LOOP__0)
__LOOP__1 =
(((([__result__readSensor:1000,1250] ;
((__gf__0 -> k!LEVEL_OK._) + ((__gf__1 -> k!LEVEL_LOW._) +
(__gf__2 -> k!LEVEL_HIGH._)))) ; idle)
[> [__timer__:10000,10000]) ; __LOOP__1)
__LOOP__2 =
(((k!PUMP_READY._ ; idle) [> [__timer__:5000,5000]) ; __LOOP__2)
__LOOP__3 =
(((k?PUMP_ON._ ; [pumpOn:1000,1250]) + (k?PUMP_OFF._ ; [pumpOff:1000,1250])) ; __LOOP__3)
__LOOP__4 =
(((k?LEVEL_OK._ ; [__null__:0,0]) + ((k?LEVEL_LOW._ ; k!PUMP_ON._) +
((k?LEVEL_HIGH._ ; k!PUMP_OFF._) +
([__timer__:15000,15000] ; (k!SHUTDOWN._ ; idle))))) ; __LOOP__4)
Net Representation
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A.3 Security Alarm System
CANDLE Program
Control | PendingTimer | Flasher | Display
where
Control =
loop do
select
timeout elapse(50000) => snd(k, CONTROL, controlMsg)
in
select
when rcv(k, PENDING_TIME, controlTimeLeft) => controlStatePendingTime()
in
case control()
when 0 => null
when 1 => snd(k, PENDING, controlTimeInterval)
when 2 => snd(k, ALERT)
when 3 => snd(k, ABORT)
end case;
idle
end select;
idle
end select
end loop
PendingTimer =
loop do
rcv(k, PENDING, ptTimeLeft);
trap
when PENDING_DONE => null
in
select
when rcv(k, ABORT) => exit PENDING_DONE
in
every 1000000 do
case pendingExpired()
when true => snd(k, PENDING_TIME, ptTimeLeft); exit PENDING_DONE
when false => snd(k, PENDING_TIME, ptTimeLeft)
end case
end every
end select
end trap
end loop
Flasher =
loop do
rcv(k, ALERT);
select
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when rcv(k, ABORT) => linkLEDOff()
in
every 250000 do
linkLEDToggle()
end every
end select
end loop
Display =
initDisplay();
loop do
rcv(k, CONTROL, displayMsg);
Display()
end loop
Architecture Description
node alarm
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Control, PendingTimer, Flasher, Display
scheduler : ROUND_ROBIN
ports : LOCAL_DATA
process Control
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> LOCAL_DATA
process PendingTimer
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> LOCAL_DATA
process Flasher
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> LOCAL_DATA
process Display
stacksize : 128
channels : k -> LOCAL_DATA
channel k
bps : 100000
messages : <CONTROL:8, PENDING_TIME:8, PENDING:8, ALERT:8, ABORT:8>
Computations Bounds
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controlStatePendingTime 1000 1250
control 1000 1250
pendingExpired 1000 1250
linkLEDOff 1000 1250
linkLEDToggle 1000 1250
initDisplay 1000 1250
Display 10000 20250
bCANDLE Model
(Control | (PendingTimer | (Flasher | Display)))
where
Control = __LOOP__0
PendingTimer = __LOOP__1
Flasher = __LOOP__3
Display = ([initDisplay:1000,1250] ; __LOOP__5)
__LOOP__0 =
(((((([__result__control:1000,1250] ;
((__gf__0 -> [__null__:0,0]) + ((__gf__1 -> k!PENDING.controlTimeInterval) +
((__gf__2 -> k!ALERT._) + (__gf__3 -> k!ABORT._))))) ; idle)
[> (k?PENDING_TIME.controlTimeLeft ; [controlStatePendingTime:1000,1250])) ; idle)
[> ([__timer__:50000,50000] ; k!CONTROL.controlMsg)) ; __LOOP__0)
__LOOP__1 =
((k?PENDING.ptTimeLeft ;
((__LOOP__2 [> (k?ABORT._ ; ([__exit__PENDING_DONE:0,0] ; idle)))
[> (__gx__PENDING_DONE -> [__null__:0,0]))) ; __LOOP__1)
__LOOP__2 =
(((([__result__pendingExpired:1000,1250] ;
((__gf__1 -> (k!PENDING_TIME.ptTimeLeft ; ([__exit__PENDING_DONE:0,0] ; idle))) +
(__gf__0 -> k!PENDING_TIME.ptTimeLeft))) ; idle)
[> [__timer__:1000000,1000000]) ; __LOOP__2)
__LOOP__3 = ((k?ALERT._ ; (__LOOP__4 [> (k?ABORT._ ; [linkLEDOff:1000,1250]))) ; __LOOP__3)
__LOOP__4 = ((([linkLEDToggle:1000,1250] ; idle) [> [__timer__:250000,250000]) ; __LOOP__4)
__LOOP__5 = ((k?CONTROL.displayMsg ; [Display:10000,20250]) ; __LOOP__5)
Net Representation
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A.4 Anti-lock Braking System
CANDLE Program
Control | Brake_0 | Brake_1 | Brake_2 | Brake_3 | Sensor_0 | Sensor_1 | Sensor_2 | Sensor_3
where
Control =
every 16000 do
snd(k, SPEED_REQ_0);
rcv(k, SPEED_0, sSpeed_0);
snd(k, SPEED_REQ_1);
rcv(k, SPEED_1, sSpeed_1);
snd(k, SPEED_REQ_2);
rcv(k, SPEED_2, sSpeed_2);
snd(k, SPEED_REQ_3);
rcv(k, SPEED_3, sSpeed_3);
case comput_acc()
when 0 => null
when 1 => ABS(); snd(k, PRESSURE, cPressure)
when 2 => ASR(); snd(k, PRESSURE, cPressure)
end case
end every
Brake_0 =
loop do
rcv(k, PRESSURE, bPressure);
adjustPressure_0()
end loop
Brake_1 =
loop do
rcv(k, PRESSURE, bPressure);
adjustPressure_1()
end loop
Brake_2 =
loop do
rcv(k, PRESSURE, bPressure);
adjustPressure_2()
end loop
Brake_3 =
loop do
rcv(k, PRESSURE, bPressure);
adjustPressure_3()
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end loop
Sensor_0 =
loop do
rcv(k, SPEED_REQ_0);
readSensor_0();
snd(k, SPEED_0, sSpeed_0)
end loop
Sensor_1 =
loop do
rcv(k, SPEED_REQ_1);
readSensor_1();
snd(k, SPEED_1, sSpeed_1)
end loop
Sensor_2 =
loop do
rcv(k, SPEED_REQ_2);
readSensor_2();
snd(k, SPEED_2, sSpeed_2)
end loop
Sensor_3 =
loop do
rcv(k, SPEED_REQ_3);
readSensor_3();
snd(k, SPEED_3, sSpeed_3)
end loop
Architecture Description
node control
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Control
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Control
stacksize : 125
channels : k -> CAN_0
node w_0
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Brake_0, Sensor_0
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scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Brake_0
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
process Sensor_0
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
node w_1
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Brake_1, Sensor_1
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Brake_1
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
process Sensor_1
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
node w_2
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Brake_2, Sensor_2
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
process Brake_2
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
process Sensor_2
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
node w_3
wordsize : 32
tickHz : 1000
processes : Brake_3, Sensor_3
scheduler : COOPERATIVE
ports : CAN_0
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process Brake_3
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
process Sensor_3
stacksize : 25
channels : k -> CAN_0
channel k
bps : 100000
messages : <PRESSURE:4, SPEED_REQ_0:0, SPEED_0:1, SPEED_REQ_1:0, SPEED_1:1,
SPEED_REQ_2:0, SPEED_2:1, SPEED_REQ_3:0, SPEED_3:1>
Computations Bounds
comput_acc 1000 1250
ABS 1000 1250
ASR 1000 1250
adjustPressure_0 1000 1250
adjustPressure_1 1000 1250
adjustPressure_2 1000 1250
adjustPressure_3 1000 1250
readSensor_0 1000 1250
readSensor_1 1000 1250
readSensor_2 1000 1250
readSensor_3 1000 1250
bCANDLE Model
(Control | (Brake_0 | (Brake_1 | (Brake_2 | (Brake_3 |
(Sensor_0 | (Sensor_1 | (Sensor_2 | Sensor_3))))))))
where
Control = __LOOP__0
Brake_0 = __LOOP__1
Brake_1 = __LOOP__2
Brake_2 = __LOOP__3
Brake_3 = __LOOP__4
Sensor_0 = __LOOP__5
Sensor_1 = __LOOP__6
Sensor_2 = __LOOP__7
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Sensor_3 = __LOOP__8
__LOOP__0 =
((((k!SPEED_REQ_0._ ; (k?SPEED_0.sSpeed_0 ;
(k!SPEED_REQ_1._ ; (k?SPEED_1.sSpeed_1 ;
(k!SPEED_REQ_2._ ; (k?SPEED_2.sSpeed_2 ;
(k!SPEED_REQ_3._ ; (k?SPEED_3.sSpeed_3 ;
([__result__comput_acc:1000,1250] ;
((__gf__0 -> [__null__:0,0]) +
((__gf__1 -> ([ABS:1000,1250] ; k!PRESSURE.cPressure)) +
(__gf__2 -> ([ASR:1000,1250] ; k!PRESSURE.cPressure))))))))))))) ; idle)
[> [__timer__:16000,16000]) ; __LOOP__0)
__LOOP__1 = ((k?PRESSURE.bPressure ; [adjustPressure_0:1000,1250]) ; __LOOP__1)
__LOOP__2 = ((k?PRESSURE.bPressure ; [adjustPressure_1:1000,1250]) ; __LOOP__2)
__LOOP__3 = ((k?PRESSURE.bPressure ; [adjustPressure_2:1000,1250]) ; __LOOP__3)
__LOOP__4 = ((k?PRESSURE.bPressure ; [adjustPressure_3:1000,1250]) ; __LOOP__4)
__LOOP__5 = ((k?SPEED_REQ_0._ ; ([readSensor_0:1000,1250] ; k!SPEED_0.sSpeed_0)) ; __LOOP__5)
__LOOP__6 = ((k?SPEED_REQ_1._ ; ([readSensor_1:1000,1250] ; k!SPEED_1.sSpeed_1)) ; __LOOP__6)
__LOOP__7 = ((k?SPEED_REQ_2._ ; ([readSensor_2:1000,1250] ; k!SPEED_2.sSpeed_2)) ; __LOOP__7)
__LOOP__8 = ((k?SPEED_REQ_3._ ; ([readSensor_3:1000,1250] ; k!SPEED_3.sSpeed_3)) ; __LOOP__8)
Net Representation
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B. UPPAAL MODELS
This section shows the generated UPPAAL models of the CAN communication
and the flow regulator example respectively.
B.1 The CAN Communication Model
Fig. B.1: The UPPAAL model of the CAN communication.
B.2 Flow Regulator System Model
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Fig. B.2: The UPPAAL model of the Flow process.
Fig. B.3: The UPPAAL model of the Valve process.
C. C SOURCE CODE
In this section, we present the C source code of the interrupt service routine
(ISR), and the generated C code of the flow regulator example, respectively.
C.1 The C code of the ISR
1 /∗
2 ∗ f i l e : bc . h
3 ∗∗/
4
5 #ifndef BC H
6 #define BC H
7
8 #include <s tdboo l . h>
9 #include <s t d i n t . h>
10 #include <bcport . h>
11
12 enum bcGuardMasks {
13 BC GUARD EXCEPTION FLAG = 0x80000000U ,
14 BC GUARD EXCEPTION RESULT MASK = 0x7FFFFFFFU,
15 } ;
16
17 typedef u i n t 3 2 t bcResu l t t ;
18
19 typedef u i n t 3 2 t bcGuardSe lect t ;
20
21 typedef void (∗ bcComputation t ) (void ) ;
22
23 typedef struct bcNCB {
24 u i n t 3 2 t ∗ptos ; /∗ po in t e r to top o f s t a c k ; must be f i r s t
f i e l d ∗/
25 i n t 3 2 t index ; /∗ index to t r a n s i t i o n f o r current
computation ∗/
26 /∗ 0 : no curren t computation ∗/
27 /∗ −t : computation ongoing f o r t r a n s i t i o n
t ∗/
28 /∗ t : computation completed f o r
t r a n s i t i o n t ∗/
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29 bcResu l t t r e s u l t ; /∗ i f t he computation i s a func t ion , s t o r e
the r e s u l t here ∗/
30 } bcNCB t ;
31
32
33 typedef struct bcPCB {
34 u i n t 3 2 t index ; /∗ Index s e t as f o l l o w s :
35 0 i f data i s s t a l e ,
36 1 i f data i s f r e s h and channel i s e x t e r na l
37 p i f p i s the p l ace number o f t r i g g e r o f
sender t r a n s i t i o n
38 and data i s f r e s h
39 and t h i s i s a LOCAL channel
40 ∗/
41 bcPortCanMessage t message ;
42 } bcPCB t ;
43
44
45 typedef enum bcAttributeType {
46 BC TICK,
47 BC IDLE ,
48 BC COMP,
49 BC DELAY,
50 BC GFUN,
51 BC GEXN,
52 BC GVAR,
53 BC EXIT ,
54 BC SEND,
55 BC RECV
56 } bcAttr ibuteType t ;
57
58
59 /∗
60 ∗ At t r i b u t e s shou ld be as s i gned as f o l l o w s :
61 ∗
62 ∗ BC TICK − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be 0 ; i gnored
63 ∗ BC IDLE − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be 0 ; i gnored
64 ∗ BCCOMP − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be po in t e r to func t i on f o r t h i s
computation
65 ∗ BC DELAY − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be i n i t i a l va lue o f de l ay
66 ∗ BC GFUN − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be 0 f o r nega t i v e guard , 1 f o r
p o s i t i v e guard and between 2 and 255 f o r excep t i on guard
67 ∗ BC GEXN − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be 0 f o r nega t i v e guard , 1 f o r
p o s i t i v e guard and between 2 and 255 f o r excep t i on guard
68 ∗ BC GVAR − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be 0 f o r nega t i v e guard , 1 f o r
p o s i t i v e guard and between 2 and 255 f o r excep t i on guard
69 ∗ BC SEND − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be address o f a CAN message v a r i a b l e
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70 ∗ BC RECV − a t t r i b u t e shou ld be address o f a CAN message v a r i a b l e
71 ∗/
72 typedef u i n t 3 2 t bcAt t r i bu t e t ;
73
74
75 typedef struct bcTimer {
76 u i n t 3 2 t index ; /∗ index to t r a n s i t i o n f o r current t imer ∗/
77 /∗ 0 : t imer not a c t i v e ∗/
78 /∗ t : t imer f o r t r a n s i t i o n t ∗/
79 u i n t 3 2 t va lue ; /∗ curren t va lue f o r a c t i v e t imer ∗/
80 /∗ undef ined f o r i n a c t i v e t imer ∗/
81 } bcTimer t ;
82
83
84 extern bcResu l t t volat i le bcExcept ionResult ;
85
86 void bcISR (void ) ;
87 void bcRunSystem (void ) ;
88 void bcNullComputation (void ) ;
89 void bcIdleComputation (void ) ;
90
91
92
93 #endif
1 /∗
2 ∗ f i l e : bc . c
3 ∗∗/
4
5 #include <s tdboo l . h>
6 #include <a s s e r t . h>
7 #include <bc . h>
8 #include <bcport . h>
9 #include <bcgen . h>
10 #include <b c b i t s e t . h>
11
12 bcResu l t t volat i le bcGuardResult = 0 ;
13
14 #ifde f BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
15
16 stat ic bcPortCanMessage t sendBuf fe r ;
17 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t port ;
18 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t l en ;
19 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t msgId ;
20 stat ic u i n t 8 t ∗ from ;
21 stat ic u i n t 8 t ∗ to ;
22
23 #endif
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24
25 stat ic void r e a c t ( u i n t 3 2 t p) ;
26 stat ic void f i r e ( u i n t 3 2 t p) ;
27 stat ic void scheduleNextComputation (void ) ;
28
29 void bcISR (void ) {
30 i n t 3 2 t i ;
31 i n t 3 2 t j ;
32 bool s t a b l e = f a l s e ;
33 bcGenPlaceSet t lastMarking ;
34
35 /∗ Jus t s t a r t i n g the ISR ∗/
36 bcPortISREntryHook ( ) ;
37
38 #ifde f BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED
39
40 /∗ update s o f t t imers ∗/
41 for ( i =0; i < BCGEN N TIMERS; i +=1) {
42 i f ( bcGenTimers [ i ] . index != 0) {
/∗ t imer i s a c t i v e . . . ∗/
43 bcGenTimers [ i ] . va lue −= 1 ;
/∗ . . . so decrement
count ∗/
44 }
45 }
46
47 #endif
48
49 #ifde f BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
50
51 /∗ update e x t e r na l por t c on t r o l b l o c k s ∗/
52 for ( i =0; i < BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS; i +=1) {
53 i f ( bcPortCanReady ( i ) ) {
54 bcPortCanRead ( i , &bcGenPCB [ i ] . message ) ;
55 bcGenPCB [ i ] . index = 1 ;
56 }
57 else {
58 bcGenPCB [ i ] . index = 0 ;
59 }
60 }
61
62 /∗ mark a l l l o c a l por t c on t r o l b l o c k s as s t a l e ∗/
63 for ( i=BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS; i<BCGEN N PORTS; i +=1) {
64 bcGenPCB [ i ] . index = 0 ;
65 }
66
67 #endif
C. C source Code 182
68
69 /∗ r eac t to marked p l a c e s ∗/
70 #i f de f ined (BCGEN DEBRUIJN)
71 {
72 /∗
73 ∗ See C. Leiserson , H. Prokop , and K. Randal l .
74 ∗ Using de Brui jn sequences to index a 1 in a computer
word .
75 ∗ MIT Laboratory f o r Computer Science , 1998
76 ∗ f o r an exp l ana t i on o f t h i s approach to i d e n t i f y i n g the b i t
number
77 ∗ o f the r i gh tmos t 1 in a computer word . Used here to i d e n t i f y
the
78 ∗ cu r r en t l y marked p l a c e s during the r eac t i on c y c l e .
Pre l iminary
79 ∗ t e s t s s u g g e s t t h a t i t ’ s about 30% qu i c k e r than t e s t i n g every
b i t
80 ∗ f o r t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n .
81 ∗
82 ∗ I t seems to s low the ISR by about 2.5% i f you dec l a r e the
f o l l ow i n g array as
83 ∗ cons t ( and hence f o r c e i t i n t o f l a s h ) .
84 ∗/
85 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t debru i jn [ 3 2 ] =
86 {0 , 1 , 28 , 2 , 29 , 14 , 24 , 3 , 30 , 22 , 20 , 15 , 25 , 17 , 4 , 8 ,
87 31 , 27 , 13 , 23 , 21 , 19 , 16 , 7 , 26 , 12 , 18 , 6 , 11 , 5 , 10 , 9} ;
88
89 u i n t 3 2 t o f f s e t = 0 ;
90 u i n t 3 2 t word = 0 ;
91 u i n t 3 2 t r ightmostBitVal = 0 ;
92 u i n t 3 2 t p lace = 0 ;
93
94 bool f i r s t I t e r a t i o n = true ; // Used to d e t e c t the f i r s t
i t e r a t i o n o f wh i l e loop .
95
96 while ( ! s t a b l e ) {
97 for ( i = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i +=1) {
98 lastMarking [ i ] = bcGenMarked [ i ] ;
99 }
100 for ( i = 0 , o f f s e t = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i +=1,
o f f s e t +=32) {
101 word = bcGenMarked [ i ] ;
102 while ( word != 0) {
103 r ightmostBitVal = ( word & (−word ) ) ;
104 word −= rightmostBitVal ;
105 p lace = debru i jn [ ( ( r ightmostBitVal ∗ 0x077CB531 ) >> 27) ] +
o f f s e t ;
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106 r e a c t ( p lace ) ;
107 #ifde f BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED
108 for ( j =0; j<BCGEN N TIMERS; j+=1) {
109 i f ( ! ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked , bcGenTimers [ j ] . index ) ) ) {
110 bcGenTimers [ j ] . index = 0 ;
111 }
112 }
113 #endif
114 }
115 }
116 s t a b l e = true ;
117 for ( i = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i +=1) {
118 i f ( bcGenMarked [ i ] != lastMarking [ i ] ) {
119 s t a b l e = f a l s e ;
120 break ;
121 }
122 }
123
124 #ifde f BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
125 /∗ mark a l l e x t e r na l por t c on t r o l b l o c k s as s t a l e a f t e r the
f i r s t i t e r a t i o n ∗/
126 i f ( f i r s t I t e r a t i o n == true ) {
127 for ( i =0; i<BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS; i +=1) {
128 bcGenPCB [ i ] . index = 0 ;
129 }
130 f i r s t I t e r a t i o n = f a l s e ;
131 }
132
133 for ( i=BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS; i<BCGEN N PORTS; i +=1) {
134 bcGenPCB [ i ] . index = 0 ;
135 }
136 #endif
137
138 }
139 }
140
141 #else
142 while ( ! s t a b l e ) {
143 for ( i = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i +=1) {
144 lastMarking [ i ] = bcGenMarked [ i ] ;
145 }
146 for ( i =0; i < BCGEN N PLACES; i +=1) {
147 i f ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked , i ) ) {
148 r e a c t ( i ) ;
149 }
150 }
151 s t a b l e = true ;
C. C source Code 184
152 for ( i = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i +=1) {
153 i f ( bcGenMarked [ i ] != lastMarking [ i ] ) {
154 s t a b l e = f a l s e ;
155 break ;
156 }
157 }
158 }
159 #endif
160
161 /∗ s chedu l e next computation ∗/
162 scheduleNextComputation ( ) ;
163
164 /∗ About to l e a v e the ISR ∗/
165 bcPortISRExitHook ( ) ;
166 }
167
168 stat ic void r e a c t ( u i n t 3 2 t p) {
169 u i n t 3 2 t tIndex = bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . index ;
170
171 switch ( bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . type ) {
172 case BC IDLE : {
173 bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . index = 0 ; /∗ a l l ow the s chedu l e r to
pass over t h i s computation i f i t wants ∗/
174 break ;
175 }
176 case BC COMP : {
177 i f (bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . index < 0) {
178 /∗ computation has been schedu l ed but i s not ye t complete ;
noth ing to do ∗/
179 }
180 else i f (bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . index == 0) { /∗ computation shou ld
be schedu l ed ∗/
181 bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . index = −p ; /∗ show computation
has been schedu l ed but i s not completed ∗/
182 bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . ptos = bcGenComputationInit ( tIndex ,
( bcComputation t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ;
183 }
184 else { /∗ (bcGenNCB[ t Index ] . index > 0) so computation has been
completed ∗/
185 bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . index = 0 ; /∗ . . . so r e s e t index to
show computation i s no l onger a c t i v e . . . ∗/
186 f i r e (p) ; /∗ . . . f i r e the
t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
187 }
188 break ;
189 }
190 case BC DELAY : {
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191 #ifde f BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED
192 i f ( bcGenTimers [ t Index ] . index != 0) { /∗ t imer i s a c t i v e ∗/
193 i f ( bcGenTimers [ t Index ] . va lue == 0) { /∗ . . . and has exp i r ed
∗/
194 f i r e (p) ;
195 bcGenTimers [ tIndex ] . index = 0 ;
196 }
197 }
198 else { /∗ s t a r t the t imer ∗/
199 bcGenTimers [ t Index ] . index = p ;
200 bcGenTimers [ t Index ] . va lue =
( u i n t 3 2 t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ;
201 }
202 #endif
203 break ;
204 }
205 case BC GFUN : {
206 i f ( ( bcGuardSe lect t )bcGenNCB [ tIndex ] . r e s u l t ==
( bcGuardSe lect t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) { /∗ t h i s
guard s e l e c t e d . . . ∗/
207 /∗ bcGuardResult = bcGenNCB[ t Index ] . r e s u l t ;
save the r e s u l t in case i t ’ s an excep t i on ∗/
208 f i r e (p) ;
/∗ . . . and f i r e t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
209 }
210 break ;
211 }
212 case BC GVAR : {
213 i f ( ( ( i n t 3 2 t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e == INT32 MAX) | |
( (∗ ( bcGuardSe lect t ∗) tIndex ==
( bcGuardSe lect t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ) ) {
/∗ t h i s guard s e l e c t e d . . . ∗/
214 f i r e (p) ;
/∗ . . . so f i r e t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
215 }
216 break ;
217 }
218 case BC GEXN : {
219 #ifde f BCGEN EXN REQUIRED
220 i f (bcGenECB [ tIndex ] & (1 <<
( u i n t 3 2 t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ) {
/∗ excep t i on i s r a i s e d . . . ∗/
221 bcGenECB [ tIndex ] &= ˜(1 <<
( u i n t 3 2 t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ;
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/∗ . . . c l e a r the excep t i on . . .
∗/
222 f i r e (p) ;
/∗ . . . and f i r e t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
223 }
224 #endif
225 break ;
226 }
227 case BC EXIT : {
228 #ifde f BCGEN EXN REQUIRED
229 bcGenECB [ tIndex ] |= (1 <<
( u i n t 3 2 t ) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ;
/∗ r a i s e the excep t i on ∗/
230 f i r e (p) ;
/∗ . . . and f i r e t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
231 #endif
232 break ;
233 }
234 case BC SEND : {
235 #ifde f BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
236 port = ( tIndex & 0x00000007 ) ;
237 l en = ( ( tIndex >> BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET) & 0x0000000F ) ;
238 msgId = tIndex >> BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET;
239 from = ( u i n t 8 t ∗) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ;
240
241 i f ( (BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS > 0) && ( port <
BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS) ) {
242 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
243 to = ( u i n t 8 t ∗)&sendBuf fe r . dataA ;
244 for ( i=l en ; i != 0 ; i−−) {
245 ∗ to++ = ∗ from++;
246 }
247 sendBuf fe r . id = msgId ;
248 sendBuf fe r . l en = len ;
249 bcPortCanWrite ( port , &sendBuf fe r ) ;
250 f i r e (p) ;
251 }
252 else {
253 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
254 i f (bcGenPCB [ port ] . index == 0) {
255 bcGenPCB [ port ] . index = p ;
256 to = ( u i n t 8 t ∗)&bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . dataA ;
257 for ( i=l en ; i != 0 ; i−−) {
258 ∗ to++ = ∗ from++;
259 }
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260 bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . id = msgId ;
261 bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . l en = len ;
262 f i r e (p) ;
263 }
264 }
265 #endif
266 break ;
267 }
268 case BC RECV : {
269 #ifde f BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
270 port = ( tIndex & 0x00000007 ) ;
271 msgId = tIndex >> BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET;
272 i f ( (bcGenPCB [ port ] . index != 0) &&
/∗ f r e s h
data a v a i l a b l e ∗/
273 (bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . id == msgId ) ) {
/∗ and
matching id ∗/
274 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
275 l en = ( ( tIndex >> BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET) & 0x0000000F ) ;
276 a s s e r t ( l en == bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . l en ) ;
/∗ check t ha t
we ’ ve go t the r i g h t number o f b y t e s ∗/
277 to = ( u i n t 8 t ∗) bcGenTransit ions [ p ] . a t t r i b u t e ;
278 from = ( u i n t 8 t ∗)&bcGenPCB [ port ] . message . dataA ;
279 for ( i=l en ; i != 0 ; i−−) {
/∗ copy to the user data v a r i a b l e ∗/
280 ∗ to++ = ∗ from++;
281 }
282 f i r e (p) ;
/∗ and f i r e the t r a n s i t i o n ∗/
283 }
284 #endif
285 break ;
286 }
287 default :
288 a s s e r t ( f a l s e ) ; /∗ shou ld not happen ∗/
289 }
290 }
291
292 stat ic void f i r e ( u i n t 3 2 t p) {
293 bcGenTrans i t ion t t = bcGenTransit ions [ p ] ;
294 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
295
296 b i tC l ea r ( bcGenMarked , p) ;
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297 for ( i = 0 ; i < BCGEN N PLACE WORDS; i++) {
298 bcGenMarked [ i ] &= ˜( t . vu lne rab l e [ i ] ) ;
299 bcGenMarked [ i ] |= t . t a r g e t [ i ] ;
300 }
301 }
302
303
304 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t scheduleNextNCBindex = 0 ;
305
306 #i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE ROUND ROBIN)
307 stat ic void scheduleNextComputation (void ) {
308 i f (++scheduleNextNCBindex == BCGEN N NETS) {
309 scheduleNextNCBindex = 1 ;
310 }
311
312 i f (bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index != 0) { /∗ t h e r e i s a
computation to cons ider ∗/
313 i f ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked ,
−(bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index ) ) ) {
314 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] ; /∗
t r i g g e r s t i l l marked so schedu l e t h i s computation ∗/
315 }
316 else {
317 bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index = 0 ; /∗ t r i g g e r
no longer marked ; abandon t h i s computation ∗/
318 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ; /∗ and
schedu l e the i d l e computation ∗/
319 }
320 }
321 else {
322 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ; /∗ no
computation a v a i l a b l e here ; s chedu l e the i d l e computation
∗/
323 }
324 }
325
326 #e l i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE FIXED PRIORITY)
327
328 stat ic void scheduleNextComputation (void ) {
329 scheduleNextNCBindex = 0 ;
330 while (++scheduleNextNCBindex < BCGEN N NETS) {
331 i f (bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index != 0) {
332 i f ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked ,
−(bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index ) ) ) {
333 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] ; /∗
t r i g g e r s t i l l marked so schedu l e t h i s computation ∗/
334 return ;
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335 }
336 else {
337 bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index = 0 ; /∗
t r i g g e r no longer marked ; abandon t h i s computation ∗/
338 }
339 }
340 }
341 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ; /∗ no
computation a v a i l a b l e ; s chedu l e the i d l e computation ∗/
342 }
343
344 #e l i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE)
345
346 stat ic bool coroutineRunning = f a l s e ;
347
348 void bcCoroutine (void ) {
349 bcNCB t volat i le ∗savedNCBPtr = bcGenCurrentNCBPtr ;
350 i n t 3 2 t tIndex = 0 ;
351 i n t 3 2 t index = 0 ;
352
353 coroutineRunning = true ;
354 while (++scheduleNextNCBindex < BCGEN N NETS) {
355 tIndex = −(bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index ) ;
356 i f ( tIndex != 0) {
/∗ t h e r e i s a computation to cons ider ∗/
357 i f ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked , tIndex ) ) {
358 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] ;
/∗ t r i g g e r s t i l l marked so . . . ∗/
359 ( ( bcComputation t ) bcGenTransit ions [ tIndex ] . a t t r i b u t e ) ( ) ;
/∗ . . . run the computation ∗/
360 index = bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index ;
361 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index = −index ;
362 }
363 else {
364 bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index = 0 ;
/∗ t r i g g e r no longer marked ; abandon t h i s computation ∗/
365 }
366 }
367 }
368 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = savedNCBPtr ;
/∗ no more computat ions a v a i l a b l e ; re turn ∗/
369 coroutineRunning = f a l s e ;
370 }
371
372 bool bcExecutingAsCoroutine (void ) {
373 return coroutineRunning ;
374 }
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375
376
377 stat ic void scheduleNextComputation (void ) {
378 scheduleNextNCBindex = 0 ;
379 while (++scheduleNextNCBindex < BCGEN N NETS) {
380 i f (bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index != 0) {
381 i f ( b i tTes t ( bcGenMarked ,
−(bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index ) ) ) {
382 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] ; /∗
t r i g g e r s t i l l marked so schedu l e t h i s computation ∗/
383 return ;
384 }
385 else {
386 bcGenNCB [ scheduleNextNCBindex ] . index = 0 ; /∗
t r i g g e r no longer marked ; abandon t h i s computation ∗/
387 }
388 }
389 }
390 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ; /∗ no
computation a v a i l a b l e ; s chedu l e the i d l e computation ∗/
391 }
392
393 #else
394
395 #error : No schedu l ing p o l i c y de f ined
396
397 #endif
398
399
400 void bcRunSystem (void ) {
401 bcPortBSPinit ( ) ;
402 bcGenStackInit ( ) ;
403 bcPortTimerInit ( ) ;
404 bcPortStartSystem ( ) ;
405 }
406
407
408 void bcNullComputation (void ) {
409 i n t 3 2 t index = bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index ;
410 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index = −index ;
411 bcIdleComputation ( ) ;
412 }
413
414
415 void bcIdleComputation (void ) {
416 while ( t rue ) {
417 }
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418 }
C.2 The C code of the flow node
1 /∗
2 ∗ F i l e : bcgen . h o f f l ow node .
3 ∗/
4
5 #ifndef BCGEN H
6 #define BCGEN H
7
8 #include <bcport . h>
9 #include <bc . h>
10
11 /∗
12 ∗ Define the t i c k ra t e f o r the ISR
13 ∗/
14 #define BCGEN TICK HZ 1000
15
16 /∗
17 ∗ Define BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED to inc l ude code f o r use
18 ∗ o f s o f t t imers
19 ∗/
20 #define BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED
21
22
23 /∗
24 ∗ Define BCGEN CAN REQUIRED to inc l ude code f o r communication
25 ∗ between proce s s e s e i t h e r v ia CAN or l o c a l l y
26 ∗/
27 #define BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
28
29
30
31 /∗
32 ∗ Define BCGEN DEBRUIJN to choose f a s t i t e r a t i o n through marked
p l a c e s in the
33 ∗ main loop in the ISR
34 ∗/
35 #define BCGEN DEBRUIJN
36
37
38 /∗ Must d e f i n e one o f BCGEN SCHEDULE ROUND ROBIN or
BCGEN SCHEDULE FIXED PRIORITY
39 ∗ or BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE or BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID
40 ∗/
41 #define BCGEN SCHEDULE ROUND ROBIN
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42
43 #i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE) | |
de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID)
44 void bcCoroutine (void ) ;
45 bool bcPrimaryCoopCall (void ) ;
46 bool bcSecondaryCoopCall (void ) ;
47 #endif
48
49 enum {
50 BCGEN N NETS = 2 ,
51 BCGEN N PLACES = 4 ,
52 BCGEN N PLACE WORDS = 1 ,
53 BCGEN N TIMERS = 1 ,
54 BCGEN N PORTS = 1 ,
55 BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS = 1 ,
56 BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET = 7 ,
57 BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET = 3 ,
58 BCGEN N STACK WORDS = 40
59 } ;
60
61 typedef bcPortWord t bcGenPlaceSet t [BCGEN N PLACE WORDS ] ;
62
63 /∗
64 ∗ The index f i e l d in bcGenTrans i t ion t be low has a v a r i e t y o f
uses .
65 ∗ I t depends on the a t t r i b u t e type and i s s e t as f o l l o w s :
66 ∗
67 ∗ BC TICK − index shou ld be 0 ; ignored
68 ∗ BC IDLE − index shou ld be 0 ; ignored
69 ∗ BCCOMP − index shou ld be index o f the NCB tha t owns t h i s
computation
70 ∗ BC DELAY − index shou ld be index o f the s o f t t imer t r a c k i n g
t h i s de l ay
71 ∗ BCGUARD − index shou ld be index o f the NCB tha t owns t h i s guard
72 ∗ BC SEND − index shou ld be ( ( message id << i d o f f s e t ) |
(message l en << l e n o f f s e t ) | pcb id )
73 ∗ BC RECV − index shou ld be as f o r BC SEND
74 ∗
75 ∗
76 ∗ a t t r i b u t e shou ld be s e t as de f i ned in bc . h
77 ∗/
78 typedef struct bcGenTransit ion {
79 bcAttr ibuteType t type ;
80 u i n t 3 2 t index ;
81 bcGenPlaceSet t vu lne rab l e ;
82 bcAt t r i bu t e t a t t r i b u t e ;
83 bcGenPlaceSet t t a r g e t ;
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84 } bcGenTrans i t ion t ;
85
86
87 extern bcNCB t volat i le bcGenNCB [BCGEN N NETS ] ;
88 extern bcNCB t volat i le ∗ volat i le bcGenCurrentNCBPtr ;
89 extern bcTimer t volat i le bcGenTimers [BCGEN N TIMERS ] ;
90 extern bcPCB t bcGenPCB [BCGEN N PORTS ] ;
91 extern bcGenPlaceSet t bcGenMarked ;
92 extern bcGenTrans i t ion t const bcGenTransit ions [BCGEN N PLACES ] ;
93
94 void bcGenStackInit (void ) ;
95 u i n t 3 2 t ∗ bcGenComputationInit ( u i n t 3 2 t net , bcComputation t comp) ;
96
97 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ User procedure and func t i on pro t o t ype s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
98
99 void bcGenCompT2(void ) ;
100
101 #endif
1 /∗
2 ∗ F i l e : bcgen . c o f f l ow node .
3 ∗/
4
5 #include <s t d i n t . h>
6 #include <bc . h>
7 #include <bcport . h>
8 #include <bcgen . h>
9 #include <user . h>
10
11 stat ic void computationDone (void ) ;
12
13 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t s tack [BCGEN N STACK WORDS ] ;
14 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t const stackBaseIndex [BCGEN N NETS] = {39 , 19} ;
15
16 bcNCB t volat i le bcGenNCB [BCGEN N NETS] = {
17 {( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) 0 , 0 , ( bcResu l t t ) 0} ,
18 {( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) 0 , 0 , ( bcResu l t t ) 0}
19 } ;
20
21 bcNCB t volat i le ∗ volat i le bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ;
22 bcPortWord t bcGenMarked [BCGEN N PLACE WORDS] = {
23 0x0000000CU
24 } ;
25
26 bcGenTrans i t ion t const bcGenTransit ions [BCGEN N PLACES] = {
27 {BC IDLE , 0 , {0x00000000U } , ( b cAt t r i bu t e t ) bcIdleComputation ,
{0x00000000U }} ,
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28 {BC SEND, ( u i n t 3 2 t ) ( (0 << BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET) | ( s izeof ( fFlow )
<< BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET) | 0) , {0x00000000U } ,
( b cAt t r i bu t e t )&fFlow , {0x00000000U }} ,
29 {BC COMP, 1 , {0x00000000U } , ( b cAt t r i bu t e t )bcGenCompT2 ,
{0x00000002U }} ,
30 {BC DELAY, 0 , {0x00000006U } , ( b cAt t r i bu t e t ) 10 , {0x0000000CU}}
31 } ;
32
33 bcTimer t volat i le bcGenTimers [BCGEN N TIMERS] = {
34 {0U, 0U}
35 } ;
36
37 bcPCB t bcGenPCB [BCGEN N PORTS] = {
38 {0U, {0U, 0U, 0U, 0U}}
39 } ;
40
41 void bcGenStackInit (void ) {
42 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
43
44 for ( i =0; i<BCGEN N NETS; i +=1) {
45 i f ( i > 0) {
46 /∗ Put some s t a c k markers in to he l p debugg ing ∗/
47 stack [ stackBaseIndex [ i ]+1] = 0xFEEDFACE;
48 }
49 bcGenNCB [ i ] . ptos =
50 bcPortComputationInit(&stack [ stackBaseIndex [ i ] ] ,
51 bcIdleComputation ) ;
52 }
53 stack [ 0 ] = 0xFEEDFACE;
54 }
55
56 u i n t 3 2 t ∗ bcGenComputationInit ( u i n t 3 2 t net , bcComputation t
comp) {
57 return bcPortComputationInit(&stack [ stackBaseIndex [ net ] ] , comp) ;
58 }
59
60 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ User procedure c a l l s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
61
62 void bcGenCompT2(void ) {
63 readSensor ( ) ;
64 computationDone ( ) ;
65 }
66
67 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ Local f unc t i on s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
68
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69 stat ic void computationDone (void ) {
70 i n t 3 2 t index = bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index ;
71
72 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index = −index ;
73 #i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE) | |
de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID)
74 i f ( bcPrimaryCoopCall ( ) ) {
75 bcCoroutine ( ) ;
76 }
77 else i f ( bcSecondaryCoopCall ( ) ) {
78 return ;
79 }
80 #endif
81 bcIdleComputation ( ) ;
82 }
C.3 The C code of the valve node
1 /∗
2 ∗ F i l e : bcgen . h o f v a l v e node .
3 ∗/
4
5 #ifndef BCGEN H
6 #define BCGEN H
7
8 #include <bcport . h>
9 #include <bc . h>
10
11 /∗
12 ∗ Define the t i c k ra t e f o r the ISR
13 ∗/
14 #define BCGEN TICK HZ 1000
15
16 /∗
17 ∗ Define BCGEN TIMERS REQUIRED to inc l ude code f o r use
18 ∗ o f s o f t t imers
19 ∗/
20
21 /∗
22 ∗ Define BCGEN CAN REQUIRED to inc l ude code f o r communication
23 ∗ between proce s s e s e i t h e r v ia CAN or l o c a l l y
24 ∗/
25 #define BCGEN CAN REQUIRED
26
27
28
29 /∗
C. C source Code 196
30 ∗ Define BCGEN DEBRUIJN to choose f a s t i t e r a t i o n through marked
p l a c e s in the
31 ∗ main loop in the ISR
32 ∗/
33 #define BCGEN DEBRUIJN
34
35
36 /∗ Must d e f i n e one o f BCGEN SCHEDULE ROUND ROBIN or
BCGEN SCHEDULE FIXED PRIORITY
37 ∗ or BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE or BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID
38 ∗/
39 #define BCGEN SCHEDULE ROUND ROBIN
40
41 #i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE) | |
de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID)
42 void bcCoroutine (void ) ;
43 bool bcPrimaryCoopCall (void ) ;
44 bool bcSecondaryCoopCall (void ) ;
45 #endif
46
47 enum {
48 BCGEN N NETS = 2 ,
49 BCGEN N PLACES = 3 ,
50 BCGEN N PLACE WORDS = 1 ,
51 BCGEN N PORTS = 1 ,
52 BCGEN N EXTERNAL PORTS = 1 ,
53 BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET = 7 ,
54 BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET = 3 ,
55 BCGEN N STACK WORDS = 40
56 } ;
57
58 typedef bcPortWord t bcGenPlaceSet t [BCGEN N PLACE WORDS ] ;
59
60 /∗
61 ∗ The index f i e l d in bcGenTrans i t ion t be low has a v a r i e t y o f
uses .
62 ∗ I t depends on the a t t r i b u t e type and i s s e t as f o l l o w s :
63 ∗
64 ∗ BC TICK − index shou ld be 0 ; ignored
65 ∗ BC IDLE − index shou ld be 0 ; ignored
66 ∗ BCCOMP − index shou ld be index o f the NCB tha t owns t h i s
computation
67 ∗ BC DELAY − index shou ld be index o f the s o f t t imer t r a c k i n g
t h i s de l ay
68 ∗ BCGUARD − index shou ld be index o f the NCB tha t owns t h i s guard
69 ∗ BC SEND − index shou ld be ( ( message id << i d o f f s e t ) |
(message l en << l e n o f f s e t ) | pcb id )
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70 ∗ BC RECV − index shou ld be as f o r BC SEND
71 ∗
72 ∗
73 ∗ a t t r i b u t e shou ld be s e t as de f i ned in bc . h
74 ∗/
75 typedef struct bcGenTransit ion {
76 bcAttr ibuteType t type ;
77 u i n t 3 2 t index ;
78 bcGenPlaceSet t vu lne rab l e ;
79 bcAt t r i bu t e t a t t r i b u t e ;
80 bcGenPlaceSet t t a r g e t ;
81 } bcGenTrans i t ion t ;
82
83
84 extern bcNCB t volat i le bcGenNCB [BCGEN N NETS ] ;
85 extern bcNCB t volat i le ∗ volat i le bcGenCurrentNCBPtr ;
86 extern bcPCB t bcGenPCB [BCGEN N PORTS ] ;
87 extern bcGenPlaceSet t bcGenMarked ;
88 extern bcGenTrans i t ion t const bcGenTransit ions [BCGEN N PLACES ] ;
89
90 void bcGenStackInit (void ) ;
91 u i n t 3 2 t ∗ bcGenComputationInit ( u i n t 3 2 t net , bcComputation t comp) ;
92
93 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ User procedure and func t i on pro t o t ype s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
94
95 void bcGenCompT2(void ) ;
96
97 #endif
1 /∗
2 ∗ F i l e : bcgen . c o f v a l v e node .
3 ∗/
4
5 #include <s t d i n t . h>
6 #include <bc . h>
7 #include <bcport . h>
8 #include <bcgen . h>
9 #include <user . h>
10
11 stat ic void computationDone (void ) ;
12
13 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t s tack [BCGEN N STACK WORDS ] ;
14 stat ic u i n t 3 2 t const stackBaseIndex [BCGEN N NETS] = {39 , 19} ;
15
16 bcNCB t volat i le bcGenNCB [BCGEN N NETS] = {
17 {( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) 0 , 0 , ( bcResu l t t ) 0} ,
18 {( u i n t 3 2 t ∗) 0 , 0 , ( bcResu l t t ) 0}
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19 } ;
20
21 bcNCB t volat i le ∗ volat i le bcGenCurrentNCBPtr = &bcGenNCB [ 0 ] ;
22 bcPortWord t bcGenMarked [BCGEN N PLACE WORDS] = {
23 0x00000002U
24 } ;
25
26 bcGenTrans i t ion t const bcGenTransit ions [BCGEN N PLACES] = {
27 {BC IDLE , 0 , {0x00000000U } , ( b cAt t r i bu t e t ) bcIdleComputation ,
{0x00000000U }} ,
28 {BC RECV, ( u i n t 3 2 t ) ( (0 << BCGEN MSG ID OFFSET) | ( s izeof ( vFlow )
<< BCGEN MSG LEN OFFSET) | 0) , {0x00000000U } ,
( b cAt t r i bu t e t )&vFlow , {0x00000004U }} ,
29 {BC COMP, 1 , {0x00000000U } , ( b cAt t r i bu t e t )bcGenCompT2 ,
{0x00000002U}}
30 } ;
31
32 bcPCB t bcGenPCB [BCGEN N PORTS] = {
33 {0U, {0U, 0U, 0U, 0U}}
34 } ;
35
36 void bcGenStackInit (void ) {
37 u i n t 3 2 t i ;
38
39 for ( i =0; i<BCGEN N NETS; i +=1) {
40 i f ( i > 0) {
41 /∗ Put some s t a c k markers in to he l p debugg ing ∗/
42 stack [ stackBaseIndex [ i ]+1] = 0xFEEDFACE;
43 }
44 bcGenNCB [ i ] . ptos =
45 bcPortComputationInit(&stack [ stackBaseIndex [ i ] ] ,
46 bcIdleComputation ) ;
47 }
48 stack [ 0 ] = 0xFEEDFACE;
49 }
50
51 u i n t 3 2 t ∗ bcGenComputationInit ( u i n t 3 2 t net , bcComputation t
comp) {
52 return bcPortComputationInit(&stack [ stackBaseIndex [ net ] ] , comp) ;
53 }
54
55 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ User procedure c a l l s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
56
57 void bcGenCompT2(void ) {
58 adjustValve ( ) ;
59 computationDone ( ) ;
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60 }
61
62 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ Local f unc t i on s
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
63
64 stat ic void computationDone (void ) {
65 i n t 3 2 t index = bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index ;
66
67 bcGenCurrentNCBPtr−>index = −index ;
68 #i f de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE COOPERATIVE) | |
de f ined (BCGEN SCHEDULE HYBRID)
69 i f ( bcPrimaryCoopCall ( ) ) {
70 bcCoroutine ( ) ;
71 }
72 else i f ( bcSecondaryCoopCall ( ) ) {
73 return ;
74 }
75 #endif
76 bcIdleComputation ( ) ;
77 }
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